Introduction: The Lord Bishop of Wakefield

Stephen George, Lord Bishop of Wakefield, was introduced and took the oath, supported by the Bishop of Southwark and the Bishop of Norwich.

Stem Cell Research
	 — 
	Question

Lord Dubs: To ask Her Majesty's Government what support they are giving, directly or indirectly, to stem cell research.

Lord Drayson: My Lords, stem cell research is a strategic priority for UK public funding. Funding for all forms of stem cell research has doubled from about £30 million in 2005-06 to more than £60 million in 2007-08. Support comes from the research councils, regional development agencies, the Department of Health and devolved Administrations, and from investments to catalyse business innovation by the Technology Strategy Board. The Government also provide indirect support in the form of infrastructure costs and public engagement.

Lord Dubs: My Lords, I welcome the Government's commitment to stem cell research. Is my noble friend aware that last month some leading scientists in stem cell research dealing with multiple sclerosis met in London? They felt that Britain had made great progress but that we would lose the advantages we had gained if we did not allocate some of the stem cell research money to multiple sclerosis. Will my noble friend consider that as a possible way forward?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, I was not aware of the meeting to which my noble friend alludes but I am grateful to him for raising it. Stem cell research has huge potential to address some of the most debilitating and awful conditions that face people. However, the science is challenging and decisions about the allocation of funding on stem cell research, like all forms of government scientific research funding, are made through the peer review process under the Haldane principle where Ministers do not interfere in judgments about which projects to support. However, we recognise that the leadership that the UK has achieved in stem cell research, in part through the excellent regulatory framework which this House has contributed to form, is one in which we need to continue to invest.

Lord Alton of Liverpool: My Lords, given that we have now destroyed or experimented on more than 2 million human embryos and last year permitted the creation of animal-human hybrid embryos, is not this an opportunity for the House to reflect on the difference in achievements of adult stem cells compared with embryonic stem cells? Is it not the case that there are more than 80 treatments worldwide and 300 clinical trials using adult stem cells and yet this country collects less than 0.2 per cent of stem-cell rich blood cord compared with 20 per cent in Greece, 18 per cent in Spain and 12 per cent in Portugal? Is this not something that we should be putting our resources into?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is aware, we have debated at length the balance of research funding against the different areas of stem cell research. We believe that this is a fast-moving field of research whereby we have to maintain investment in all forms of stem cells—adult, embryonic, induced and pluripotent—and that that requires us to be open minded about the pace at which development can take place in them all. We have to recognise that the field of adult stem cell research has been in existence since the 1950s whereas embryonic research has been with us only since the 1990s. It is therefore too early to judge whether that field has a full potential to be realised. The noble Lord's point about the collection of blood from human cords is a fair one, which I shall look into further.

Baroness Sharp of Guildford: My Lords, the Minister referred to the significant lead that the UK had in stem cell research. How far does he think that that, and in particular the recruitment and retention of scientists, might be under threat as a result of the rather more liberal attitude taken by the Obama Government towards such research?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, the noble Baroness is absolutely right that the change in attitude in the United States towards stem cell research presents both a threat and an opportunity to the United Kingdom. Because of the approach that we have adopted, with a combination of investment in research, world-class science and the regulatory framework that our Parliament has provided, the United Kingdom has the world lead in that area.
	The fact that the United States has now recognised the full potential means that we have to continue to invest. We also need to explore collaborations with the United States; for example, to build on the existing memorandum of research understanding that we have with the state of California and develop that into collaborations with the whole of the United States. We are actively pursuing that.

Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, I welcome what the noble Lord said about paying attention to the Haldane principle, which seems to me as true now as when it was first propounded. Notwithstanding that arm's length relationship, can the noble Lord assure us that, when grants are given for stem cell research—or, indeed, for any other very high-technology research—every opportunity and encouragement are given to the researchers to talk broadly and publicly about their research so as to gain public support for what they do?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right that, alongside the other areas of strength that I have mentioned in this field, the very fact that we, in this country, are developing the ability to discuss the most challenging ethical issues that some branches of science raise for us gives us the confidence to be able to move forward with the appropriate legislation that maintains public confidence. Therefore, we are encouraging scientists to do that by reflecting on how scientific research is judged, through the new research excellence framework, taking into account their engagement in public debate for their science.

The Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham: My Lords, does the Minister agree that it is less than helpful if not, indeed, cruel to raise false hopes in many desperately ill people? Does he further agree that the success of adult stem cell research, all evidence-based, would suggest a tipping of the balance of investment towards adult stem cell research?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, the right reverend Prelate raises an important point because we need to balance, on the one hand, the amazing potential of this science to transform lives—the tracheal replacement that we heard about recently was a good example—with, on the other, the fact that many areas of that research are 15 or more years away from being applied to the clinic. Therefore, these matters need to be kept in balance. It is the responsibility of the scientific community to avoid hype when talking about the potential of their science. We take that very seriously within Government.
	As I have already mentioned, we see a balance of research funding at the moment that is approximately 50:50 between adult and embryonic research. The balance is a judgment for the scientific communities, not for Ministers. Through the peer-review process and the excellence of science, we have the structures to get that balance right.

Lord Ashley of Stoke: My Lords, I am not quite clear from the Minister's answers whether we will have more money from the Government, or whether the Government will have a hands-off attitude? Which is it to be?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, the Government are absolutely clear that we need to maintain our investment in science. We have more than doubled the science budget and, within that, over the past few years we have seen our research budget allocated to stem cell research more than double. While investing in the underpinning components that maintain Britain's excellence in science, it is not for Ministers to judge which science is backed. That is for the research community itself under the long established peer review process.

Transport: Road and Rail Accidents
	 — 
	Question

Lord Lee of Trafford: To ask Her Majesty's Government what guidance is given to the police and transport authorities on the reopening of routes after road and rail accidents.

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, incident management is an operational matter for the emergency services and transport authorities. Restoring transport services is important to everyone, but the priorities must be to preserve life and public safety, to deal sensitively with any fatalities, and to collect evidence. The Government do not issue operational guidance, but we encourage emergency services and transport authorities to work together on how to deal with accidents and minimise disruption.

Lord Lee of Trafford: My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord to the Dispatch Box for the first time.
	In an accident, no one objects to traffic being held up to rescue the injured. However, where there is a clear fatality—say a suicide on the railways, however tragic that may be in personal terms—should not the emphasis be on restarting traffic to enable those affected to continue their travel and their lives, as it were, rather than having a lengthy and laborious scene-of-crime investigation?

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: Life is full of surprises, my Lords. I thank the noble Lord very much for his kind words.
	I have great sympathy with the point that the noble Lord makes. The British Transport Police, which is primarily responsible for dealing with the sort of incident on the railway to which he refers, has a remarkably good record in getting lines open again. It has a target of 90 minutes; last year it exceeded that and achieved a reopening time of 76 minutes, and I am told that it hopes to do better again this year.
	The police have to be absolutely certain that no crime has been committed before they can reopen the roads, and have to work with the other emergency services. It is important, particularly in the hours of darkness, that evidence is not lost because of a too hasty opening of the operation. If it is possible to improve co-ordination between the emergency services, we should look at that, and we can always do better.

Lord Rosser: My Lords, last year not a single passenger or workforce fatality was caused by a train accident, for the third time in the last four years. Can my noble friend—I, too, congratulate him on his well merited appointment—tell the House why, when deaths occur regularly on our roads, there appears to be no equivalent independent investigation to that which would follow a train accident death to see what lessons can be learnt and what remedial action can be taken to avoid a recurrence? Is it not in the interests of safety that we put an end to the culture that road deaths are somehow an inevitable aspect of that form of transport?

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, I have great sympathy with the point of view expressed by my noble friend. He is absolutely right: as a country, we accept all too unthinkingly the 3,000 deaths a year that occur on our roads, but when an incident occurs on our railway—it would obviously be a much higher profile incident—there is enormous media attention. The emphasis must be on reducing the number of road casualties and getting the country much less used to believing that it is acceptable to kill and injure the number of people who currently suffer from road accidents.

Lord Berkeley: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, when it comes to a railway accident, there are at least four organisations involved—the local police, British Transport Police, the Health and Safety Executive, now part of the Office of Rail Regulation, and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch—all of them looking for evidence. Does he not agree that there would be a lot of benefit in rationalising the roles of some of those organisations so that the work was done more quickly? Is he aware that there was a suspected fatality between Didcot and Reading recently, where a man was seen lying beside the track and trains were delayed for many hours? It turned out that the man was asleep and drunk and then just walked away.

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, I can correct my noble friend on the incident he refers to. It occurred on 20 May alongside the track at Pangbourne. A gentleman had, indeed, had too much drink at lunchtime and lay down to sleep alongside the line. The driver of a passing train thought that he had seen a body and quite rightly the line was closed and the police investigated. As the police arrived, he got up and staggered away. On that occasion, the line was reopened, not many hours later, as my noble friend said, but 45 minutes later. But I accept his point that there were 3,000 minutes of delay to other trains. The police acted expeditiously and it is important that we encourage them to do so in such cases. As far as co-ordination between the various bodies is concerned, it is important that the blue-light services, the county police and the other forces are brought in and work together in as co-operative a manner as possible.

Earl Attlee: My Lords, may I join in welcoming the Minister to the world of the Whips' Offices? The Minister will be aware of the availability of laser surveying equipment for road traffic accidents. Is he convinced that the police have enough of it and what requirements do the Home Office and the Department for Transport impose on the police in this regard?

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his welcome, and I hope there will be other occasions when we shall be exchanging ideas across the Dispatch Box. I have been extraordinarily well briefed for this Question, and I asked some further questions of the department over the weekend and again this morning. I have to confess, however, that the question that he has raised is not in the briefing, so I hope he will permit me on this occasion to write to him with the answer.

Baroness Scott of Needham Market: My Lords, it is quite often the case that the British Transport Police is not the first force to arrive on the site of a fatality. Can the noble Lord say why it is that the local police forces take so much longer than the British Transport Police to get the line working again and what is being done to make sure that the techniques they use are spread to local police forces?

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a good point. The force which has the real expertise for dealing with the railway is the British Transport Police. The record that it has achieved over recent years under Chief Constable Sir Ian Johnston, who is about to retire, has been remarkable. It is always preferable if it is able to get to an incident on the railway before the county police, but it has no priority and it is required to work together with the county force. Whether it is necessary for us to be talking to both organisations to see whether greater co-operation can be achieved is something I would like to go away and think about.

Parliament Act 1911
	 — 
	Question

Lord McNally: To ask Her Majesty's Government what plans they have to celebrate the centenary of the Parliament Act completing its passage in the House of Lords on 10 August 1911.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, at present the Government have made no plans to celebrate the centenary.

Lord McNally: My Lords, may I first take this opportunity to congratulate the noble Baroness on her appointment as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster? The noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, will already have told her that it is the highest office that any reasonable politician can hope for. Did she notice yesterday the Pauline conversion announced in the Observer of Mr Jack Straw to a wholly elected Senate to replace this House, which brings him into line with the official policy of the Conservative Party, so eloquently expressed on these Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde? Does this not mean, given my party's 100-year commitment to such reform, that we are very close to moving quickly after the next election to House of Lords reform and to celebrating the centenary by passing another parliamentary reform Act?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I very much look forward to visiting Lancashire. In relation to Lords reform, my right honourable friend the Justice Secretary said yesterday in a newspaper that we are committing to bringing forward draft legislation and trying to get it through before the next election, but, if that is not possible, to having it fully in place shortly before the next election. I am sure that that is what all parties will be working towards.

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, if the Government reconsider their plans on whether to celebrate the passing of the Parliament Act, will they consider publicising one of its most important provisions, namely that this House still holds an absolute veto on extending the life of a Parliament? Can the noble Baroness confirm that this Government have absolutely no intention of asking the House to extend this Parliament?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, tempting though that might be, I can confirm that the Government have no intention to do that.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, does the noble Baroness recollect that the preamble to the 1911 Act says that,
	"whereas it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a second chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis ... such substitution cannot immediately be brought into operation"?
	Since it took Parliament some 80 years to overcome the first of those obstacles, albeit only in part, would it be right to look on the final solution as something that exists less on the plane of time than on that of eternity?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I think that the Benches to my left are much better equipped to talk about eternity than I am. However, this Government should be congratulated on bringing forward the first very important stage of reform in 88 years.

Lord Howarth of Newport: My Lords, will my noble friend resist any temptation to Schadenfreude as she contemplates the fact that, barely more than 10 years after the Liberals forced through the Parliament Act 1911, they had become extinct as a party of government? Is not the lesson of the past 100 years that grand designs to impose constitutional reform usually prove to be the political graveyard of their proponents and that the Prime Minister is wise to insist that constitutional reform should be a bottom-up process, expressing—in due course—the considered wishes of the people?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I have no shivers down my spine because I am confident that, yes, we are engaged in a bottom-up process, but I am also confident that any legislation that the Government bring forward will build on the consensus that we already have across all three parties.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, I have always believed that we would achieve a fully or mainly elected House by the centenary of the Parliament Act. The trouble in the past few years has been over the question: which Parliament Act, 1911 or 1949? Do the Government recognise, in response to the previous intervention, that nothing will happen if they insist on consensus before taking action?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, it is very important that we have come as far as we have on the basis of consensus. Of course, the best way is to move forward expanding on the consensus that we already have.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, would the noble Baroness be good enough to consider with great suspicion any suggestions on these matters made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally? Does she realise that, although she talks about consensus, there does not seem to be any? Instead, is not all the brouhaha going on at the other end of the Palace of Westminster a good cause to celebrate the existence of your Lordships' House, with or without—preferably without—the 1911 Act?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I do indeed celebrate the existence of this House; I celebrate day by day the excellent work that we all do in this House. I wish that more people would take note of that excellent work, which is done on all Benches in this House.

Lord Barnett: My Lords, I note the views of the noble Lords, Lord McNally and Lord Strathclyde, as well as those of my noble friend, but will she note the fact that the views of the three Front Benches bear no relation to those of the Back Benches?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing that to my attention.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that some of us—we may be constitutional anachronisms—believe that there should be at least a partially elected second Chamber?

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I do indeed recognise that and I would never think of the noble Earl as an anachronism.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: My Lords, are the Government not putting the cart before the horse? Would it not be more sensible first to retrieve our democracy from Brussels, where the majority of our national law is now made? We should then organise the Select Committee procedure in the House of Commons to hold the Executive to account. Having done that, we should decide whether we want a second Chamber, how it should be composed and what its powers should be.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I do not think that the Government are putting the cart before the horse at all, as the noble Lord puts it. We have an excellent relationship with the European Union; it is a relationship of partnership. The House of Commons is considering how it organises its Select Committees, which is entirely a matter for the other place, but I am confident that that is what it is doing. One of the next great reforms should be the reform of the House of Lords.

European Parliament: Expatriate Candidates
	 — 
	Question

Lord Dykes: To ask Her Majesty's Government what conclusions they draw from the growing involvement of British expatriate candidates in the European Parliament elections on 7 June in other European Union member states.

Lord Bach: My Lords, the Government welcome the fact that UK nationals and the nationals of other EU member countries actively exerted their rights under the Council directive of 6 December 1993 to vote and stand as candidates in other member states at the recent European Parliament elections and are actively participating in public life in their adopted country.

Lord Dykes: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. Was it not gratifying to see the growing diaspora of people not only in general, but as candidates and political activists mainly in Spain, France, Italy and Germany, but in other countries too, where the British diaspora resides not only presumably as patriotic British citizens but as enthusiastic citizens of the European Union? That was decided by the then Conservative Government under the Maastricht treaty, in sad contrast to the antics of the Conservative Party which is now joining up with extreme right wing neo-cons of a peculiar bent in some countries, who are unable to join any consensus in the European Parliament for future progress.

Lord Bach: My Lords, the noble Lord's last point is truly astonishing. His earlier point is also interesting. At least five people from other EU states, who are resident in Britain, stood in the British elections to the European Parliament. The wonderful, delightful irony is that the only one who was successful belonged to the United Kingdom Independence Party.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: My Lords, in that case I take it that the Government welcome the election of the EU's former chief accountant, Marta Andreasen, to the European Parliament. I shall repeat a question that I asked on Thursday 18 June, which was not answered at the time. Has the Minister read her new book, Brussels Laid Bare?If so, does he believe that that book will do anything to endear the project of European integration to the British people?

Lord Bach: My Lords, I am afraid that I have not had the opportunity of reading the lady's book, but I plan to take it on holiday with me to Portugal. Whether I will get round to it, I am not sure.

Lord Henley: My Lords, the noble Lord has been asked what conclusions the Government have drawn from the growing involvement of British expatriates and others in the European elections. What conclusions have they drawn from their own dire performance in those elections, and will they bring on a general election?

Lord Bach: My Lords, our performance was not good, but that of the noble Lord's party, at 27 per cent, was not a result of which they can be very proud. It comforts me slightly that in 1999 the Conservatives got a full 7 per cent more than that—34 per cent. Two years later they were well beaten in a general election, and in 2004 they got 26.7 per cent. Less than a year after that, they were thrashed again.

Lord Alton of Liverpool: My Lords, would the Minister comment on the decline in turnout right across Europe? Should we not be worried by the alienation of voters and the growth of fringe parties such as the British National Party, which gained the seat in my own North West region? In that context, will he look again at the closed party list system, which does not involve people at all in elections? When it was first introduced, we were promised that it would be reviewed as a matter of course. That has never happened.

Lord Bach: My Lords, I know that there is strong feeling around the House about the system that we are bound to employ in the European elections. I share the noble Lord's view that the turnout was depressing; not just in the United Kingdom but in Europe too. The decrease of only 2 percentage points across Europe since the last ones was the smallest ever, but that is hardly a very strong argument. As the European Parliament continues to establish itself in the EU institutional structures, and as it has an increasing say in European-level legislation, we hope we will see a reverse in this trend in the future and we will continue to work on it.

Lord Waddington: My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that the lack of enthusiasm throughout Europe for the elections to the European Parliament is a good reason for our lobbying hard for the abolition of direct elections to the European Parliament? We would thereby save ourselves a mint of money, and reinforce the fact that the bureaucracy in Brussels is accountable to the elected representatives of the member countries throughout Europe.

Lord Bach: My Lords, I do not agree. Of course, the turnout is much too low, but I would remind the noble Lord that the European electorate is the largest in the world, with a population of just under 500 million. An eligible electorate of 375 million, directly electing their MEPs, makes it the second largest democratic electorate in the world, after India. I am proud to be in the Government who support the elections that have just taken place and who support the European Union.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, do the Government have accurate figures for the number of British citizens now resident—living, working, studying or retired—in other EU countries? I understand that it is somewhere between 3 million and 5 million. Does that not increase the incentive for Her Majesty's Government to co-operate with other European Union Governments, on, for example, police, health services and access to other services—unlike the Conservative Party in what it is really prepared to accept?

Lord Bach: My Lords, I am not sure what the figures are. I thought they were not quite as high as the noble Lord mentions, but they are clearly in the millions—more than 2 million, as I understand it. One of the great things about today's times is that British Citizens can go and live in EU countries, take part in democratic life there, if they want to, and, likewise, EU citizens can come to this country and take part in civic life too.

Arrangement of Business
	 — 
	Announcement

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, it may have come to your Lordships' attention that the other place will be electing a new Speaker today. It may therefore be of interest to the House if I set out the proposed arrangements for the Royal Commission that will be held for the approbation of the new Speaker.
	The precise timing of the Royal Commission is, of course, at this stage uncertain, and depends on how the election proceeds in the other place. I can advise the House of the following. In the event that a decision is reached in the other place after the first ballot, the Royal Commission will be held later this afternoon, at a time to be notified to the House. If the other place has completed the election of a new Speaker by our expected rising time, around 10 pm, the Royal Commission will take place tonight, either immediately after business or after an adjournment of the House. In this event, the time for the Royal Commission will be displayed on the annunciators. If, however, the other place is still in the process of electing a new Speaker when this House rises, at around 10 pm, the House will resume at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning for prayers, followed by the Royal Commission. The House would then be adjourned again until 2.30 pm for Oral Questions. This would be indicated on the annunciators tomorrow morning.
	I am sure that the whole House will join with me in wishing the other place well in its important business today.

Autism Bill
	 — 
	First Reading

The Bill was brought from the Commons, read a first time and ordered to be printed.

Policing and Crime Bill

Bill Main Page
	Copy of the Bill
	Explanatory Notes
	Amendments
	10th Report from JCHR
	15th Report from JCHR
	9th Report from DPC

Committee (1st Day)

Clause 1 : Duty of police authorities in relation to public accountability
	Amendment 1
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	1: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
	"( ) In section 6 of the Police Act 1996 (c. 16) (general functions of police authorities) after subsection (2) insert—
	"(2A) Every police authority must make arrangements to obtain the views of children and young people in their area about policing in that area.""

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I declare an interest at the start as a former chair of the North Yorkshire Police Authority and as a former deputy chair and now vice-president of the Association of Police Authorities, as well as having other police authority roles over a 25-year period.
	Clause 1 inserts into the Police Act 1996 a requirement for police authorities, when discharging any of their functions, to have regard to the views of the public concerning policing. This duty is intended to complement the duty of police authorities under Section 96 of the Police Act 1996, again, to obtain the views of the public concerning policing. The Standing Committee for Youth Justice, to which I am indebted for its amendment, is concerned about how this proposal may impact on children and young people. The Children's Commissioner for England has referred to a widely held fear of children within our society and to the negative portrayal of young people in the media. Children and young people are too often portrayed solely as perpetrators of crime, and the latest concluding observations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, published in October 2008, note the very negative coverage on youth issues and recommend that the UK Government,
	"take urgent measures to address the intolerance and inappropriate characterisation of children, especially adolescents, within society, including the media".
	Negative media and the raft of legislative measures to deal with youth crime and anti-social behaviour have created a climate in society where any children's activity may be seen as anti-social. For example, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice is aware of a number of cases in which complaints about anti-social behaviour have turned out to be about young people playing football in the park. In this context, there is a significant risk that public opinion based on negative stereotypes of young people, as distinct from informed public judgment, could result in policing priorities that are skewed against the interests of this group. This could seriously undermine the approach of existing multi-agency partnerships, both within and without the criminal justice sector, to tackling youth crime. The Government's recent youth crime action plan, the YCAP, recognised the high incidence of children and young people as victims of crime, and this must also be reflected in these provisions.
	Evidence submitted to the Good Childhood Inquiry, commissioned by the Children's Society, illustrated that children and young people have strong views about crime and anti-social behaviour in their local communities. An 11 year-old boy said, "When I go out and I see so many teenagers swearing and littering, it makes me ask myself if the Government realise what goes on". To this end, I believe that it is vital that consideration is given to the question of how police will ensure that they obtain the views of children and young people. In the past, many crime and disorder partnerships failed to take into account the views of children and young people in their planning processes. Children and young people are important members of the community and their views and ideas can make a positive contribution to improving community safety. I ask the Minister how the police will canvass public opinion about what policing should focus on and, specifically, how this will include the views of children and young people. I beg to move.

Baroness Hanham: It may be convenient if I speak to Amendment 2 now so that we can debate the whole group together. Before I do so, and because it will be relevant during the course of the Bill, though not necessarily on this aspect of it, I declare two interests—one as a sitting magistrate in both the adult and family courts, the second as an elected member of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, which will be relevant when local government issues become pertinent to the discussion.
	The matters raised by the noble Baroness have shown how important it is to ensure that there is increased public involvement at all levels of local policing, and that this is done in a sensible way. We agree strongly that the police must become more accountable to the public—our policies on police reform, which I will not go into today, go much further than this modest amendment.
	The danger with adding "just one more" matter that a police authority must have regard to is that there is no clarification of how the new matter will interact with the existing priorities, and what will actually change. Will the police authority continue much as before, but now take note of when an initiative is particularly popular or unpopular? Or will it seek to integrate a concern for public views into policing priorities?
	In a very helpful brief that the Minister sent to me, for which I thank him very much, he says that Section 96 duties require police authorities to obtain information for consultation, but that, except when drawing up their priorities, they are not required to do anything with the information. That is clearly the reason why these amendments on consultation have been tabled. The new duty means that police authorities must consider information whenever they exercise their functions, which will ensure that the views of the public are a core part of any and all work that the police authority does. That is a direct lift from what the Minister said to me, and clearly underscores the reason why these amendments on consultation have been tabled.
	Local communities have a valuable contribution to make to effective policing and we do not want to see the provisions watered down to the point that they become just a PR exercise. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, highlighted when moving Amendment 1, if attention is not paid to implementing this clause properly, that could be counterproductive. Without an impartial process that analyses the public's views, there is a danger that the police will end up selectively listening to those who agree with established priorities while disregarding those that seek a new focus. Together with the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, I would be grateful if the Minister will give us more detail about how the police will seek out the public's views. How will that consultation be undertaken? As my amendment suggests, I would like to know whether they will rely on those with a strong opinion writing in or whether they will prioritise any sector's views above another. If the police rely on the public to come to them with concerns, there is a great danger that only the most vocal views, and probably those that are the widest apart, will be heard. Many sectors of the community lack any form of representative body, while others have numerous organisations that are accustomed to making representations.
	The noble Baroness's amendment quite rightly deals with the concern that the perception that has developed significantly in the past 10 years of children and young people as a threat will or might colour police attitudes to criminal behaviour and further isolate young people from the institutions and organisations that are there to protect them. I take her point that if children and young people are involved in the consultation, their views are being expressed in a way. We have had young people's parliaments, we have young people's citizens' juries, and it is amazing how adult they can be when they are asked to put those views forward. That is an important aspect.
	Perhaps equally important is the fact that we know that we are in the middle of an outbreak of violent crime that is flourishing around the knife culture, which has become rife, and that young people do seem to be involved in crime. As we may not quite understand why that is happening, perhaps a consultation that included young people would be helpful.
	My honourable friend in another place asked whether the police take enough account of the impact that crime and disorder have on businesses, so I have included them in the list of sectors that I suggest should be listened to and whose views would be sought under this amendment. The British Chambers of Commerce highlighted the fact that the police response to business communities' concerns is inconsistent across authorities and fails to appreciate the growing cost of damage that crime inflicts on businesses. Therefore, it is essential that business is included.
	Will the Minister say whether there is any intention of reviving the national Commercial Victimisation Survey, or whether the Government are making any effort to assess what help can be given to the business sector to protect it against the damage that crime can inflict on it?
	The other bodies included in my amendment are local authorities and the voluntary sector, which has an enormous role to play in preventing crime and supporting various people in the community. As this Bill goes ahead, it will also have a role to play in the judicial process. We therefore seek a clear understanding of this consultation. We recognise that there is already a requirement on the police authorities to consult, but that does not seem to have a huge impact. Will the consultations be published, and will there be meetings—if so, how will they take place—to improve enormously on what is there already?

Lord Borrie: I have a great deal of sympathy for the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, about the stereotyping of the young in relation to offences of various kinds and the way in which that stereotyping may unduly influence the police and others in power, such as magistrates. However, I must express a certain doubt about the desirability of imposing a statutory duty on police authorities to consult children and young persons specifically. The noble Baroness did not define "children" and "young persons", and I assume from other parts of the law, such as employment law, that "young persons" normally means those between 16 and 18 and that, when the phrases "young persons" and "children" are alongside one another, "children" presumably covers those below 16. While I have some feeling that consulting young persons may be worth while and beneficial to everyone concerned in judging what the police should or should not do, I am rather doubtful about children if they are to be defined as those under 16. I know that we have youth parliaments and so on; they are of great educational value, to help people debate and understand and listen to others. But the idea that the police authority should seriously sit down with children—presumably, to be representative, they would have to be not just under 16, but some of them under 10, or under 8, or maybe even under the age of criminal responsibility for all I know—seems to be taking liberalism too far.

Baroness Walmsley: Ihave to intervene to support my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond. I find myself very much in disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Borrie. Young people are quite capable of expressing themselves in a very serious way about very serious issues. Over the weekend, in fact, I was reading about a local authority that was setting up a junior children's safeguarding board, to consult children about matters as serious as safeguarding other children in their community.
	My other point is this. The police authorities obviously want the arrangements that they make for policing to work, and many of those who are most affected by policing arrangements are young people, including the arrangements made to ensure that young people are safe when they go about their local community and the arrangements for ensuring that when minor misdemeanours are committed, the police do not overreact with young people and drag them into the criminal justice system in an unwarranted way. All those arrangements really do affect young people's lives.
	There is such a thing as the "not invented here" syndrome. I think that we are all aware of it. We are much more likely to co-operate with something of which we take ownership ourselves. We take ownership of something when we are consulted and we have our own input. The Government are very aware of the "not invented here" syndrome. Only this morning, I was talking about two reports on the primary school curriculum, one of which was commissioned by the Government and the other of which was not. I am sure your Lordships will have a very good idea of which of those two the Government are taking notice—the one that they commissioned themselves. They have ownership of that report and not of the other one.
	If we want young people to co-operate with the police—and we do—then it is very important and beneficial to the whole community, not just to the young people, and to the police in their ability to do their job well, that we should consult young people. Local authorities already have duties to consult young people on a whole raft of issues. That means that they have already developed the skills needed to talk to and listen to young people and to interpret what they are saying—even very young children in some cases, as in relation to the provision of nursery places. So, with local authorities, the skills are already there and are developing all the time. The need is there, and the benefits are obvious.

Lord Swinfen: I very much agree with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, on Amendment 1. Of the two amendments under discussion, I prefer that of my noble friend Lady Hanham, because her proposed new subsection (2A)(d) would cover what is in Amendment 1. It specifies:
	"any other people or organisations they consider relevant".
	It is far more important for the police to discuss the position with parents rather than children because they need the parents' co-operation. To some extent, the problems of young people today arise because parents very often do not start to teach their children discipline and the difference between right and wrong at a young age.
	The children covered by Amendment 1 could be as young as three or four. They may well have to be consulted if this amendment becomes law. I do not think that that would be right, because they are too young to know. The police could go and talk to youth groups or clubs. That would be an opportunity for those young people—those approaching 16 or over 16—to talk to the police and answer their questions on community policing. I would prefer Amendment 2 to go forward because Amendment 1 is misconceived.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: Many Members of the Committee will have read the interview with the new Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, in today's Times, in which he refers to the fact that the Government have been coasting on ASBOs and that they are going to take a new, proactive approach. Presumably that means that they will take a much more active line with them.
	Anti-social behaviour is always difficult and needs to be dealt with. However, it is interesting that the Home Secretary chose to use the example that young people may become subject to an ASBO for sitting on a wall in front of an elderly person's house because, as he said, they have nowhere else to go. The elderly residents of a street may well have asked for an ASBO to be imposed after they had asked the youngsters to move and the youngsters had said no, perhaps quite rudely. Young people tend to use different and sometimes offensive language, which can be intimidating to older people. Nevertheless, they would not have committed a criminal offence; they would be assembling as they have done for ages.
	I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen. Of course parents have a role, but young people over the age of 10 and up to 18 have been a problem ever since I can remember. Often their parents, with the best will in the world, are unable to deal with them because the behaviour may take place between school and home or when they are out on a Saturday afternoon. You cannot keep them locked up in the house, nor should you—they have to learn to be independent and to deal with the world.
	If we pass this Bill, yet again, if the Government have their way on everything—the provisions on alcohol misuse, for example—we will be passing legislation aimed at young people who have done nothing criminal and it will impinge on their freedoms in the same way as ASBOs do. It behoves us—it certainly behoves the Government—at the same time as bringing in further laws that affect young people in these ways, to consider how we are going to ensure that the authorities, such as the police, that deal with these issues take a more proactive approach to young people, who otherwise will feel further alienated.
	I know that the record of most police forces is extremely good, but that is not always the case. The people who write letters to the press or sit behind their PCs and fire off letters to their MPs asking for more action to be taken on young people are all adults; very often we do not hear the young person's side of the story. As I said, the Home Secretary said that the young people may be sitting on the wall in the first place because they have nowhere else to go. It is important that we keep the necessity of engaging with their views at the forefront of our minds when considering the Bill.

Lord West of Spithead: I declare an interest in that I am heavily involved with the Army, Air Force and Navy Cadet Forces and the Combined Cadet Force in encouraging those who have fewer opportunities than others to achieve vocational qualifications, which amount to four GCSEs, to start the process of giving them an opportunity in life. I am heavily involved in that area and with a number of other charities, one of which gives sponsorships to youngsters in the areas of sport, music, the arts and so on. So I am involved in this area to an extent.
	I agree to an extent with the noble Baronesses, Lady Harris, Lady Walmsley and Lady Miller, that at times it seems that we are down on youngsters when they are doing what youngsters do, such as hanging around; certainly I was a bit of a scallywag when I was younger. However, I have some sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, said: back then, when I was admittedly very naughty, there was a certain inherent respect that I believe has somehow been undermined. We are down on youngsters too much, but we are in a slightly different place from where we were. We should remember, though, that youngsters are youngsters and, from my experience of the cadet forces and other groups, given half an opportunity and something to focus on, we have some remarkable and wonderful young people in this country. We always need to remember that.
	This is a difficult area. As we saw from the debate between the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, my noble friend Lord Borrie and the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, there are a lot of differing views and one has to think about that. I agree with noble Lords that the views of children, young people, local authorities, the business sector and the voluntary sector all need to be considered when the police authority carries out its functions. In that regard, I accept the principle behind the amendment, which I understand. However, this clause is not the right place to make that point.
	Police authorities have long been required to obtain the views of the public under Section 96 of the Police Act 1996 and any amendment to how views are obtained or whose views are relevant would need to be made in or under that section rather than here. I would not wish to apply this amendment to that section either, though, for one simple reason: it has too few items on the list. The Bill refers to,
	"people in the authority's area",
	which is a very wide standard. The Government are clear that that can include the views of people who live and/or work in an area, including children and young people, people in businesses in that area, people in the local authorities in that area and people in the voluntary sector organisations in that area. We therefore accept that all the people specified by noble Lords should be included, but trying to list everyone who should be consulted runs the risk of excluding all the groups that are not on that list. Why should we specify children but not parents who live outside the area whose children attend schools there, or those who visit elderly relatives or other vulnerable people in the area? There is an endless list of people and groups that deserve a say in how an area is policed, but it would not be sensible to try to put an exhaustive list in this Act—and a partial list, as always, risks exclusions.
	Furthermore, merely adding that police authorities must engage with people whom they consider relevant, as Amendment 2 seeks to do, would not solve that problem. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a police authority would consider a person to be relevant and yet not consult them. We should not be too prescriptive; we should treat these people as mature people who do these things, as indeed I think they do.
	What would the additional duty add? The measure is too subjective to have any real-life effect. That is why the Police and Justice Act 2006 amended Section 96 of the 1996 Act to allow the Government to make regulations that may include provision about who must be consulted. The Government will therefore make such regulations setting out the arrangements that authorities must make for obtaining the views of people in their area, which will allow a more flexible approach so that the list can be changed when appropriate. It will, however, provide a specific set of principles by which the police authority will be bound rather than the sort of general catch-all proposed in the amendment, which, as I say, is too prescriptive. The Home Secretary will bring regulations to set out minimum standards for engagement and those regulations will include specific provisions for groups that are harder to reach, such as children.
	While noble Lords make an excellent point, which I accept, I suggest that the clause is not the most appropriate place, nor is this the most appropriate way, to do what is suggested. I ask them kindly not to press their amendments.

Baroness Hanham: Before we conclude this debate, if we are going to, I want to go back to both the legislation and what the Minister has said. I am now slightly concerned that the Minister has suggested regulations. There is no room for regulations in this Bill because it does not say anything about them, which means that there is no possibility of them coming to this House. We may later have to insert an amendment that says that the regulations on consultation must be brought forward.
	To widen this a little further, my amendment would amend Section 6(2) of the Police Act, which is what we are talking about. The Minister suggested that it would not, but it would. Clause 1(1) says that the Police Act, as it is presently structured, states that the police authority "must have regard". That is a very wobbly phrase and I wonder how it got through parliamentary scrutiny. It might mean absolutely anything. From what the Minister has said, I suppose that the regulations will point out how they "must have regard". That is not here. We do not have any information at all about how the police authorities will be asked to carry out this important duty. I accept what the Minister says: in lists there are always difficulties over making sure that everybody is included. However, my amendment mentions,
	"any other people or organisations they consider relevant".
	I ask the Minister to go a little further and to give us an opportunity to probe more on exactly how this consultation will take place. Will it be formal consultation or will there be visits to, and discussions with, youth organisations by the police? It would be worth getting a little more body around this so that we know what will happen.

Lord West of Spithead: We do not want to be too prescriptive. As I have said, it is rather like mission command, where you give the mark for where you want to go and then let people get on with it. However, regulations and changes to regulations would be under existing Section 96 of the Police Act 1996. That is how that would be done. It will be constantly looked at in discussion with the people involved, to see how we need to amend, if necessary, that section of the Act.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: First, I thank those noble Lords who have supported my amendment, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, and my noble friends Lady Walmsley and Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer. My noble friend Lady Walmsley talked about the benefits to the whole community when young people are consulted about how they can see crime improving in their area. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, I point him to the example that I gave of the young boy who talked about being concerned about swearing and littering. He was 11 years old. There are many young people below the age of 16 who attend youth clubs. Their concerns can be expressed very clearly through youth clubs and other youth societies. The police should take note of them.
	I also hear what the Minister said about being naughty when he was a boy, but in those days there was respect for older people. Young people today can be more respectful if they are consulted. They become better young citizens if they are asked what their views are. It is very important to take that on board. I also accept that, at the moment, the Minister does not feel that this is the right place in which to make the point. I was going to ask him whether he would consider putting it in regulations, but he neatly answered that point by saying that there would be regulations on a set of principles. I thank him for that small concession.
	I will withdraw the amendment but we may decide to bring it back at a later stage to see whether something a little meatier could be inserted at another point in the Bill. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 1 withdrawn.
	Amendment 2 not moved.
	Amendment 3
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	3: Clause 1, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
	"( ) In section 4(6) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 after the words "in paragraphs (a) to (e)" add the words "and (g)"."

Baroness Harris of Richmond: This is a probing amendment. If the Committee were to accept the argument that I propose, a number of consequential amendments would in practice be required to give effect to this amendment. At present, chief executives of police authorities do not enjoy the same statutory protection as chief executives of local authorities. For that matter neither do the other statutory officers, the treasurer and the monitoring officer. The amendment is intended to rectify this anomaly.
	Section 4 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 requires a relevant authority to designate a head of paid service. In practice, that is usually the chief executives of the authority. The definition of "relevant authority" in this section of the Act does not include a police authority, although a number of other sections apply to police authorities. In 2001, the Local Authorities (Standing Orders) (England) Regulations were introduced, part of which dealt with incorporating into authorities' standing orders certain provisions about disciplinary action that could be brought against the head of paid services, the chief finance officer and the monitoring officer.
	At the time of the 1989 Act police authorities—as I well remember, having been a member of one—were still a committee of the local authority rather than the independent bodies that they now are. However, it is not clear why police authorities were not included in the 2001 order, because by that time they were independent bodies, other than in the City of London, where I understand that the police authority continues to be the Common Council of the City of London.
	In 2001, chief executives of police authorities were called clerks. I remember participating in a police Bill a few years ago that managed to get their title changed to that of chief executive, about which they were all very pleased. One can speculate that in 2001 many chief executives of police authorities were also chief executives of a local authority, so that they headed police authority secretariats on a part-time basis. To that extent, chief executives had relevant protection through their mainstream employment; they were part time on both sides. However, even then not all statutory officers of police authorities were also local authority employees, and now it is almost definitely the case that very few are.
	Now that there is increased emphasis on strengthening police authorities and making both members and officers more accountable, is it not time to rectify this anomaly? I want to ensure that not only chief executives but police authority treasurers and monitoring officers—sometimes they are the same person—benefit from the same protection as their counterparts in local authorities. I beg to move.

Baroness Henig: I support the amendment. In doing so, I declare an interest as the president and a past chair of the Association of Police Authorities. I support the amendment on the grounds that this matter has clearly not been updated in line with the various pieces of legislation that have been passed in the past few years and on grounds of equity. It seems to me that this is a very important change that should be made to safeguard the position of chief executives.
	As the noble Baroness has said, chief executives are now in a very different position from the one that they had 10 years ago. It is important not only that they should be covered in the way that she suggests, to make them operate on a similar basis to those in local government, but that they should have that position in relation to the force and to its chief constable. An extremely important suggestion is being made here, and I strongly support it.

Lord West of Spithead: On this amendment, the noble Baronesses have both raised an interesting and important point. I have also noted the position of the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives on this matter. Police authority chief executives and other officers perform a hugely important and, possibly, underrated role in the operation of the police service in this country. I know that Home Office officials often find the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives to be a useful and expert adviser on policing matters.
	I agree that it seems strange that police authority chief executives do not have the clear protections and status in law that their local authority counterparts enjoy. As previous speakers have said, that was, perhaps, an accident of history due to the evolution of policing governance and the role of police authority clerks and chief executives. Police authorities are, especially from a corporate perspective, similar in many respects to other local authorities. They are not, however, identical and there might be a need to have more tailored provisions regarding the position of police authority officers. Therefore, while the amendment certainly warrants serious consideration the Government must give the position much more thought before they could offer it their backing.
	I will make a commitment, however, that Home Office officials will engage with the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives and the Association of Police Authorities with a view to evaluating what changes may be needed. In doing that, there should be a full comparison of the duties of police authority and local authority chief executives to see whether a separate legal status is warranted. We could look to effect any changes, if they are needed, in the light of that exercise. Therefore, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment, with a view to the Government discussing the proposals with the APA and the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives. That will enable the Government to give these proposals the close consideration that they require.

Baroness Hanham: Before this discussion finishes, what other examination will be done on this? It might only be my own ignorance, but I do not quite understand why the police authority chief executives have been left out on what appears to be a limb, rather than being included like most other public body chief executives. I wonder what the difference is between a police authority chief executive and, for example, a chief executive in the National Health Service, or in any other public authorities. The Minister may not know the answer to that, but before he comes back to this issue it might be worth having a look at whether they are alone in this particular problem, or whether it goes across public bodies and needs to be looked at differently.

Lord West of Spithead: As I said, this is just an historical anomaly, and the noble Baroness is absolutely right that we need to look at whether there are any other complexities. We also need to look at whether it applies to any others, to make sure that this all ties together.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I am most grateful to the Minister for giving me a hint of help in the future. I know that the chief executives will, certainly, be looking carefully at what he had to say, while knowing that the Home Office might be in consultation with them to look at the legal vagaries here. I think that their main concern is that they may be first in the firing line if a critical report is the outcome of the joint inspections of police authorities, because they are not protected from being scapegoats as local authority chiefs are. That is their main worry, but I am heartened to hear what the Minister has to say and, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 3 withdrawn.
	Amendment 4
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	4: Clause 1, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
	"( ) The following amendments to the Local Government Act 1999 (c. 27) shall have effect with regard to police authorities—
	(a) section 1(1)(d) is omitted;
	(b) section 1(4) is omitted;
	(c) section 24 is omitted."

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Leaping up and down quickly, I shall speak to the amendment, which I mentioned at Second Reading. It examines the best-value case once again. Those of you who have heard me speak on policing legislation in the past will be familiar with the theme, but I return to it in the hope that some progress may be made. Best value was of course originally introduced through the Local Government Act 1999 but, if there is one piece of legislation more in need of consolidation and rationalisation than the various policing Acts, that is most definitely it. For that reason, the amendment is only probing, as in reality many more consolidating changes would be needed to give effect to it. However, the broad intention is to disapply best-value legislation from policing.
	I am sure that the Minister will remind me that, among other things, that would remove powers to inspect police authorities. It would also remove from police authorities the power to oversee continuous improvement within their forces. I reassure him here and now that I fully support police authority inspection—I have for many years—and police authorities' important role in making sure that their forces strive to improve. However, it would be altogether much better either to place the powers in policing-specific legislation, or to completely revise the original legislation. Then it can be honed to do a precise job and take into account the subtleties of the policing context, where governance and delivery are separated into two different bodies—the police authority and the force.
	As things stand, this local government legislation has been applied, in policing, to a context for which it was not originally intended. That has been exacerbated by almost constant amendment, re-amendment, counter-amendment and partial disapplication, followed by even more partial reapplication; I think that I said those very words at Second Reading. I suspect that few understand now where we are with it. The original aim of the legislation was laudable; it tried to apply, to the public sector, key principles originally developed in the private sector about making improvements while remaining efficient. However, as so often happens, in translation it became mangled into a vastly bureaucratic process, made worse by almost constant tinkering with the underlying legislation.
	I want a return to the clarity and simplicity originally intended, and seek reassurance from the Minister about whether and when serious consideration will be given to achieving that. I beg to move.

Lord West of Spithead: The noble Baroness mentioned that the financial functions of police authorities and duties arose from the local government best-value provisions, which regulate police authorities' procurement, recruitment and financial accounting and reporting. Although the Government accept that police authorities are in many ways distinct from other local authorities, surely the financial and corporate affairs of police authorities are substantially similar to those of other local authorities. They have a similar imperative to provide value to the public and to be efficient and effective, and must be held to similar public scrutiny. On the latter point, the new police authority inspection regime is built on the important foundation of the best-value legislation, as was stressed and supported by the noble Baroness.
	The effect of this amendment would be that police authorities would no longer be required to produce statements of accounts, would no longer be regulated as to their procurement, and could no longer be inspected by the Audit Commission. I am aware that this is a probing amendment. While removing police authorities from the best-value framework may deserve some consideration, as the noble Baroness recognised, it would not be a simple exercise. As noble Lords will appreciate, this cannot be achieved though one or two clauses. It would need careful unpicking, and dedicated legislation would almost certainly be necessary if we choose to take that route. Such a review would take some time and could not be completed during the passage of this Bill.
	Therefore, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment with a view to the Government discussing the proposals further with relevant partners. This will enable us to give them the careful consideration they require—because they will be complex—and hopefully the clarity that the noble Baroness quite rightly demanded.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I sense a germ of hope, finally, in what the Minister has said. For years I have been bashing on about this, never getting anywhere and always being thrown back by whoever happened to be dealing with me at the Dispatch Box. There is hope, and I am most grateful to him for indicating that. I never intimated that it would not be a complex exercise to try and get it sorted out; but it needs sorting out. If the Minister will happily take that on board, I will withdraw the amendment, as it was simply probing.
	Amendment 4 withdrawn.
	Clause 1 agreed.
	Amendment 5
	 Moved by Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer
	5: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
	"Freedom of information: ACPO
	The Secretary of State shall, within six months of this Act being passed, in exercise of his powers under section 5 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36) (further power to designate public authorities), amend Schedule 1 to that Act (public authorities) to include the Association of Chief Police Officers."

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: This amendment would bring the Association of Chief Police Officers within the provision of the Freedom of Information Act. My reason for tabling it is that the Government are, in any case, looking at whether the FOI Act is wide enough in the organisations it covers. The Prime Minister opened a consultation in February 2008 on whether Section 5 of the FOI Act should be extended to persons who perform functions of a public nature and contractors who provide services that are functions of public authorities. On 13 May 2009, at the very interesting Information Commissioner's conference, Justice Minister Michael Wills MP announced that there will be an expansion of the number of institutions to which the Freedom of Information Act applies. So against that background I am tabling this in hope.
	There seems to be no good reason why the Freedom of Information Act should not apply to ACPO. The status of ACPO is quite confusing but rather well laid out by the Minister in a Written Answer to a Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, about funding:
	"As an independent organisation of chief officers from the police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, ACPO is accountable to its members. Chief officers are in turn accountable to police authorities and the public. As it is a private company, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to ACPO, since Schedule 1 to the Act does not include a definition which covers ACPO".—[Official Report, 2/6/09; col. WA64.]
	So ACPO is public/private in terms of the FOI Act.
	Clearly, ACPO has very public functions and is often setting strategy, which suggests that the FOI Act should apply to it. To its credit, ACPO states on its website that it is willing to place as much information as it can in the public domain. It argues that as a small organisation it has too few members of staff to be able to conduct the necessary research and compile the responses. However, other small institutions have to deal with FOI requests—university departments, for example. The size of an organisation should not dominate a decision on whether it should be subject to FOI requests. It should be made on whether it is performing functions of a public nature.
	The FOI Act creates a general right of access to information held by bodies fitting into a description in Schedule 1 to that Act, which are mainly public bodies. However, my amendment makes use of the power under Section 5 of the Act to treat other bodies as public bodies for the purposes of the Act. This is appropriate because, as I have explained, the boundaries between public and private bodies are increasingly blurred.
	ACPO is funded by a combination of Home Office grant, contributions from the 44 police authorities, membership subscriptions and the proceeds of its annual exhibition. Given that the majority of ACPO's funding is provided by the public in one way or another and that its leading representatives are generally serving senior police officers, it is effectively a public sector entity operating as a private company. It is responsible for leading the development and direction of police authorities in England and Wales; so its public functions are obvious. It co-ordinates strategic decisions among police forces and much of that decision-making process is opaque and unminuted. The counterargument that the Minister and others may choose to put is that if ACPO is to be subject to the FOI Act and feels sensitive about it, that will drive any decision-making process underground. But that is not in the spirit of the FOI Act and I hope that that would not happen.
	Perhaps I may give your Lordships an example of one area of ACPO's work which is of crucial public interest and much debate—the police policy on tasers. ACPO's evaluation report on taser trials has been cited by the Home Office and states that tasers are safe enough to be deployed to non-firearmed police. ACPO has received information requests for the evidence for that but has not released it. I submit that that information is in the public interest and would enable better public debate. Apart from that, the very keeping of that information as a secret creates the wrong impression.
	Therefore, against that background and what I have described the Government are considering, it is important that ACPO is in the forefront of bodies to which the FOI Act needs to apply. I beg to move.

Baroness Hanham: I—

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: I—

Baroness Hanham: We are opening the debate and I am sure that there will be plenty of room for everyone to join in. I am interested in the amendment because it
	raises the question of whether this legislation makes ACPO a statutory body. The position that it will be given by the legislation in terms of the appointments panel represents the first time that ACPO will be named in legislation as having a role. That is important in addition to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, as regards how the scrutiny and safeguarding of what ACPO does will be ensured.
	Concern has been raised in the past few months, and the Flanagan review highlighted the confusion that has arisen from a lack of a clear understanding about roles and responsibilities of various bodies and organisations in the policing sector. Shoe-horning ACPO into the legislation in a statutory role, without proper clarification of its responsibilities and without scrutiny, does nothing to help the implementation of the review recommendations.
	The question of whether ACPO should be covered by the Freedom of Information Act—I am sure that it is not at the moment—is a perfect example. If ACPO is to have a statutory role in senior appointments, it will have to have proper accountability. Later amendments will address the question of what accountability the appointments panel will have, but the nominating organisations should also have responsibility to be accountable to the wider public, not just to their members, if they are to be included legislatively as the people who have to do all that is required under the legislation.
	I understand that ACPO has some concern about the inclusion within the schedule placing too high a burden on its members. The noble Baroness has referred to that. I hope that the Minister can give us a little more detail on how many of the requests for information that are currently received on ACPO's role can be answered by ACPO and how many are refused, if such information is available. Much more importantly, we need to understand the status of ACPO, not just as an organisation with members but now in its position of having a statutory role in appointments.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: I support the amendment and do so because I have been concerned about this organisation for a while and have tabled Questions for Written Answer. The noble Baroness is nodding so she has obviously seen them. A body that is financed in part by the Government and in part by the police authorities ought to be under public control.
	I received a Written Answer on 7 May as to the scope of the work of ACPO, which is very wide indeed. If noble Lords will allow, I shall read the Answer given by the noble Lord, Lord West. It states:
	"The Association of Chief Police Officers is an independent organisation made up of representatives of forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, which works in partnership with both the Government and the Association of Police Authorities to co-ordinate the direction and development of the police service.
	ACPO plays a key role advising the Government on behalf of the police service as a whole on major national projects aimed at developing the capacity of the service. It also advises on how to tackle serious and ongoing strategic threats that might put the public at risk. In times of national need, ACPO is specifically tasked with co-ordinating the strategic policing response on behalf of all chief officers.
	ACPO is funded by a combination of Home Office grant, contributions from each police authority, membership subscriptions and the proceeds of its annual exhibition".—[Official Report, 7/5/09; col. WA 130.]
	Those powers are very wide indeed. I was even more surprised and concerned when a later reply told me that ACPO was not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. I congratulate the noble Baroness on tabling the amendment today. My broader view is that such an organisation is rather more than an association. It has power and will advise the Government on serious matters, so it ought not to be a private organisation. It should be under public control. It should be financed completely by the public. Indeed, its activities should be transparent and obviously, then, open to the Freedom of Information Act. I hope that the noble Lord will take note of this, and, indeed, that when he answers my latest question as to whether ACPO should be privatised, he will give me a very encouraging answer. Perhaps that is hoping for too much—but this organisation should be subject to public control and supervision, and accountable in the last analysis to Parliament through the Minister. I am pleased that the amendment was tabled and I have pleasure in supporting it.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I would like to ask the Minister how an organisation that is not subject to public scrutiny can set up a unit to monitor political and environmental groups. That question was raised by Henry Porter on Tuesday, 10 February, in the Guardian online. He referred to it as a "sinister unit"; I certainly do not do that. But it does encapsulate some of our concerns, which have been so well expressed by my noble friend and by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham.
	ACPO is not governed by any statute; rather, it is a company limited by guarantee. It is not a staff association; it consists of members who are senior police officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It has about 280 members. As we have heard, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply to it. The company's objectives include leading and co-ordinating the direction and development of the police service and developing the ACPO brand—whatever that is. ACPO publishes advice and guidance on a wide range of policing issues and contributes decisions and comments to a wide range of contemporary debates.
	What is the constitutional role that ACPO plays? Is it an external reference group for Home Office Ministers? Is it a professional association protecting the interests of senior officers? Is it a public authority which issues guidance and good practice to local forces? Is it a national policing agency? Is it a campaigning pressure group arguing for greater police powers? These are questions that need answering before ACPO is given a statutory role, as it is under Clause 2.
	ACPO has already been included as a body that the Secretary of State must consult with before making particular orders or regulations. Is it time to reflect on the nature of ACPO and consider the appropriateness of involving it in decision-making processes? The Government have missed an opportunity properly to define the role of ACPO in the Bill. The constitutional role and make-up of ACPO has not been adequately debated and defined. Until that is done, it is impossible to know whether it is appropriate for a representative of ACPO to be consulted before any senior police appointments are made.

Lord West of Spithead: As has been said by a number of speakers, the Association of Chief Police Officers—ACPO—is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. We have not opened up the FOI parameters as yet, and ACPO is an independent voluntary organisation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, mentioned, it is not a public authority. It is a registered private company limited by guarantee and it is directly accountable to its members, not to the public. It is therefore not open to FOI requests. Its members, however, are chief police officers who are themselves accountable to police authorities and the public. All individual police forces are already subject to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, as the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, said, ACPO already seeks to place as much information as possible in the public domain—for example, on the web—and of course the details of its accounts are available to be viewed at Companies House. As the noble Baroness said, it receives some public money as it represents the leadership of the police service.
	In response to a question by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, ACPO provides effective representation for chief officers at a national level, in part because it is not on a firm statutory footing but is instead able to operate independently to represent the interests of its membership. I have some sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, said about tying it down a little. It has been rather a thorn in my flesh and tying it down a little more might be quite useful because it sometimes proves extremely difficult for the Government. However, I think that that is one of the benefits of having it in its current form.
	As was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, ACPO is referred to in statutes—for example, in Section 37A of the Police Act 1996, which places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult both ACPO and the APA on strategic priorities. Therefore, I think that it has a very useful role to play.
	Because of what one might call an anomaly but what I consider to be quite a useful status, ACPO is able to make a very effective contribution to the development of policing in this country. I am not sure that it would be able to do that if we put in all the controls that are being talked about, and the Government do not intend to undermine that by seeking to interfere in the operation of what is a private organisation. I certainly would not be keen to do that.
	I understand that in recent debate there has been a lot of interest in ACPO's status and structure. I know that the party opposite has been looking at this in some detail. However, as I said, I think that it performs a very useful duty. Although it can sometimes prove very uncomfortable, I have found it valuable in doing my job as it holds my feet to the fire. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, who has been very helpful in putting down Written Questions, and I am grateful for his excellent contribution today. He made many points with which I totally agree.
	My noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond asked a very relevant question: what sort of beast are we dealing with? The Minister has insisted that it is a private organisation, but how can senior police officers who are paid by the public purse to serve the public—we have just been debating a clause about how accountable they should be—have an association that is entirely private and not subject to FOI? I am afraid that I am taken back to my childhood and conversations between very concerned people as to whether members of the police force belonged to, for example, the Freemasons. I do not want to draw a parallel between the Freemasons and ACPO because that may well not be appropriate. Nevertheless, an association of senior police officers needs to have a better constitutional footing and we need to be much clearer about what sort of animal we are dealing with here. As my noble friend said, it is leading and co-ordinating the direction and development of the police services and developing the ACPO brand. There should not be an ACPO brand, because being a senior police officer in this country is more about serving the public. That worries me. In his reply, the Minister told us what ACPO is and is not, but he did not address the question of whether it is appropriate. Does he think that its constitutional standing, which we have explored this afternoon, is appropriate?

Lord West of Spithead: I assess that it is appropriate, although it does seem that there are anomalies.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: I will hold on to "anomaly" as something that I intend to build on. It is not a satisfactory position. I would not go so far as Henry Porter did in his article when he suggested that it is an immense conspiracy; but he raised a number of valid points that should give even the Minister great cause for concern. We cannot, under Clause 1, debate how accountable the police are, and then, when debating the very next clause, start debating how appropriate it is to keep from the eyes of the public all the discussions that senior police officers have about strategy. That is not appropriate and not what we should allow to happen in the Bill. I will come back to this on Report, when I have gathered more information.

Baroness Hanham: The point that I made has not been referred to. Does the noble Baroness agree that the fact that ACPO is now getting a statutory responsibility to nominate people to the police senior appointments panel changes the situation? It now has a firm statutory role within the police service.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, who has put her finger so accurately on the point. We have discussed accountability in the Bill, and, as she says, we are about to discuss the statutory role of ACPO; yet the Minister is denying that it should be open to people to see what it is about and what it is doing. As I pointed out at the beginning of the debate, the Prime Minister and a Minister from the Ministry of Justice have said that they intend to expand the application of FOI. This should be the first place to expand it to. We will come back to the matter on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 5 withdrawn.
	Clause 2 : Police Senior Appointments Panel
	Amendment 5A
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	5A: Clause 2, page 2, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 31 on page 3 and insert—
	"(1) The Police Act 1996 (c. 16) is amended as follows."

Baroness Henig: I shall speak also to Amendment 6. I have already declared an interest as president of the Association of Police Authorities. I declare an interest also as chair of the Security Industry Authority.
	These two amendments take different approaches but deal with the same concern, which is to ensure that the national influence in appointing the most senior police officers does not outweigh the local interest. Much of the strength and credibility of British policing lies in getting this delicate balance right. If we get it wrong, the consequences will be serious.
	First, I apologise to the Committee, because both amendments have slight errors in the form in which they appear on the Marshalled List. For clarity, I will explain what is meant when I reach the relevant sections. My first amendment takes the simplest approach. It is intended to remove the whole clause, apart from subsection (2), which relates to delegated functions and the role of HMIC. I accept that HMIC should no longer have delegated functions to carry out the Secretary of State's role in approving senior appointments, given its new and more independent role as set out in the Green Paper. However, the amendment as shown in the Marshalled List suggests that subsections (3) and (4) should also remain. This is an error, for which I apologise. If the main part of this clause is removed, these subsections must go, too. This is covered in Amendment 11, which should really be debated alongside Amendment 5A. When we come to debate Amendment 11, I shall seek to withdraw it.
	The amendment would result in the senior appointments panel remaining a non-statutory body. I listened carefully to the Minister at Second Reading, and I support his desire to make the senior appointments panel more independent and more proactive, but I am afraid that I do not see why it needs to be a statutory body to operate in this way. This will merely inject unwelcome additional bureaucracy into the appointments process and hand greater powers to the Home Secretary of the day, and to his or her officials, to direct this body in favour of national requirements to the detriment of local interests and requirements.
	It might be worth reiterating that the local police authority has the power to appoint chief officers, not the Home Secretary, whose role is to approve appointments made by police authorities. My noble friend therefore has yet to convince me that a statutory body is necessary for the Home Secretary to carry out this role of approval effectively or for police authorities to take heed of advice on the wider national strategic requirements. As noble Lords will notice, I am taking a twin-track approach here, so I argue that a statutory body is not necessary. If we accept that it is desirable, I am concerned about the precise nature of some of the proposals that are set out in Clause 2, so my second amendment deals with that situation.
	Again, before explaining exactly what my concerns are, I must apologise to the Committee for an error in the amendment on the Marshalled List. Proposed new subsection (18) should refer to subsections (12) and (13)—that is, to the respective functions of the Secretary of State and police authorities to approve and make senior appointments.
	Broadly speaking, my Amendment 6 is designed to introduce precisely the more independent and proactive approach to which my noble friend has alluded, without the centralised approach that risks upsetting the national/local balance. The amendment makes it clear that the make-up of the panel needs to be balanced so that the Home Secretary's appointees cannot outnumber the appointees nominated by police authorities and chief officers. It would also enable the panel to elect its own chair, rather than leaving this appointment to the Home Secretary. It would provide independence to the panel to determine its own arrangements for conducting its business, rather than those arrangements being set out by the Home Secretary.
	Perhaps most importantly, my amendment is more explicit about what the functions of the panel should be. Specifically, it includes the ability to give general advice not just to the Home Secretary but to police authorities. If the Home Secretary needs advice on approving chief officer appointments, it is only sensible that that advice should also be given to the bodies that make the appointments.
	The functions also include the critical duty of developing a more consistent and robust system for setting out the criteria for prioritising vacancies and considering candidates for them. This problem has long existed and has never been satisfactorily resolved. It always means that some authorities must wait much longer than others before it is their turn to interview available candidates. It also means that, for those who come later in the queue, the pool of available candidates tends to be smaller. In the past, this has been dealt with by a process of negotiation reaching eventual consensus. That has not been without problems, however, and a new and more proactive panel should be required to see whether there are ways of improving the system.
	Finally, the amendment would give the panel the flexibility to carry out any other functions that may be necessary to fulfil its main duties. This would replace an order-making power for the Secretary of State to confer additional functions.
	All these proposed provisions in Amendment 6 are based on practical experience of the workings of this body. If the body is to be made statutory, it should be made statutory to improve its workings and to make it a more effective body for all the parties concerned—the Secretary of State, the police authorities and senior police officers. In moving this amendment, I hope that my noble friend will agree that the amendment would genuinely provide for an independent and proactive panel that is properly balanced between the tripartite policing partners and national and local requirements. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I added my name to the amendments because I completely agree with them. I have been interested to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, had to say. My question was why the senior appointments panel needs to be a statutory body. Once again, the Secretary of State will be granted new powers to make arrangements or orders about the make-up, functions and proceedings of this new body.
	It is the primary responsibility of police authorities to appoint their chief officers, after which the Secretary of State approves, or otherwise, that appointment. Therefore, I am extremely concerned that the balance of responsibility for ensuring that police authorities get the right chief of police for their area could be skewed away from them and towards the Secretary of State. The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, clearly pointed that out. If that is not political interference with local decision-making, I do not know what is.
	This panel must have a genuine tripartite balance in its membership. As it stands, the wording is so wide that it could allow a future Home Secretary to appoint more government representatives and so upset that very delicate balance. Government representatives should not outnumber police community appointees, so I ask the Minister to look again at this and ensure that the wording is tightened.
	I have spent many years on policing matters. I have gone through many interviews with chief officers—from chief constables through to deputies and assistants—and so have a wide-ranging knowledge of how they are selected to come before a police authority and what then happens when they do. As the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, said, the Secretary of State could say, "No, I do not particularly want that person to go before a selection panel of police authorities". That simply is not good news. A transparent process is what is needed in the Bill. There are no criteria by which decisions are made about when and which officers can apply for posts. SAP must develop mechanisms to address these concerns. I hope that the Minister will be able to assuage some of my concerns in this area.

Viscount Bridgeman: The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has made a constructive speech and, while disagreeing with the change from non-statutory to statutory, she has produced some constructive amendments. She has raised several points about the panel—in particular, the role that the Secretary of State will play in the appointments process—and about the ongoing development of the panel.
	A shake-up is clearly needed in the appointments process. The difficulty of attracting sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified candidates to apply for available positions is an indication that much more needs to be done to support and train candidates to prepare them for senior roles. However, I agree with both noble Baronesses who have spoken that some concerns remain, certainly among outside organisations, that the Government have not established the panel on the best footing to achieve this. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us more detail on exactly how he envisages this legislation improving how the panel currently operates. The role is to be put on a statutory basis, as the Government propose. However, in the previous arrangements, if the Secretary of State had wanted to consult the non-statutory appointments panel, there was nothing to stop him.
	We generally support this clause as a welcome sign that the Government have turned their attention to a pressing problem and hope that the panel will be able to make an important contribution to the process. We agree, however, with the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that the changes that need to be made are not ones that can be legislated for; they need to be made in government and in the police bodies.
	I turn to the details of the provisions—and this is where we very much agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Harris—and how they differ from the proposals in the noble Baroness's amendment. The noble Baroness is quite right to highlight the significant powers that the Secretary of State is taking over the constitution of the panel in the future. We understand the need for some flexibility, but the failure to specify the number of members or the relative proportions of the representative members means that the future make-up of the panel could well be very different from the model envisaged by the Government. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us more detail on this matter.

Lord West of Spithead: Taken alone, Amendment 5A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, would remove the statutory senior appointments panel from the Bill. However, Clause 2 is an important part of the Bill and the Government are committed to working, through the tripartite, to get the best possible leaders for the future in policing. A more proactive, strengthened statutory senior appointments panel will play a key role in delivering this. Amendment 6, also tabled by my noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, would replace the majority of the Government's clause establishing a senior appointments panel and alter the composition and functions of this panel. They are fairly major amendments.
	I thank my noble friend Lady Henig for highlighting the importance, as I said at Second Reading, of streamlining, making better and sorting out the appointments panel so that we get the best senior policemen we can, in a co-ordinated fashion, across a disparate group of police areas in this country, which has always been so difficult to achieve in the past. The Government agree with the principle that the tripartite contribution to the panel should remain balanced. The noble Baroness, Lady Harris, mentioned this and we share her view, which we see as important. That is why the Bill specifies that that ability is required to keep the tripartite well balanced.
	As set out in the policing Green Paper, which is where this stemmed from, the Government believe that the new panel should have a greater independent element so that there is a broader perspective on leadership. This is established by Clause 2. The provision in new Section 53B(2)(a) will be used to appoint independent members according to the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments principles. The Government also share the view that the panel should publish reports, but new Section 53B(5)(b) already provides for arrangements to be made for publishing those reports. The Government made clear in the Green Paper and in the debate in the other place that these reports would be published and the detail would be set out in the panel's constitution.
	Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary will continue to have an important role as an adviser to the panel. Work is ongoing with those involved to ensure that the key needs of the appointments system are identified; it is envisaged that the key additional functions will relate to the co-ordination of the appointment rounds. While I understand the intention of the amendment to set out in detail the functions of the panel, I do not believe that doing so will give us the flexibility that we need, working as tripartite, to deliver the best senior appointments arrangements for the future. For example, the amended clause would not allow the necessary scope for the greater co-ordination of the appointments round, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Henig. This is crucial, because we have found that, when these matters have been done in a disparate way, we end up with some poor choices for those further downstream. We committed ourselves in the policing Green Paper to move forward on this. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, correctly identified the need for a shake-up, which is what we are trying to achieve and are achieving.
	The new panel will not make appointments directly. The function of a police authority to appoint the senior officers set out in the Police Act remains in statute. The panel retains a powerful advisory role on ministerial approval of candidates and will increasingly take a more strategic overview of the talent pool. That is absolutely crucial. I was surprised when I came into this area for the first time that, unlike in the military, there is not an overall view to develop the best officers to go to the top of the profession.
	When the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of this House reviewed this, it did not consider the absence of parliamentary control over the panel's arrangements to be inappropriate. The committee is also content that Clause 2 provides appropriate parliamentary oversight for conferring additional functions. Before conferring additional functions, the Secretary of State must consult the panel, giving all panel members—both independent and tripartite representatives—an opportunity for full discussion. Parliamentary scrutiny committees look at all orders laid before the House, providing an additional check and an opportunity to scrutinise. All those issues are important.
	I therefore believe that the current provision provides the framework needed most effectively to oversee and manage the important issue of policing appointments, which all of us in this place agree needs a shake-up. I invite my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Hanham: This seems to be an opportunity to open up consideration of the representative members. We briefly touched in our last amendment on ACPO's role in nominating. Will the Minister say a little more on ACPO's role in advising the panel and how that will change under the Bill?
	Secondly, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, is interesting in what it leaves out. She leaves out from proposed new Section 53C:
	"The Secretary of State may refer any report made by Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary to the panel".
	That means that HMIC can ask the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State will refer. One wonders which reports HMIC deems so important that it has to go via the Secretary of State to ask the panel to consider them that do not fall into subsection (4), which the noble Baroness has included.
	I ask the Minister for two explanations. The first relates to the nomination process for members of the panel. As I understand it, in the past ACPO and APA used to work in an advisory capacity on putting forward nominations, but here they are now both with statutory responsibility. The second is the interesting aspect of what HMIC is going to be referring or asking the Secretary of State. Indeed, the provision does not specify that, so the Secretary of State may refer of his own volition an HMIC report to the panel. What might that report be on?

Lord West of Spithead: I fear that I will not be able to be specific on either of the points. All I can say is that ACPO is very much seen as part of the tripartite in the new system with the APA and the Secretary of State. Perhaps I may come back to the noble Baroness in writing about the differences between now and the future, as I am afraid that I am not able to articulate that clearly now. Similarly, to give a specific example of what the Secretary of State demands of an HMIC report, I will have to come back in writing; I do not have the information at my fingertips.

Baroness Henig: I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baronesses for their supportive comments. I agree with the Minister that we need to make the system of senior appointments work more effectively; we all want to do that. He feels that greater co-ordination is crucial. One of the problems relates to remarks by the noble Viscount about poor choices for those downstream and some of the appointments; the problem lies not at senior appointment level but lower down, in the numbers of senior officers coming forward and coming through the selection process. That is where the action needs to be taken. I have sat on many bodies that the Home Office has set up over the years to try to improve diversity and the flow of appropriate candidates coming through. More action is needed at that level. Increasing choice at senior appointments level is not a matter for the senior appointments panel; that lies lower down the chain.
	I hear what my noble friend said about his surprise when he came into the post that a military model was not followed for police officers. Many of us have debated that point long and hard over the years. Both senior police officers and police authorities value the element of choice. There are police officers who have family concerns and preferences. They do not wish to be moved around, as might be the case with a military career. They might not want to move their children out of schools. There are many legitimate family issues for police officers to pursue in wanting to have a certain amount of choice in the appointments that they go for. Similarly, if locality means anything, it means that police authorities may themselves want a choice about the sort of police officers whom they are looking for. I say respectfully that I do not think that the military model is an appropriate one, and I have said so for the past 10 years. So far I have managed to beat off this idea that the senior ranks of the police should be moved around and that we should develop cadres that have a military way of proceeding, but I can see that I am going to have to fight the battle for longer. At the end of the day, the tripartite structure is important to all of us and we want to preserve it. That means allowing choice at local level.
	My reservations centre on the role of the Secretary of State. Is this going to be the thin end of the wedge in giving the Secretary of State more power in an area that a lot of us feel is central to maintaining democratic accountability over policing and the powers of local authorities? While I will withdraw the amendment at this stage, I may wish to return to the issue on Report.
	Amendment 5A withdrawn.
	Amendment 6 not moved.
	Amendments 7 and 8 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.
	Amendment 9
	 Moved by Viscount Bridgeman
	9: Clause 2, page 3, leave out lines 19 to 40

Viscount Bridgeman: Following on from the previous debate where we discussed the uncertainty over the future number and make-up of members, Amendment 9 seeks to highlight uncertainty about the future functions of the panel. Although we welcome the creation of a body capable of driving through the changes necessary to ensure proper career development within the police force, and hope that the advisory functions will allow for a useful relationship between the panel and the Home Office, new Section 53D potentially opens up a much larger role for the panel in future. We on these Benches are sensitive—and it is possible that the Liberal Democrats sometimes feel the same—that this is far too much legislation going into secondary legislation. What additional functions do the Government envisage giving to the panel in future? If there is a useful role that the panel could play in other areas, why has that role not been drafted into this legislation already? I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I support the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman. We too are concerned at the powers of the Secretary of State under this section to confer an additional function on the senior appointments panel, and he can do this by a negative Statutory Instrument. We do not feel that this is appropriate either.

Lord West of Spithead: The amendment would remove the power of the Home Secretary to confer additional functions on the senior appointments panel, and it is important that the arrangements for the panel contain sufficient flexibility to allow it to take its work forward in future, while having the checks in place so that Parliament and the tripartite are appropriately involved.
	As I have mentioned in this debate, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has scrutinised the approach taken in the Bill and is satisfied with this power to confer additional functions. The proposed amendment would also mean that the power of the Home Secretary to delegate his role in the appointment of senior officers to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary was retained. While the chief inspector will continue to have a key role in advising the senior appointments panel, he will no longer chair it, as it would no longer be appropriate for him to hold this role under the new system as HMIC takes on the strengthened role of performance improvement. The power to delegate the Home Secretary's approval role to the chief inspector therefore does not reflect the chief inspector's new role, and is being repealed. An independent chair and members will help to bring a wider perspective from people who do not represent organisations with a direct stake in individual chief officer appointments.
	I am unclear as to the noble Lord's intention in removing the amendments to the Race Relations and Freedom of Information Acts. The Bill ensures that the panel is subject to all relevant equality duties by amending the Race Relations Act to apply the race equality duty to the panel. The equality duties for gender and disability will apply to the panel, since it will be carrying out public functions. In future, I fully expect the panel to be subject to the requirements of the equality duty set out in the Equality Bill. It is important that a body that has a role in helping to improve the diversity of senior appointments has the appropriate statutory equality responsibilities. As an example of extra co-ordination, by allowing this not to be in the Bill we want to achieve greater flexibility in future. As soon as we tie it in to the Bill, we are tied down to something and it does not necessarily cover everything that we will want to do in the future. Therefore, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Viscount Bridgeman: I think the Minister is not being quite specific enough about the intentions behind this clause. We will certainly address this in future stages of the debate. Is the Minister in a position to go a little further now?

Lord West of Spithead: I fear that I am unable to go further at the moment. Could we return to this?

Viscount Bridgeman: I understand. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, for her support. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 9 withdrawn.
	Amendment 10
	 Moved by Baroness Hanham
	10: Clause 2, page 3, line 31, at end insert—
	"( ) In Section 54(2A) of that Act (inspection and report powers of inspectors of constabulary) at end insert, "and, in the case of the Police Senior Appointments Panel, the operation of the Senior Appointments process in each police force area."

Baroness Hanham: Amendment 10 explores how the panel's activities will be scrutinised and what mechanisms there will be to assess its performance. When a similar amendment was tabled by my honourable friend in Committee in another place, he received some welcome assurances that current legislation would allow HMIC to report on the work of the panel; that the panel itself would also report on its functioning; and that all such reports would be public. While that is welcome, the Minister's concern that putting a duty to report would be overly bureaucratic is therefore all the more surprising. The current appointments process is clearly in need of a thorough overhaul, as we have already said. I would be extremely worried if HMIC were to decide that the panel's work was not of sufficient importance to report on in future, so I cannot see that a bureaucratic burden is being imposed. I would welcome further clarification from the Minister about what the intended reporting requirements that will cover the panel will be, and whether HMIC will be in a position to do it. I beg to move.

Lord West of Spithead: This amendment seeks to create a role for the Inspectorate of Constabulary in inspecting the operation of the senior appointments system in each police force area. There is no doubt about the importance of transparency and accountability in the appointments system. I therefore share the principle behind this amendment. However, I believe that the amendment is unnecessary since the Secretary of State already has the power, under Section 54 of the Police Act 1996, to require HMIC to prepare reports on particular functions of a police authority, which could include the workings of the senior officer appointments process in that force. More broadly it is also the responsibility of the panel itself, which will publicly report on the functioning of the appointments system and the strategic challenges to address. This will take into account the views of APA, ACPO and others, as well as the professional input of the inspectorate.
	In the debate in the other place that was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, the Government made clear the intention, set out in the policing Green Paper, for the panel to publish reports to increase the transparency of the senior appointments process. This requirement will be set out in the senior appointment panel's constitutional arrangements, which will be made under Clause 2. Therefore, I hope noble Lords can see that, while I have much sympathy with the principle behind the amendment of having a transparent and accountable senior appointments panel, I believe that the amendment is not necessary, since we are already achieving that. I hope that, on the basis of those reassurances, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Hanham: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. As I understand it, the power is already there for HMIC to produce the reports and for the Secretary of State to invite it to do so. I very much hope that that will happen and that reports will be made so that these appointments, all that is involved in them, and what the panel is doing, are well understood. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 10 withdrawn.
	Amendment 11
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	11: Clause 2, page 3, line 35, leave out subsections (3) and (4)

Baroness Henig: I should explain that I wanted to take this amendment with Amendment 5A because it goes with that amendment. Therefore, I have spoken to it already. I am not sure that I have anything further to add.

Lord Geddes: The noble Baroness must move the amendment to give others a chance to speak to it.

Baroness Henig: I beg to move the amendment, and I wish to say nothing further in support of it.

Lord West of Spithead: I am sure that this was an unintended aspect of Amendment 11, but it would remove the senior appointments panel from the scope of the race equality duty in the Race Relations Act 1976 and from the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I am unclear of the intention behind the amendment. I think that I now understand it better given the previous description of it but it still has the problems to which I have referred.
	I take the view very strongly that the new appointments panel must be subject to the relevant equalities and freedom of information legislation if it is to command the confidence of officers, police authorities and the public. The equality duties for gender and disability will apply. However, specific provision is needed to ensure that the panel is subject to the race equality duty in the Race Relations Act.
	The race equality duty will require the panel to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination. It would be a serious anomaly if the panel were not subject to this duty. It is important that a body which has a role in helping to improve the diversity of senior appointments has the appropriate statutory responsibilities. Given that the panel has a particular advisory role for appointments, and that increasing diversity is a key challenge, it is especially important that this is done. I do not believe that the amendment intended to remove that duty but that is what it would achieve. I hope that I have helped to clarify it a little. The other aspect of it was debated earlier. On that basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Henig: I thank my noble friend. I think there was an error in the way that this was formulated, for which I apologise to the Committee. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 11 withdrawn.
	Clause 2 agreed.
	Clause 3 : Regulations about senior officers
	Amendment 12
	 Moved by Baroness Hanham
	12: Clause 3, page 4, leave out lines 6 and 7

Baroness Hanham: This is a probing amendment to try to find out what payments the Government envisage paying to senior officers who cease to hold office before the end of a fixed term appointment, and why those payments should be made.
	In another place the Minister for crime and policing made the rather surprising remark that the clause did not seek to fix any problem. Therefore, one does not know whether a problem is anticipated in the future. Presumably the Government anticipate that there might be a problem with officers seeking to terminate their employment prematurely or having their employment terminated. Perhaps the Minister can give us examples of why either of those situations might occur. There is a great deal more in this part of the Bill regarding co-ordination and co-operation which might legitimately lead to a situation where there was a vacancy or one was created. We need to understand a little more about what the clause is about and why it is included. I hope that the noble Lord will be kind enough to explain this and, if possible, relate it to other aspects of the legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I had assumed that this part of the Bill related to pay-offs for senior officers who were asked to go early. If that is the case, no doubt my noble friend will respond on that specific point. I should be grateful if he will also respond on the wider question of incentive payments to senior officers because it is my understanding that some police authorities make extremely generous payments outside the normal negotiating board arrangements, thereby distorting the payment arrangements for senior officers in different parts of the country. If that is the case, rather than narrowing the ambit of this clause, as the noble Baroness proposes, we might want to see it widened to cover those additional bonus payments that are, I think, made in some police authority areas.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The noble Lord, Lord Harris, makes an interesting point. I, too, would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that. I support the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham. How do the Government envisage this being used? Would there be different levels of payment for each different reason that a person would leave, dependent on how long they had been in post and that sort of thing? Those are my concerns about this amendment.

Lord West of Spithead: In one word, flexibility is the cry. A key theme of the policing Green Paper is greater local accountability. Therefore, ensuring that police authorities have all the options necessary to act in the best interest of communities is important. The new chief officer appointments framework will increase the focus on chief officers' performance. However, the Government recognise—although I cannot give a specific example—that there easily could be a circumstance where, as a result of the changing needs of the force or of the individual, the current chief officer is no longer the best person to lead their force.
	Therefore, the regulations would allow police authorities to exercise their discretion in agreeing the appropriate compensation for a chief officer to leave before the end of his contract if it is not the best way forward overall, given that this would not imply any lack of performance on behalf of the officer. One can see occasions where one is not actually in a position to remove an officer because his performance is not adequate, but because of a change in circumstances it is in everyone's benefit for that person to move on. That is what this provision aims to achieve, and it is necessary for setting out a clear mechanism for a policy authority to make such payments, if required.
	My noble friend Lord Harris talked of incentives; I am afraid that I do not have the statistics on those outside the norm at my fingertips, but perhaps I may look into that and get back to him on that specific point separately from this debate, because I am not aware of those. As I say, it is for flexibility; having given greater local accountability to allow people to make the best moves necessary to ensure that they have the best person there, as there are changing circumstances. I hope that clarification will suffice, and I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Baroness Hanham: I am surprised that this does not exist already. In employment law, I would have thought that there was always a right for an authority to terminate employment. It gives no indication of whether this would be done under employment law, or of the sort of levels of payment that there might be. It gives no indication of whether that payment would fall on the pension fund, because so often early retirement—which is what this would be—amounts to that. It only says that this is going to come in within regulations. What are those regulations going to be?
	It is a very broad statement to say that payments can be made. There is nothing to give any substance to what that is going to be. I accept the circumstances as I laid them out; I suggested that it might be when there was an interest in changing the way that authorities were run, and vacancies were having to be created. Neither does it indicate whether this is something that might be a quasi-disciplinary matter. Can the Minister put a little more flesh on this?

Lord West of Spithead: The aim is that this should absolutely not be a disciplinary matter, because there are rules to go through for that. We need a clear power in statute to support the payments where appropriate. We want to give discretion in each case to the individual police authority, so I have not been more specific about the amounts. I am afraid that I do not have the answer on the pension at my fingertips. Maybe I could come back to the noble Baroness outside the debate on the detail of that.

Baroness Hanham: I am grateful to the Minister but am still quizzical. I shall probably return to the subject because, if ever a situation causes angst, difficulty and consternation, it is to do with payments, whether pay-off payments or whatever. We have had huge examples not too far down the line of what people have discovered in finding out how much payments will be. I would be grateful to know whether there will be any guidance on where the payments are coming from—it might be the pension fund. Would they constitute a year's salary or more than that? How will that be laid down? If we get the Freedom of Information Act coming in and somebody asks the question and finds out what payments are made, there will be plenty of room for mischief and trouble. As I said earlier, we need a bit more flesh on this. I would be grateful if the Minister would give me that so that I could decide whether to bring the amendment back on Report.

Lord West of Spithead: The noble Baroness raises some good points. I shall get back to her in some detail on them.

Baroness Hanham: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 12 withdrawn.

Lord Geddes: The Question is that Clause 13 stand part of the Bill.

Noble Lords: Clause 3!

Lord Geddes: I beg your Lordships' pardon. I cannot read my own writing.
	Debate on whether Clause 3 should stand part of the Bill.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: That almost gave me a heart attack.
	I will now raise yet again the issue of the large number of regulation-making powers in the Bill for the Secretary of State. I am afraid that you will hear a great deal more from me on the subject as the Bill progresses. It is fundamentally an unsatisfactory way to make laws. The powers tend to be wide-ranging and non-specific to make sure that every future possibility is catered for, but that is completely unclear about what is intended in the first place. This clause is no exception. What precisely is meant by,
	"steps to be taken in connection with the appointment of senior officers"?
	That is very wide-ranging. Might it include, for instance, limiting the number of candidates put forward for interview, which follows on from the issues discussed on Clause 2 about the role of the senior appointments panel? I am also not clear whether the new paragraph on payments to senior officers is designed to mandate or prevent large golden handshakes being doled out to failing senior officers who depart prematurely. I had a lot of experience of that over the years when I was chairing my own police authority.
	I understand that one key driver for the provision was a concern on the part of ACPO that chief officers were not always fully consulted by police authorities before the authorities made appointments at deputy or assistant chief constable rank. However, I understand from the Association of Police Authorities that protocols governing the topic have now been agreed between it and ACPO in principle, which looks like a good move. I do not see any reason to regulate on the subject at all if the main reason that drove the inclusion of the clause has been removed. It remains the job of the police authority, not the Home Secretary, to appoint chief officers and to determine the pay and conditions on which they are appointed. Regulation-making powers of this nature look like an attempt to erode and blur this important line and they are to be greatly resisted.

Lord West of Spithead: Clause 3 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations which will support the work of the senior appointments panel—the subject of Clause 2—and enable police authorities to agree appropriate compensation for chief officers who leave a force before the end of their fixed-term appointment.
	The key theme for the policing Green Paper is greater local accountability. Enabling police authorities to act in the best interest of the force to ensure it has the right leadership to enable it to deliver for the public is critical. The new chief officer appointments framework increases the focus on the performance of chief officers. However, the Government recognise that there could be circumstances when there is a need to change the individual, as I discussed before, and Clause 3 allows police authorities to exercise their discretion in agreeing the appropriate compensation.
	Additional functions would relate to the appointment of senior officers and would be conferred by the Secretary of State, following consultation with a panel. These may be required so that the work of the panel can evolve to best meet the needs of the tripartite. I do not believe this gives too much power to the Secretary of State. It is necessary to have order-making powers to confer additional functions on the panel. We are creating a more flexible structure and allowing further consultation with stakeholders. Before conferring additional functions, the Secretary of State must consult the panel—so the Secretary of State is not acting in an autocratic way—giving all the panel members, both independent and tripartite, an opportunity for a full discussion. Parliamentary committees looked at all the orders laid before the House, providing an additional check, so there are checks and balances.
	Clause 3 agreed.

Lord Geddes: Before calling Amendment 13, I must advise the Committee that if it is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 14 to 16 inclusive due to pre-emption.
	Clause 4 : Metropolitan police force appointments
	Amendment 13
	 Moved by Lord Imbert
	13: Clause 4, page 4, leave out lines 16 to 40 and insert—
	""(2) Any appointment of an Assistant Commissioner shall be made by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, subject to regulations under section 50.
	(2A) Before appointing an Assistant Commissioner the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis shall—
	(a) consult the Metropolitan Police Authority, and
	(b) obtain the approval of the Secretary of State."
	(3) In section 9FA (Deputy Assistant Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis) for subsection (2) substitute—
	"(2) Any appointment of a Deputy Assistant Commissioner shall be made by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, subject to regulations under section 50.
	(2A) Before appointing a Deputy Assistant Commissioner the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis shall—
	(a) consult the Metropolitan Police Authority, and
	(b) obtain the approval of the Secretary of State."
	(4) In section 9G (Commanders in the metropolitan police force) for subsection (2) substitute—
	"(2) Any appointment of a Commander in the metropolitan police force shall be made by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, subject to regulations under section 50.
	(2A) Before appointing a Commander in the metropolitan police force the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis shall—
	(a) consult the Metropolitan Police Authority, and
	(b) obtain the approval of the Secretary of State.""

Lord Imbert: I begin with an apology. I was unable to be present in your Lordships' House for Second Reading and, thereby, to make early comment on Clause 4 and give notice of my intention to table an amendment. I know convention does not demand that I give reasons for that omission, but as a matter of courtesy and good practice, I shall do so. Only a few days ago, I returned from a course of post-stroke therapy, which has kept me from attendance in your Lordships' House, but I hope that it will now enhance my involvement, enabling me to speak without juxtaposing words and to stand before you more steadily.
	I have tabled this amendment with the full knowledge and support of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. It accords with his wishes and reflects his fears for the future accountability of the commissioner and my fears for the further politicising of policing. This amendment applies only to London, our capital city, since it already has an elected mayor and regional government. I declare an interest and past involvement as a former chief constable of a large provincial constabulary, and as a former Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. Yes, I am the archetypal yesterday's man or, perhaps more correctly, the day-before-yesterday's man. None the less, this gives me some insight into the present system of selections. Having observed how the office of Metropolitan Police Commissioner has, in the last few years, been buffeted backwards and forwards in a party-political cauldron, I firmly believe it is time to take policing out of politics and to take politics—as far as possible political influence and most definitely political direction—out of policing.
	I repeat my emphasis that my amendment refers only to our capital city. The arrangements for appointing the commissioner and deputy commissioner should, however, remain unchanged because of their national responsibilities. Similarly, the arrangements for selecting chief officers in other parts of the country would remain as envisaged in the Bill.
	Since the creation of the post of Mayor of London and the amendment to the Greater London Authority Act, which enables him to chair the police authority, there is enhanced accountability for the commissioner in London, with potentially significant consequences. If that accountability almost by osmosis turns into increased direction and operational control by political appointees, we will have moved a significant step towards a system obtaining under totalitarian regimes where the reigning political power has operational control and direction of policing. Freedom to demonstrate peacefully has long been cherished in this country and authority to march or hold a protest meeting should be given only on public order grounds and without political consideration.
	I have a short anecdote. A number of years ago I was considered to be a leading police figure in the fight against terrorism and in the art of negotiation. I was invited to share such knowledge as I had with police services in many different countries. When I went to the capital city of a particular large but friendly state, as a matter of good practice I visited the commissioner of police before I began a series of lectures to police, military and government personnel within his country. His office was on the 18th floor of the police headquarters. I returned to the city three years later and took the lift to the 18th floor, ready to pay my courtesy call on the boss. "Sorry, sir", said the local officer who accompanied me, "the commissioner has now moved to a lower floor. These upper offices are now occupied by the police Minister and his staff". I got the message immediately, as had everyone else, no doubt. Operational decisions, direction and control were firmly in the hands of the politicians.
	Policing is too important to be left solely in the hands of politicians or indeed solely in the hands of the police. We must find a way to get the right balance for the benefit of the public we serve. Will we one day see a future mayor with an office on the upper floors of New Scotland Yard? I return to my main theme. If the mayor as chair of the authority can hold the commissioner and his or her top team to account, it is only right that the commissioner should have the power to appoint that top team. I understand that the outgoing Home Secretary, the mayor, the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority and the deputy mayor for policing have acknowledged the good sense of the commissioner's suggestion that this should be the way forward.
	This is about leadership. The leader of an organisation like the Metropolitan Police with a staff of more than 30,000 personnel must have a vision of how to improve policing of the metropolis for the benefit of all law-abiding residents and for those who work in, visit or pass through this great city. He or she must articulate that vision, obtain public acceptance and then, together with loyal disciples, put it into practice. If those who are to turn the vision into reality are selected by anyone other than the commissioner, they may, because of influence from elsewhere, be going down a different path.
	I re-emphasise that I do not advocate any change in the Bill relating to the selection of senior personnel in other than the Metropolitan Police. From my experience there is a much more transparent and—dare I say?—civilised approach, to such matters elsewhere. In my time as chief constable of Thames Valley Police, the selection board comprised the non-political chairman of the police authority and two members from each of the major political parties. As chief constable, the merits of the various candidates were discussed with me. Although the selection was rightly carried out by those members of the police authority, they would not have selected someone to whom I was opposed or have gone against my advice—an altogether civilised approach to get the best, most suitable candidate for the job.
	London, however, is a different kettle of fish. I reiterate that since the creation of the post of Mayor of London and the amendment to the Greater London Authority Act, which enables him to chair the Metropolitan Police Authority, there is enhanced accountability in London with potentially significant consequences, as we saw with the departure of Sir Ian Blair when the mayor withdrew his support. Let us not mince words. Sir Ian Blair was sacked. We can pussyfoot our way around with fine words about an amicable discussion, but the end of the story is that he was fired. He had to go; no alternative. The mayor had been voted in and he was not going anywhere.
	If the chairman of Thames Valley Police Authority, when I was chief constable, had said that he would no longer give me his support in running the force, I would have known which way he was pointing. I commend the amendment as a way of reducing the risk of party politics becoming unnecessarily involved in or influencing policing in our capital city.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority and former chair of that authority. I have enormous respect for the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, whose views on most matters to do with policing I listen to with great interest, and I usually agree profoundly with what he says.
	On this occasion, however, I disagree profoundly with what he says. I think that he has misunderstood the current situation in London and the position of some of the key players. First, the amendment is a retrograde step, which goes against the philosophy and changes proposed in the Bill. It goes against the spirit of giving more control and say to local communities in the running of the police service, and it goes against ways of opening up the police service to the influence of the local community.
	I was distressed to hear the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, say that the amendment was proposed with the full knowledge and support of the present Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. I have no reason to doubt that that is the case, but if so, it is a serious breach of faith between him and the police authority in London. This matter has not been discussed with the Metropolitan Police authority. It may have been the subject of private discussions with the Mayor of London and the deputy Mayor of London with responsibility for policing, but they have not expressed the views of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Were the amendment to be carried, it would increase rather than diminish the risk of politicisation of policing decisions in London. We would create a situation in which the commissioner was more likely to be set against the views and wishes of the police authority than one where the commissioner was working with the authority.
	In my time, I have chaired appointments panels for a large number of commanders, deputy assistant commissioners and assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. I have participated in a number of such appointment panels subsequently. In all of those the commissioner has been an important adviser. As I understand the Bill, that position would be strengthened to give the commissioner the power essentially to veto. I think that it would be a veto if a commissioner said that he was not happy with a particular candidate. The proposal suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Imbert—

Lord Clinton-Davis: Is the noble Lord saying that we ought to have more time for discussion with the police authority on this matter?

Lord Harris of Haringey: I am suggesting that we should not support the amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, might want to think again and talk more widely about it. The arrangements in the Bill provide all the safeguards that the commissioner needs to have the sort of management team and people that he wants, but at the same time it makes clear the relevance and importance of public accountability of other senior officers. An assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is the equivalent of a chief constable outside London. Under this Bill, assistant chief constables and deputy chief constables will be clearly appointed by the police authority. This amendment would make London different. The result is likely to create more of a gulf between the commissioner and the police authority to which the person is accountable.
	In practice, if you are to carry the public of London with the difficult policing decisions that need to be taken, it is important that they, through the police authority, have confidence in those holding significant office. The arrangements that have been put in place will set up confidence rather than diminish it. The amendment would be a retrograde step and I hope that when responding, my noble friend will say that the Government also think that it is a retrograde step. As I say, I have the most enormous respect for the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, on most policing matters, but I hope that he will recognise that perhaps this is not a sensible way forward.

Baroness Henig: I understand where the amendment is coming from. It has elements to which I am sympathetic but I must oppose it in this form for reasons that I shall outline.
	I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, that party politics have absolutely no place in policing. I am sure that we all agree on that. I understand the concerns lying behind the amendment and the worry of a commissioner, or any chief constable who has to be judged by the team around them. They fear that while others choose the team, they will be judged on the team's performance, which could lead to problems. The fear is misplaced because appointments tend to be made by the chief and the police authority working closely together. It is rare for it not to work that way, but I understand the fear.
	As my noble friend said, outside London police chiefs are locally accountable to their authorities. I think that the same principle should apply in London. For those elements of policing that are relevant to London the commissioner has to be accountable to the Metropolitan Police Authority. I accept that there may be national functions for which the commissioner has direct responsibility to the Secretary of State. That is where policing in London differs because it has that twin element to it. For me, political proportionality is absolutely key. No police authority should be dominated by a political party one way or another. The biggest change that I have witnessed in policing since the 1990s is that many people who have worked with police authorities in the past 10 to 15 years have worked to make policing and police authorities non-party-political. To make the Association of Police Authorities an all-party-respected national body is crucial to this discussion. If I felt for a minute that the police authority in London was unduly politicised, I would be much more concerned. I would certainly be more mindful to support the noble Lord.
	My worry is not for now but for the future; in this amendment, we see the dark shadow of the future. If we go down the road of direct election to police authorities—if we go down the road of elected commissioners—this issue about the politicisation of policing will come back to this House. That is why I am so vehemently opposed to some of the proposals I have heard. Police authorities and policing have to be above politics. That is a crucial principle, with which I am sure we would all agree.

Lord Borrie: It is a pleasure to see and hear the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, once again in this Chamber—and in good voice. We heard everything he had to say, and while colleagues who have spoken so far may not have agreed with him, he has made his case clearly. I have no doubt the Minister will be glad that the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, has spoken in the way he has, with his long experience in police forces, not only as head of the Metropolitan Police, but also, of course, outside London.
	I find this an extremely difficult issue. In favour of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, is the point that the Commissioner wants the very senior police commissioners and assistant commissioners around him on a day-to-day basis to work together as a coherent, harmonious team. That is in the interest of the running of the police force and, of course, in the public of London. On the other hand, there are the points that my noble colleagues have already made; one wants in the team surrounding the Metropolitan Commissioner—assistant commissioners and commander—people who are independently minded and who have their own views; people who will contribute, sometimes strongly, and perhaps to the irritation of the Commissioner, their views. It is important that the group surrounding the Commissioner is independently minded. It is also most important to avoid the risk, and the reality, of cronyism, which can come from appointments all being made at the top level by the Commissioner himself.
	I find this extremely difficult. Because it is so difficult, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, will consider the matter—especially in the light of comments that were made by colleagues earlier in the debate; perhaps he will consider withdrawing the amendment. Ultimately, the accountability to the police authority is probably what should count in the creation not only of the Commissioner himself but of the most senior deputies and assistants who surround him; they are the equivalent, as one of my noble colleagues said, of a "chief constable elsewhere", and therefore ought, perhaps, to be appointed by the authority itself.

Lord West of Spithead: A number of noble Lords have already mentioned this, but I think the whole House welcomes the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, back again. He is in fine form, having completed whatever course it was; the noble Lord's charming wife has been the regimental sergeant-major who has driven him down this route, and I have been filled with admiration for that as well.
	I would like to thank the noble Lord for raising the important issue of the senior appointment arrangements in the Metropolitan Police Service. As he knows, Clause 4 of the Bill already corrects an anomaly. Previously, the Commissioner had no formal voice in the appointment of officers at the rank of assistant commissioner, deputy assistant commissioner and commander. We have ensured that there is a formal role now for consultation.
	The noble Lord is not alone in making the case to go further. The Metropolitan Police is unique in the scale of its operations and in the national functions that it carries. Under current arrangements this has meant that the MPA has to appoint a far larger number of senior officers than in any other force in this country. The Government are sympathetic to the view that this may not reflect the best balance of police authority oversight and leadership of the organisation by the Commissioner. After all, it would seem entirely reasonable for the most senior and accountable member of an organisation as large and with such wide-reaching functions as the Met to be able to have a full role in appointing his or her own senior staff.
	I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Borrie about the importance of having independence among one's subordinates, but it is always a question of balance. I would not have liked, on a ship of mine, a second in command who tried to run a totally different ship from the one I wanted. However, were such a change to be made, I am of the view that there should be a balancing change to the legislation concerning the removal of senior officers at the ranks that the Commissioner took responsibility for. It would be unusual to lead on the appointment of a senior team and then not even to be consulted were removal to be considered. Indeed not having this role may not be the best basis for generating confidence in those seeking appointment, and therefore potentially undermine such appointments at a very basic level.
	However, I am also aware that there are differing views on this matter, for example those articulated by my noble friends Lord Harris of Haringey and Lady Henig. There are significant issues to consider. In particular, we need to ensure that any new arrangements for Met appointments will deliver improvements both to the strength and the diversity of leadership within the force. They will also need to ensure accountability and transparency so that the Commissioner could be held to account for the increased responsibility for appointments.
	A key issue is where the line is clearest drawn between the oversight functions of the MPA and the leadership of the Commissioner, and whether this would include a change in the lead role for the strategic rank of assistant commissioner as well as the broader senior team. I welcome debate on this matter, but the MPA continuing to lead on assistant commissioners' appointments would mean that the top three levels in the organisational structure were not appointed by the Commissioner, equivalent to the strategic appointments role taken by police authorities nationally.

Lord Clinton-Davis: Would the Minister indicate what discussions have taken place between the Government and the Metropolitan Police Authority about this particular point?

Lord West of Spithead: As far as I am aware, there have been some discussions at official level, but nothing further. The previous Home Secretary felt that maybe some moves should be made in this area, but nothing formal had been agreed.
	I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, for raising this matter, and while I am sympathetic to some of the principles underlying this amendment, I would wish to consider and consult on the matter further, before reaching a decision. On the basis, I would invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Imbert: I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this discussion, and I thank in particular the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, and the Minister for their comments in welcoming me back from my all-too-frequent absences from your Lordships' House. I shall pass on the Minister's comments to my wife, no doubt with a bouquet of flowers, which will not go down to expenses, if you will forgive me for saying so. I respect the views of the noble Lord, Lord Harris; I may not agree with them, but I do respect them. In the light of the comments by the Minister about reflecting on this matter, I have at least put up a marker, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 13 withdrawn.
	Amendment 14
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	14: Clause 4, page 4, leave out line 22

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendments 14, 15 and 16 leave out the words,
	"obtain the approval of the Secretary of State".
	We have been over this ground, so I shall not detain the Committee overlong. Amendment 17, which concerns the appointment of chief constables and assistant chief constables, touches on what we have just been talking about. Again, it is the question of the Secretary of State overseeing the appointment of assistant commissioners of the Met police. However, we should be decentralising, as envisaged in the Green Paper, and not adding another layer to an already complex process.
	I listened with great interest to what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said about the position of the Mayor of London. I do not see that position written into this clause, yet the present incumbent of that post had a great deal to do with the removal of the previous commissioner and the appointment of the new one—and a very good choice it was. Is it intended that he, too, will have a hand in this? If so, where might that be written?
	These highly skilled officers are appointed after a thorough grilling by many professional channels, including the senior appointments panel. One would have thought that all that scrutiny of their undoubted abilities would be sufficient for the MPA and the commissioner alone to agree without the final stamp of approval of the Secretary of State. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I support the amendment on the basis that I hope we will get clarity from the Minister about the successive repetition of the phrase,
	"obtain the approval of the Secretary of State".
	Is it intended to mean that candidates who are appointed will have been through the senior appointments panel before the appointments process or is it adding yet another stage to the appointments process so that after candidates have been through the senior appointments panel, having been short-listed and interviewed under a police authority process, they then have to go back for final approval by the Secretary of State? If it is the former rather than the latter, it seems a very cumbersome legislative way of expressing it. If it is the latter—that is, if there is a three-stage process with candidates first having to be vetted by the senior appointments panel, then being appointed by the police authority in consultation with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and then going for approval by the Secretary of State—I think that we will have created a new situation. It seems to me unnecessarily cumbersome, with an element of control-freakery, for the Home Office to control who fills senior office in the Met.

Lord Bradshaw: I have taken part on a number of these panels and I should like the Minister to explain very carefully who in the Home Office will use his name to carry out this approval. When you sit on an appointments panel with a list of names that have already been approved, it is usual at the end of the session—the chief constable is usually there—to appoint a person immediately. You do not have to say, "Thank you all very much. We'll let you know when the Secretary of State has given his ruling", knowing full well that it will not be the Secretary of State but one of his functionaries.

Viscount Bridgeman: The noble Lords, Lord Harris of Haringey and Lord Bradshaw, have made some very telling points, and we look forward to the Minister's reply.

Lord West of Spithead: Amendments 14, 15 and 16 would remove the approval role of the Secretary of State in appointments to the Metropolitan Police at assistant commissioner, deputy assistant commissioner and commander levels. Amendment 17 would insert a new clause to allow a police authority to appoint and remove a senior officer without reference to the Secretary of State.
	The Government recognise the hugely important role of police authorities, including the need to hold to account chief officers. However, the most senior officers have national roles to play, as well as leading within the communities that they serve. Therefore, it is necessary to retain a role for central government in approving these appointments and in any removal procedures.
	Indeed, in certain circumstances, in may be necessary for the Home Secretary to take action, under Section 42 of the Police Act 1996, directly to secure the removal of a chief officer. There are cases where efficiency and effectiveness questions are of such severity that the Home Secretary needs to have the power to act in the public interest, notwithstanding the actions of the police authority. Examples of where this could have been required include the need to restore confidence in Humberside Police following the Soham murders, and in Sussex Police as a consequence of the shooting—

Lord Harris of Haringey: I am grateful to my noble friend. The answer that he is giving, although compelling and interesting, is about the removal of senior officers, whereas the amendment is about the appointment of senior officers. Are we suggesting that in the Humberside case the Home Secretary of the day would have been so prescient that, at the moment the chief constable of Humberside was appointed, he would instantly have withheld his approval on the basis of what might happen some years in the future?

Lord West of Spithead: I was giving an example of where the Home Secretary might require the power to act in a specific case. My noble friend Lord Harris asked about this being another stage. The SAP advises the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State has already approved the short-list, and his approval is required because of the national role of these officers.
	The posts in the Metropolitan Police covered by the amendment are equivalent in seniority to chief constables, deputy chief constables and assistant chief constables. Therefore, the post holders are making a contribution of national significance and the Home Secretary needs to ensure that candidates have the necessary qualifications and expertise—for example, in collaboration between forces—to perform at this level. The amendments would also undermine the role of the senior appointments panel by preventing it advising on appointments to these ranks.

Lord Bradshaw: Is the Minister really suggesting that when the names are put forward for interview, the Home Secretary has already approved them but that somehow, between the time the approval is given by the Secretary of State and the interviews take place, these people suddenly become unsuitable and the Home Secretary changes his mind? That seems quite incredible.

Lord West of Spithead: I can think of occasions when, as Naval Secretary, I approved lists of people for promotion and there were then boards and so on, but when one looked in more detail, one discovered things that perhaps had not cropped up previously. Therefore, such a situation is feasible. I am simply going by personal experience of promotions within another organisation. Perhaps in the police that never happens but I just give that single example.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way yet again on this point. He seems to be saying that this is genuinely a three or perhaps a four-stage process. The first stage is that the Secretary of State gives approval to candidates to be interviewed through the senior appointments panel. The second stage is an interview by the police authority, and the third stage is consultation with the commissioner. However, there is then a fourth stage in which the Secretary of State either gives or declines to give approval to someone who has been through that process. Therefore, this clause creates a new superstructure in the appointments process for the Metropolitan Police, effectively giving the Home Secretary far more opportunities to intervene. I had assumed in my naivety that repeating the phrase,
	"obtain the approval of the Secretary of State",
	was simply a rather cack-handed way for the parliamentary draftsman to refer to the role of the senior appointments panel. However, we are now being told, although I hope I am wrong, that there will be an additional stage to the appointments process—something that was not deemed necessary when the Greater London Authority Act created a police authority for London, and something that was not deemed necessary when the precise arrangements for chairing the police authority were changed with an amendment to the Greater London Authority Act. I just wonder what appointment has taken place in the past nine years that the Home Secretary feels that he now needs these powers.

Lord West of Spithead: As I understand it, that is what happens, but I will get advice from the Box on the exact stages. At the first stage, candidates are approved by the Home Secretary on advice from the SAP. The second stage is the interviews. At the third stage, the police authority decides who to appoint and there is no further role for the Home Secretary. I am afraid that I confused noble Lords with my last statement. I hope that that clarifies to my noble friend Lord Harris that there are still three stages, and that that is what is meant.
	I gave some examples of where this might be required. I dealt with posts in the Metropolitan Police covered by the amendments. The tripartite has agreed a leadership strategy for the service that provides an analysis of the skills required in the top ranks of policing, in particular a need for further development in business, organisational and partnership working, alongside maintaining excellent operational skills. In order for the vision to be delivered, it is essential that the senior appointments panel is able to advise on appointments to all senior posts, and for all appointments to have the benefit of the panel's expertise.
	I hope that noble Lords can see that the amendments are not in the interest either of improving senior appointments in the Met, or of supporting the senior appointments panel in its work; and that Clause 2 is not a centralising measure, but is important to ensure that we have the best people leading the police in future, to protect the public locally and nationally. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I am grateful to the noble Lord for clarifying what is without doubt a very blurred area. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, for supporting my amendments. That was an unusual but very welcome addition to our debate. I am grateful also to my noble friend Lord Bradshaw, who will be speaking at greater length as we debate the Bill.
	I do not agree with the Minister—he will not be surprised to hear me say that. I keep on about the powers of the Secretary of State. They have been thoroughly aired and we will probably debate them again later in the Bill. However, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 14 withdrawn.
	Amendments 15 and 16 not moved.
	Clause 4 agreed.
	Amendment 17 not moved.
	Amendment 18
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	18: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause—
	"Responsibilities of police authorities
	(1) Each police authority may determine its own local precept agreement with the relevant local council or councils as appropriate to its individual requirements.
	(2) Each police authority may determine its own fiscal priorities in accordance with its individual requirements.
	(3) The Secretary of State may not give unsolicited directions to police authorities on local precepts, minimum budgets or fiscal priorities.
	(4) Each police authority has a duty to consult with the Secretary of State, and to take account of national policing authorities.
	(5) The Police Act 1996 (c. 16) is amended as follows.
	(6) In section 6(2) (general functions of police authorities), omit paragraph (a).
	(7) In section 6(2)(c) leave out ", whether in compliance with a direction under section 38 or otherwise".
	(8) In section 6 omit subsection (3).
	(9) For section 37A (setting of strategic priorities for police authorities) substitute—
	"37A Policing objectives
	Each individual police authority must determine objectives for the policing of their own local area."
	(10) For section 38 (setting of performance targets) substitute—
	"38 Levels of performance
	Where an objective has been determined under section 37, the relevant police authority shall establish levels of performance (performance targets to be aimed at in seeking to achieve the objective)."
	(11) Section 39 (codes of practice) is repealed.
	(12) Section 41 (directions as to a minimum budget) is repealed.
	(13) Section 44 (reports from chief constables) is repealed.
	(14) The Local Government Act 1999 (c. 27) is amended as follows.
	(15) In section 31(9) (major precepting authorities: further recognition), after "1992" insert ", but excluding police authorities and the Metropolitan Police Authority"."

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The amendment was discussed in Committee in the other place. The proposed new clause sets out the responsibilities of police authorities. It gives them the power to determine their own council tax precepts and removes the powers of the Home Secretary to override it. It also gives police authorities the power to determine their own local policing priorities. Amendment 18 would give a directly elected police authority complete control over setting its precept, without being subject to the directives of central government, and therefore without the rate-capping and precept-capping powers that we have lived with for 20 years or more. It would also give the police authority more power and independence to set its own objectives in response to its local needs, community and electorate. Those objectives would differ in different parts of the country. We hear about postcode lotteries, but to some extent they must be accepted. If local bodies—be they health bodies, local councils or police bodies—are elected to represent local views, there will be some differences in where communities in different parts of the country put their emphasis. I beg to move.

Lord Bradshaw: I return to the vexed issue of the rate capping in Surrey. This took place just before local county council elections, which would have determined the political appointees to the police authority. It is they who are in the majority when the precept is agreed—they must be in the majority. When the people of Surrey support the police authority—which they did—is it right that the Government should say, "You have had your say, you have said that you want these people and what they are doing, yet in the interests of local democracy we know better, and we set aside your decision"? Police authorities are aware of the need to keep the council tax down. They are also well aware of the efficiency opportunities in their area that they could take advantage of to do so. The Government are going beyond their role in stepping on what local people want.

Lord West of Spithead: Clearly, the noble Baronesses tabled these amendments because they think the Secretary of State's powers and involvement in the budgetary and financial affairs, strategic direction and performance management of police authorities need to be fettered to allow them greater autonomy in determining their budgets. The proposed new clause suggests that police authorities do not already have the ability to determine their own local precepts. In fact, they already have the powers suggested by this amendment—under Section 40 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, read with Section 19 of the Police Act 1996—and will continue to do so.
	More worryingly, the proposed new clause seeks to remove the Government's powers to cap police authorities. Ministers currently have powers under the Local Government Finance Act 1992—amended by the Local Government Act 1999—to cap excessive increases in council tax. These important powers protect council tax payers from excessive increases in council tax; but they are reserve powers, and are not used lightly. The Government are reluctant to cap, but cannot stand back and ignore circumstances where council tax payers are being subjected to excessive increases. It was a manifesto commitment that we would cap where such action was appropriate.
	The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, mentioned the Surrey police authority. The Government imposed a cap on its precept because, for the second year running, it was the only authority in England and Wales to propose an excessive increase in its precept. The noble Lord said that council tax payers in Surrey were happy about the increase. I do not know whether a survey showed that they were happy about the increase to their council tax—in most places in Britain, people are not happy about such increases. The matter of the Surrey police authority has been raised a number of times in the House.
	When capping action is initiated, authorities have a right to challenge their proposed caps, and Ministers are bound to consider their representations carefully before taking a final decision. Authorities can be confident that, under the current system, they can present their case and ensure that Ministers are fully aware of their circumstances before taking a final decision. This is being done. When a decision is taken to cap an authority in-year, or in advance for the following year, it is subject to the approval of the House of Commons unless an authority has accepted its proposed cap.
	The proposed new clause goes on to remove the powers of the Secretary of State to make strategic policing priorities, performance targets and codes of practice. There will always be a need for national co-ordination of policing, so we will always need a national strategic framework to ensure that policing is being delivered efficiently and effectively. Strategic policing priorities, and the targets that flow from them, are vital to achieving this, as is the power to establish codes of conduct. They are always set at a very high level, stating what the Home Secretary thinks should be considered by police authorities when exercising their functions. They do not dictate how an authority acts or how it should act, but merely allow for a modest degree of national co-ordination of priorities. Removing them would mean that each authority would have to consult individually with the Secretary of State, and there would be no co-ordinated setting of priorities, as there is now.
	I see no reason to remove the current provisions, only to replace them with a duty to consult with the Home Secretary. That would be far more time-consuming for the authorities, as they would need to do this individually with no national co-ordination of strategy.
	I hope I have been able to convince the noble Baroness and the Committee that, in budgetary management, police authorities already have some of the powers that are being sought in the amendments, that some of the existing safeguards on capping are necessary, and that the proposed removal of the Secretary of State's powers would spoil the very fine balance between local efficient and effective delivery policing and nationally co-ordinated and strategically consistent efficient and effective policing. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The Minister and I will never agree on this point. The effect of what he is saying is a great tightening band around police authorities' freedoms to manage their affairs sensibly. Police authorities do not go spending willy-nilly money that they do not have or cannot raise properly. I advise the Minister that in north Yorkshire a number of years ago—not under my watch; it was as soon as I left, when the Conservatives took over the running of the authority—the precept ranged enormously. It was the largest in the country. It is not right to say that this cannot happen and that the Home Secretary can impose a cap. He did not do so when north Yorkshire did what it did, because it was done proportionately. Local people have voted for what they want their police authority to provide. I fear that we will go over this again and again, and I apologise to the Minister for continue to nag him about it, but at this point I know that we are not going to get any further, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 18 withdrawn.
	Clause 5 : Police collaboration
	Amendment 19
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	19: Clause 5, page 5, leave out lines 18 to 20

Baroness Henig: Amendments 19 and 21 are the first of many amendments to deal with issues of collaboration. Their aim is to make collaboration effective. To do that, we have to make clear where the responsibility needs to lie to ensure that there is collaboration and that it does not undermine existing accountabilities.
	Ever since the Police Act was passed in 1996, each police authority has had a statutory duty to ensure that the police force for its area is efficient and effective. In addition, new arrangements were brought in three years ago under the Police and Justice Act, which gave a police authority the statutory duty to ensure that its force collaborates where this improves efficiency and effectiveness in policing for a wider area, not just for the area of its own force. Amendment 19 is therefore consistent with a police authority's existing duties. Against this, it is not currently the primary duty of chief officers to determine what is efficient and effective, which the amendment makes clear. The Bill allows room for confusion to be created about who should determine efficiency and effectiveness in the context of collaboration.
	One would hope that disagreements about whether to collaborate would rarely, if ever, arise between a police authority and its chief officer, but if this were to happen the Bill's wording would simply result in deadlock. Potentially, this could be fully resolved only by the police authority firing the chief officer, which would be a rather unsatisfactory resolution, not least for the chief officer. The legislation therefore needs to be clear about who has the ultimate accountability for ensuring collaboration. The amendment would achieve this by removing the reference to the chief officer's judgment about efficiency and effectiveness. The key driver would then become the provision in the clause that follows: that a chief officer may make a collaboration agreement only with the approval of the police authority. That is consistent with current legislation.
	The second amendment in the group—Amendment 21, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, will speak—reinforces this approach and the overarching role of the police authority to determine what is efficient and effective. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendment 21 is grouped with Amendment 19. As the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has just pointed out, the two amendments are related.
	The noble Baroness has already spoken about the background to the amendments, so I will not repeat it. I agree with her that the Bill needs to be clear about where the ultimate accountability rests in order to ensure collaboration. I also agree with her that this is not clear at the moment, for the reasons that she outlined. Collaboration is really too important to leave this open to interpretation.
	My amendment would add to Amendment 19 and make this crystal clear. It would provide that a police authority could approve a police force collaboration agreement only if it believed that the agreement was in the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of one or more police forces. This is consistent with the police authorities' existing powers and would reiterate this in the context of force collaboration agreements.

Viscount Bridgeman: We find Amendments 19 and 21 very sensible because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, has said, they are designed to relate to the interests of the efficiency or effectiveness of one or more police forces. I particularly take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that firing the chief police officer would be a draconian move. I also very much support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond.

Lord West of Spithead: Efficiency and effectiveness at all levels of policing are at the heart of the purpose of encouraging collaboration. It is right that efficiency and effectiveness should be the test used in assessing whether a joint approach is the best approach to follow when considering such an agreement. Police authorities have the central function of ensuring that the policing of their areas is efficient and effective, so they have a wider responsibility to support these aims for the community through collaboration.
	My noble friend Lady Henig talked about the chief officer being asked to judge efficiency and effectiveness. There is no question but that the ultimate judgment of efficiency and effectiveness should be made by police authorities. This links into one of their core functions and goes to the heart of their purpose, but that does not mean that a chief police officer should have no regard to these considerations. It is also important to remember that a chief police officer is depended on for his professional judgment of operational effectiveness, and it would be wrong to undervalue the importance of his advice on how policing is best delivered in our communities.
	The concern behind these two amendments is that this position should be upheld. Amendment 19 would remove the consideration of efficiency and effectiveness from chief officers, while Amendment 21 would clarify that it was the basis on which police authorities must approve agreements. However, these changes are not necessary as, under the provisions that we are bringing forward, the police authority's judgment is the deciding one and the police authority would not approve the agreement if it did not consider it to be in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness.
	In addition, the amendments may overlook the fact that police forces are expected to deliver efficient and effective services, for which their authorities hold them to account. Therefore, both the chief officer and the police authority can be relied on for their professional judgment to propose agreements that will deliver operational effectiveness. Both the chief officer and his authority will bear in mind the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposal when considering the options for collaboration and I suggest that any alternative position should be questioned.
	Nothing in Clause 5 contradicts the existing statutory responsibilities of police authorities to deliver an efficient and effective police force, so I suggest that the amendments are unnecessary and ask that they not be pressed.

Baroness Henig: I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, for their support for my amendment. I have listened carefully to what my noble friend has just said. I agree with him that the police authorities have an absolutely central function in ensuring efficiency and effectiveness. I also hear what he says about the chief officer needing to have regard particularly to operational effectiveness. This takes me back to the old days when police officers used to say to us, "That is operational and you can't interfere". We have moved on from those days. We have agreed that there are strategic discussions to be had and that the police authority shares with the chief officer the responsibility for strategic oversight and has this very important judgment to make.
	I was pleased to hear my noble friend say that the police authorities' judgment was the deciding judgment. If that is the case, we do not seem to be carrying this logic through. If the police authority has this deciding role, in the interests of clarity that needs to be underlined and made clear in the legislation. I submit, with respect, that the situation is not clearly defined at the moment. I do not totally support my noble friend's argument, as logic suggests that we should not be afraid of spelling out what this entails, which is that the police authority should be the deciding voice, as my amendment suggests. I will withdraw the amendment, but we might need to return to this at a later stage.
	Amendment 19 withdrawn.
	Amendment 20
	 Moved by Lord Campbell-Savours
	20: Clause 5, page 5, line 22, at end insert—
	"( ) A chief officer may make an agreement only after consulting with representatives of police authority employees."

Lord Campbell-Savours: The Bill has major implications for staff and for the trade union UNISON, which has a substantial membership in staffing grades within police forces. Those comprise a group identified under proposed new Section 23(3) of the 1996 Police Act as civilian employees. My amendment would require chief constables to consult trade union representatives over any proposals for police force collaboration agreements.
	I make it clear that I have no relationship of a pecuniary or financial nature whatsoever with UNISON. I simply raise in this House on occasions amendments in which it has an interest because I agree with the position that the union has taken.
	Such agreements, which are being strongly promoted by Home Office Ministers, would see individual forces creating collaborative arrangements to deliver protective services across their respective force areas. This push for collaboration arose from an HMIC assessment that protective services, particularly in relation to serious organised crime, murder or counterterrorism, were patchy across different forces. The union's concern over collaboration agreements is that they will have major implications for the location and, potentially, terms and conditions of its members who are police staff. Police staff involved in collaborative projects may have to relocate to another force area and come under the management of a different force while remaining the employee of their parent force.
	The amendment would require each chief constable to consult his or her UNISON branch to ensure that all workforce matters work properly and are at least properly considered in the context of collaborative plans. The union has discussed the amendment in principle with the Police Minister, Vernon Coaker, and, although the Government indicated that they would not support putting the amendment on the face of the Bill, they had intended that the intention behind the amendment would find expression in the statutory guidance to follow the Act. Therefore, David Taylor MP—a good friend of mine in the other place—tabled the amendment at Report stage in the House of Commons with the aim of this intention being confirmed in Hansard. Unfortunately, the amendment was not debated, due to the volume of business being considered—and, if I might add, due to the inadequate arrangements for scrutiny of legislation in the House of Commons. I hope that my noble friend will look sensitively at this amendment today. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I have a great deal of sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, but in effect police authorities would most certainly want to talk to their employees because, although they may be under the direction and control of the chief constable, it would be a poor authority that did not look to the interests of its staff and staff associations. I am at a bit of a loss to understand how their terms and conditions might be affected, as I understood the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, to say they might be if staff were moved to a different area. Again, there would have been consultation—certainly in the police authority areas that I know that are good employers—with the police authorities and certainly with the chief constable. If statutory guidance is going to be given under the Bill, I would welcome that, because this needs reinforcing if it is felt that it is lacking at the moment and that the Bill does not cover it.

Lord West of Spithead: I must admit that I have great sympathy with the point made by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours about scrutiny in the other place, but I do not think that I will go there at the moment.
	It would be inconsistent with other provisions in the Police Act to include a provision in the clause on police collaboration agreements to mandate consultation with bodies representing employees, as there is no similar provision about consulting them on other strategic changes to policing. I think that it would be unnecessary, too. It is well recognised that collaborative working impacts on the work of some police staff. For this reason, the statutory guidance supporting the revised framework will make clear the need to involve unions and staff associations representing the interests not only of employees but of warranted officers. I think that that was the statutory guidance to which my noble friend referred. That will be done from early on in the development of collaboration projects. This is one of the lessons learnt by those already engaged in collaborations.
	The essence of the amendment is certainly very good advice, and we encourage the approach, but it does not need to be enshrined in statute. In developing the statutory guidance, unions and staff associations are among the wide range of interested parties being consulted. I might point out that UNISON, which represents the majority of police authority employees, and the Police Federation have both signalled their desire to contribute and are doing so through the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.
	I hope that this gives my noble friend the confidence that he was looking for. I suggest that guidance on the full breadth of consultation appropriate to collaborations, developed with these representative organisations themselves, is the sensible approach. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Campbell-Savours: I will refer the comments of my noble friend to members of UNISON. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, for her comments, too. I thank my noble friend for his response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 20 withdrawn.
	Amendment 21 not moved.
	Amendment 22
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	22: Clause 5, page 6, line 6, leave out "with the approval of" and insert "after consulting with"

Baroness Henig: This amendment provides that a police authority must consult its chief officer before entering into an agreement involving employees who are under the direction and control of the chief officer, but it makes it clear that, ultimately, the decision to collaborate must remain with the authority. As the clause in the Bill stands, the words effectively provide chief officers with a mechanism to veto the decision of the authority if there is a disagreement about what is efficient and effective and about whether collaboration agreements should be entered into.
	Amendment 22 would maintain an important constitutional and governance line between police authorities and their chief officers. The police authority is the governing body and should not have to obtain the approval of its chief officer before entering into an agreement. I am sure that, from what my noble friend has said on this score previously, he would agree with the logic of what I have just said.
	A consequence of the original drafting could have the effect of reinstating the provision in the old Section 15 of the Police Act 1996, where, in effect, the authority had to get the chief officer's agreement to provide resources for itself. It is the same sort of logic here and I am sure that we would not want to return to that kind of situation, which is why I am moving this amendment. I want the Bill to restate with more clarity what I am sure is actually intended in terms of collaboration. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The amendment is connected to the debate that we have just had about ultimate accountability for ensuring that collaboration happens. This clause did not appear when the Bill was first published; an even more draconian variant was included at the Committee stage in the other place. This was subsequently replaced at the Report stage and Third Reading with the current wording, for which much thanks—or some thanks.
	The problem with the clause lies in the complexities of the employment status of police staff. They are employees of the authority but, as long as they are employed to assist the force as opposed to the authority, they remain under the direction and control of the chief officer. Under the collaboration provisions, police authorities are directly responsible for making agreements that relate to support services, including making collaborative arrangements about payroll services, fleet management and so on, but in practice this will be administered by police staff who are under the direction and control of the chief officer.
	The clause, therefore, again muddles responsibility and accountability for collaboration. It suggests that a police authority must seek the permission of the chief officer to use staff whom it employs to provide support to an agreement for which it is responsible. This effectively gives chief officers a veto over police authority collaboration agreements. This is totally unacceptable, as it hampers authorities in fulfilling their statutory duty to secure collaboration.
	In addition, the current wording would have the effect of reinstating the provision that was in the old Section 15 of the Police Act 1996. This was removed through the Police and Justice Act 2006 but, prior to that, an authority effectively had to get its chief officer's agreement to provide human resources for itself. I remember that all too well.
	The amendment more accurately reflects the situation that should exist, which is that a police authority should consult a chief officer before entering into a collaboration agreement that affects staff who are under his direction and control, but it should not have to seek his permission to collaborate. Noble Lords will require no prompting from me to recognise the absurdity of the situation. The police authority is the governing body of the police force—we keep repeating that—and to suggest that it should have to seek permission from the body that it governs in order to fulfil its own duties is to turn governance completely on its head.

Viscount Bridgeman: Once again the noble Baronesses, Lady Henig and Lady Harris of Richmond, have made a good case for the insertion of the amendment. Can the Minister say how much of a role the Government intend to give chief officers in deciding whether or not a collaboration agreement should go forward?

Lord West of Spithead: It is obviously important to ensure that collaboration agreements between police authorities are capable of providing for changes to the use of police staff, and new Section 23A ensures that. However, where a chief officer has direction and control over such police staff, that independent power should be protected and the chief officer should be asked to approve the particular provisions of the agreement that affect the job that they do—not the whole agreement, just the specific details.
	The amendment would enable police authorities to include plans for police staff under a collaboration agreement without needing first to get the approval of the chief officer who has been delegated control over them. They are all employees of the police authority, because the police force is not empowered to be an employer. However, to all intents and purposes, they work for the police force under the chief officer's direction and control. If a chief officer were to challenge a police authority proposal under these provisions, the authority should take account of his concerns. One would expect that such a discussion would follow the normal course of debate between the chief officer and his authority in order to reach an agreement weighing up the concerns of both sides.
	The power of direction and control is a necessary part of a chief officer's operational independence. If it were made open to interference, his authority would be undermined. However, having heard the debate, I should like to look into the matter a little further. It seems that there might be an anomaly and I should like to clarify it. On that basis, I would ask for the amendment to be withdrawn. I will look at this in detail and come back on that specific point.

Baroness Henig: I thank my noble friend for his reply and for the sliver of hope that we might be able to agree on this in the future. Relationships do not quite work in the way he described. A police authority and a chief officer consult; you do not have a situation where the chief officer says, "You are not going to do that", and then the police authority says, "We will". It does not work that way. If ever there was a scenario such as the one described, the thing would not work. It works 99.9 per cent of time through consultation and the good offices and common sense of the police authority and the chief constable. I hear what my noble friend said and I am heartened by it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 22 withdrawn.
	Amendment 23
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	23: Clause 5, page 6, line 16, after "payments" insert "and indemnities"

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendments 23 and 24 are interdependent, and I shall outline briefly why I think they are desirable. Collaboration in a policing context is a complex business, as many of your Lordships have gathered from our preceding debates about responsibility and governance.
	At the heart of this lies a tension between lines of control and lines of accountability under what are, essentially, joint ventures. These arrangements cross defined geographical boundaries in a situation where different bodies are responsible for governance and for operational responsibility. Under existing collaboration agreements, difficulties have arisen about indemnities relating to grievance and other claims against police officers who are acting under the terms of collaboration agreements. At present, the "home" force of a police officer retains responsibility to indemnify or otherwise cover any grievance or other claims which arise from that officer's actions. This remains the case even in a situation where that officer is acting under a collaboration agreement which places him under the command and control of another chief officer. In effect, this means that forces and authorities must provide indemnity for police officers against actions over which they may have no control when a collaboration agreement comes into play.
	The amendment closes this loophole. It enables responsibility for indemnities to be transferred to the force responsible for command and control where this is the most appropriate course of action. I beg to move.

Baroness Henig: I strongly support the amendment which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, said, covers the loophole that currently exists. It provides a stronger basis for ensuring that collaboration arrangements operate effectively and that indemnities are given to cover situations as necessary.

Lord West of Spithead: The two amendments raise the sensible point that indemnities which may need to be part of the detail of a collaboration arrangement should be considered before any agreement is made. The agreement may also need to set out where the responsibility for indemnities lies. It is a sensible point and sound advice.
	However, a permissive provision of this kind, in addition to the provisions already set out in proposed new Section 23B on payments, is not necessary to enable the inclusion of these details. I can confirm that it is intended that indemnity arrangements can and should be included by virtue of this new section.
	While I do not believe it is necessary to state indemnity specifically in statute, this is a useful piece of advice that will be included among the planned recommendations in the statutory guidance that the Secretary of State will be issuing to support the provisions along with many other subjects. It would be inappropriate to include all such details in primary legislation and trust that this House would agree that guidance based on best practice is a sensible place. The fact that it is in Hansard has been extremely useful. I thank the noble Baronesses for making this important point and placing it on the record with the fact that indemnity should be included along with other payments in proposed new Section 23B. I hope that on that basis the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: Before my noble friend comes back on her interesting and necessary point, under these collaborative arrangements, should it be necessary for a member of the public to know what the arrangements are, where to get redress, where to go in case of indemnity and so on, at the moment it is obvious where the line of accountability is. How will it be obvious to them when the new arrangements come in?

Lord West of Spithead: I do not believe that it should be in primary legislation. I will come back to the noble Baroness with details of the way in which the arrangements will be put across so they can be easily accessed.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I am most grateful to the Minister. Including this information in guidance is the appropriate way forward. As he said, it will be placed in Hansard so that everyone will be able to see what the intention is. I am most grateful to him and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 23 withdrawn.
	Amendment 24 not moved.
	Amendment 25
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	25: Clause 5, page 6, leave out lines 36 and 37

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Once again, I am afraid that we return to the wide-ranging powers of the Secretary of State in the Bill. This provision is unnecessary and is more likely to kill collaboration than encourage it. First, police authorities must already report collaboration agreements to the Secretary of State as efficiencies in one form or another, largely through their policing plans, which must still be lodged with the Home Secretary, although information on other efficiencies is also gathered through performance frameworks and audit. I am not altogether clear between these existing reporting arrangements and the overarching duty on police authorities to secure efficiency and effectiveness what the Home Secretary adds by being consulted in this way.
	On the contrary, there seem to be a number of disbenefits. It would add another layer of bureaucracy when the Home Office claims to be reducing bureaucracy. It would lead to delays in decision making and consequently delays to bring improvements in policing. It seems to fly in the face of the Green Paper proposals for more local devolution. If the intention is to retain a strategic grip at the centre, why is there no de minimis provision? Even low value minor agreements will require consultation with the Secretary of State if they involve more than six parties, as proposed, which begins to look like micromanagement.
	For example, a number of police authorities might decide to share a member of staff to help with technical interpretation of forced performance information, or they might put in a joint bid for funding, perhaps to support an initiative linked to anti-social behaviour. Does that really need the Secretary of State's permission? Taken together, those requirements are likely to act as a deterrent and disincentive to collaboration. Collaboration should be encouraged by incentives, not stifled by bureaucracy. Speaking in the sixth sitting of the Public Bill Committee on the Policing and Crime Bill on 3 February, my honourable friend Paul Holmes said:
	"It would be a huge culture shock for any Minister—be it policing, education, or health—to give up micro-managing all these aspects of life. The Minister said that it could not happen and it could not work, but it does in most western democratic countries where central Governments do not have power over decisions on local health provision, the police force, education and so forth. It is a culture shock that one day, hopefully, the British Government will get to grips with".—[Official Report, Commons, Policing and Crime Bill Committee, 3/2/2009; col. 209.]
	I agree with his sentiments and hope that the Minister will be able to give me some reassurance.
	Finally, it is completely unclear to me how "six parties" is defined. If police authorities and police forces enter agreements together, does it mean that the provision will be triggered if more than three police areas wanted to work together on something? I beg to move.

Baroness Hanham: I am interested in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, because it raises many questions. We have not explored in great detail the Government's proposals about collaboration. As I understand it, collaboration could extend from anything to do with IT and amalgamating the behind-office organisation to security and employing detectives across the piece. There seems to be a host of areas where such collaboration could take place. There is interesting wording, which is not six or more other "authorities" but six or more other "parties". How is "parties" to be defined? The collaboration agreements as I understand them are to be with other police forces, but parties is a different word. I wonder whether there is an expectation that collaboration can take place with, for example, a local authority.
	An agreement to have an arrangement to share payroll with a local authority would open up a wider debate on where the collaboration is going to take us. Perhaps when the Minister replies he could expand a little more on where the collaboration agreements are going to go, how widely they are going to go and whether they can be wider than between police forces.

Lord West of Spithead: The issue raised in proposed new Section 23C(1) was discussed at Second Reading by several noble Lords. I would like to reassure them that the Bill's provisions are not intended as a form of micromanagement being imposed on the police service because the Home Office does not trust it to make its own judgment on collaboration.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, properly pointed out, the police have been carrying out collaborations for a long time. For that reason there is no blanket requirement for all collaboration plans to be given the Government's stamp of approval. However, where agreements are so geographically extensive that they exceed even the largest of the ACPO policing regions—six police force areas being the largest for these regions—that would represent a strategically significant development of which the Government would want to be aware as early as possible. It is possible that such planned agreements could work against broader plans nationally. The Home Office and its police partners would need to ensure that such a conflict did not arise. That is why we are looking at that provision. Under the new provisions, individual collaboration agreements can be made only by forces or police authorities. A collaboration involving six forces and six authorities will therefore be formed using two agreements of six parties each under the legislation. Therefore such collaboration would not trigger the safeguard, but if it was greater, it would.
	That concern was raised by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary during the consultation with the police service on the legislation's development. There was general agreement that a mechanism was needed with as light a touch as possible to guard against that eventuality. I am happy to clarify that we are determined that the process of seeking approval in such a case would not impose any significant burden, although I appreciate that timing can be an issue. Large-scale agreements are not made overnight and early notice of such plans on the scale being considered should allow the Secretary of State, with the advice of HMIC, ample room to confirm within the appropriate time frame that there is no conflict.
	In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, we are trying to look at collaboration across the board at all levels, covering almost everything, so that we can work better and more closely together. As I say, we are looking at these larger-scale collaboration agreements as ones where we would like to monitor and take action, while in the smaller-scale agreements we would let people get on with it themselves. For the reasons I have given, I cannot agree to the proposed amendment. I hope that, on the basis of these assurances, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I thank the Minister as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, who asked a range of relevant questions about collaboration.
	In my area, North Yorkshire, a very large rural area crossing the whole of England almost at the top of the country, we collaborate with West Yorkshire, Humberside and South Yorkshire. That is an enormous region. Is it then considered necessary for that huge rural area with a mix of urban and rural forces—mainly urban, with South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire—to collaborate with, say, Cleveland just over one side of the border and Cumbria on the other? Would that trigger the six parties? Would the Home Secretary say that those two little forces that made up the six had triggered his wanting to know what was going on?
	I ask this because it seems strange, although and I do not know whether the Minister is able to reply. Little Cleveland has a tiny force just to the north of North Yorkshire, where everyone can be hurled together in 30 minutes—the whole of the police force can be at police headquarters in that time. Cumbria may not be quite like that but, again, it is a big rural area, on the edge of North Yorkshire. I still do not see the point of the six parties being specified so clearly. Will the Minister comment on that before I think about withdrawing my amendment?

Lord West of Spithead: We picked the figure of six because it is the number of police force areas in the largest known region. The process is triggered by the figure going over six—when it goes to seven, eight or nine—because we believe that that represents a strategically significant development that the Government would want to be aware of. It might be that it is a tiny thing that has no real impact but, as HMIC said during the consultation, the Government should be aware of it. That is how we have arrived at that figure.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The Government "being aware of" and the Government "interfering with" are perhaps two different things. I will read carefully what the Minister has said. We still might come back to this on Report, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 25 withdrawn.
	Amendment 26
	 Moved by Baroness Hanham
	26: Clause 5, page 7, leave out lines 1 to 3

Baroness Hanham: This small amendment tries to clarify proposed new subsection 23C(5). As I understand it, the collaboration agreement can be entered into by either the police authority or the chief officer, in which case both sides have to consult the other. A police authority cannot enter a collaboration agreement without having consulted the chief officer, and a chief officer cannot enter into a collaborative agreement without the agreement of the police authority. If they all agree to the collaboration, that is fine—but what if they do not agree, to stop it? How does the consultation go again?
	The police authority says to the chief officer, "We don't think this collaboration's any good. It's not working at all. We think that we ought to talk to the other authority and call it all off". The chief officer says, "It's going absolutely fine. I don't want this to stop". Or, the other way around, the chief officer who entered into it thinks it ought to stop, but the police authority does not think so. Where does the authority actually lie for terminating those agreements if there is a disagreement between one police authority and its chief officer?

Lord West of Spithead: The provision of the proposed new subsection requires police forces and authorities to reach a mutual agreement in order to dissolve a collaboration venture. They must therefore show a degree of commitment that I believe collaborations require. That protects the group as a whole from the dangers of losing a partner, and I argue that it is more important to protect the group than to allow each party the freedom to unilaterally withdraw once that agreement has been made. If one party were to withdraw, it would leave the rest to try to make new arrangements work, or the collaboration might collapse altogether.
	If the investment made by any party to a collaboration agreement were vulnerable to the sudden withdrawal of another party, the risks could seriously damage the chances of the opportunity being taken forward. Equally, it could be argued that if the participants were not prepared to make this commitment, the case for a particular collaboration may need to be questioned. It is vital to be able to trust partners in a collaboration agreement where significant resources may be committed and they might well have had to commit those resources to this collaboration.
	If the amendment were to be accepted, it could result in police forces not engaging in collaboration agreements where they would be beneficial, or in minor disagreements resulting in agreements falling apart; whereas the clause as it stands means that the parties involved have to take these seriously. It therefore has benefit because it makes sure that the parties are committed to it, they are fully locked in and there will not be any loss or waste of resources in terms of value for money. In the light of this, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Baroness Hanham: It may sound like semantics, but it seems that the Minister has not quite answered the question. There could potentially be a disagreement. Take the police authority that has entered into a collaborative agreement. It has consulted with its chief officer, who has said, "OK, I don't mind doing that". After two years, though, the police authority says, "This absolutely is not working", or, "It is far too expensive", or, "We think that it's time that we viewed it again", and the police authority on the other side of the agreement is quite happy about that. However, the chief officer, with whom they consulted originally and whose agreement they had to have, says, "I don't agree with you. The chief officer on the other side and I think that the agreement is wonderful and is working spectacularly well". Who has the authority to finally decide that the agreement can be ended? This is a disagreement in one particular police authority between that police authority and its chief officer.

Lord West of Spithead: I did not answer the noble Baroness's question, and I see exactly where she is coming from. The police authority has to agree to a police force agreement; if it does not agree, the force cannot terminate that. However, the procedure is not clear enough in the Bill. I take the point that things might change two or three years down the track. While it makes sense that in the short term no one can suddenly say, "I've changed my mind", and try to terminate it, I agree that there may be circumstances over the slightly longer term where there has to be a mechanism for this to be debated. I would like to come back to the noble Baroness on that, because the question of how that would be done needs to be resolved. If she is happy with that, I ask her to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Hanham: I am grateful to the Minister. I look forward to that coming back, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 26 withdrawn.
	Amendment 27
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	27: Clause 5, page 7, line 3, at end insert—
	"( ) A collaboration agreement may be entered into jointly by a police authority and the police force for its area with another party or parties.
	( ) Any police force collaboration agreements which imposes any legal liability on the police authority must include the police authority as a party to that agreement."

Baroness Henig: As with previous amendments, this one aims to bring greater clarity to collaboration agreements. The first paragraph would make it explicit that police authorities and their police forces could enter agreements jointly. I am not convinced that this is currently clear in the Bill.
	On the contrary, the way in which the Bill is drafted makes an absolute distinction between operational agreements—to be entered into by police forces—and agreements relating to support services, which are to be entered into by police authorities. This distinction also implies an absolute separation of the two functions, which is much more sharply drawn than in the current legislation governing collaboration. It is true that this allows for separate force and authority agreements, but it is less precise about the exact nature of these agreements. Because existing legislation is, in some senses, more permissive than the replacement now being proposed, it has been customary to enter into many collaboration agreements jointly, as between force and authority. This makes sense where an essentially operational agreement requires support services to make it effective. In fact, it is hard to think of any area of collaboration that is so operationally focused that it would not require some element of administrative back-up. Perhaps, to a lesser extent, the argument also holds the other way around, when collaboration might focus on administrative support but impact on some element of operational policing.
	The point of this section of the Bill is to improve on existing legislation to better enable collaboration and bring greater clarity to the respective roles of the authority and the force. This is to be supported, but I fear that, unless the Bill explicitly permits joint arrangements, it will have the opposite effect. I know the Minister will argue that this is unnecessary because there is nothing in the legislation that says joint agreements cannot be entered into, but I am not convinced that it is so straightforward. The existing wording at least implies that joint agreements are not possible because of the absolute separation of functions. If this is so, it would render most existing collaboration agreements unworkable and prevent, rather than encourage, a significant proportion of new agreements.
	The second paragraph ensures that any police force collaboration agreement that commits a police authority to a financial or legal liability must include that police authority as a party to that agreement. This refers largely to the position of police authorities as both employers to the police and budget holders for their force, with a duty of care to their employees and a financial stewardship for the budget. The amendment acknowledges this position and puts in place arrangements that prevent an authority's legal liabilities being compromised through agreements that might otherwise be outside their control. In moving this amendment, I reiterate that it is designed to be helpful and bring greater clarity to the impetus to encourage more widespread and effective collaboration. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I have added my name to this amendment. There is no need for me to reiterate what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has said. I share her concern about the Bill making an absolute separation between operational agreements by forces and support services by police authorities. It would be very helpful if that distinction could be cleared up.

Lord West of Spithead: There has been some confusion over separation in this legislation—in how it deals with the agreements between forces or police authorities. It has been suggested that such a separation indicates that police forces cannot engage with their authorities and come to agreements with them about the details of the collaborative work that they want to do. This divide is not new; it is also in the current legislation. Both the current and new provisions provide for separate agreements to preserve the important distinctions between the functions of forces and authorities. It would not have made sense to confer power on chief officers to agree matters relating to the exercise of functions by their police authority, and vice versa. Neither would it have made sense for two chief officers to decide how they are to be held to account. These two groups will be signing up to wholly different agreements, reflecting their own responsibilities. However, this is not to say that authorities and forces will not work together to ensure effective collaboration. In practice, a substantial collaborative enterprise normally involves both kinds of agreement in parallel. These new provisions continue to support agreements in which all the parties come together and sign up to an arrangement where each agrees to their specific role.
	The wording of the amendment is intended to ensure that police authorities will always be party to agreements by their forces when police force collaboration plans impose a legal liability on them. Under the provisions that we are bringing in, police authorities will have to be involved in all police force collaboration agreements. Under Section 23(6) they must approve all police force agreements. Therefore, they will need to approve any liability imposed upon them. They will also need to consider their own agreements to facilitate jointly the force collaboration. Under new Section 23D the authorities must agree on the arrangements to be followed to ensure that accountability for the force collaboration will be delivered, and must publish those arrangements alongside the details of the collaboration agreement.
	The agreement between the forces and the agreement between the authorities will most likely take the form of a single collaboration document that satisfies the legislation in both the current Section 23 and the new provisions. There is no need to specify that both sorts of agreement can be combined in a single document but this practice will no doubt continue and indeed will be provided for in example agreements that will be included with the supporting guidance that we intend to publish. On the basis of this assurance that the intention of the amendment is already served by the draft provisions, I ask that it be withdrawn.

Baroness Henig: I thank my noble friend for his very clear explanation. I will say only that the intention of the amendment was to improve collaboration by making it more effective and ensuring that no obstacles were in its path. It is quite clear that my noble friend and I share the same objective. It is just that he hopes that it will be achieved in a more overall way by some general provisions that he has cited. I was concerned to remove obstacles at a more detailed level. I hear what he says and may return to this at a latter stage. At this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 27 withdrawn.
	Amendment 28
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	28: Clause 5, page 7, line 6, after "force" insert "or a joint committee of those authorities involved in the agreement as specified under section 23D(3),"

Baroness Henig: In moving Amendment 28, I will speak also to Amendment 36A. Amendment 28 aims to put beyond doubt the arrangements about police accountability under the collaboration provisions set out in this section. It strengthens the other parts of the section, which I welcome as a genuine attempt to bring clarity to this tricky area, aiming to set out how chief officers will be held to account under collaboration arrangements. This has proved difficult in practice under existing arrangements, and it is crucially important to get this right under the new proposals. While I agree that the Bill makes a good start, I am not convinced that the existing wording adequately covers collaboration arrangements overseen by joint committees of the police authorities involved. The amendment is therefore specifically designed to address this situation.
	The existing wording in this clause seems merely to reiterate that a police authority holds its own chief officer to account, which is something that authorities do under existing legislation in any case. It does not seem to deal adequately with the complexities of holding to account for arrangements that extend beyond the boundary of the police authority concerned. This might occur when a force's chief officer conducts operations in another force area under a collaboration agreement. There are difficulties in squaring this accountability circle at present. On the one hand, there is uncertainty as to whether the home authority can ask a chief officer to answer to it over conduct outside its area. On the other, there is doubt about whether the authority in whose area the officer is operating can hold him or her to account. This is generally overcome by those authorities forming a joint committee, but in the past some chief officers have questioned the authority of a joint committee to hold them to account. While joint arrangements are mentioned in subsection (3), these are oblique and do not seem explicitly to deal with accountability. Because accountability and answerability are fundamental in getting collaboration right, the arrangements to make this work in a joint context need to be clear and beyond doubt in the Bill. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendment 36A in this grouping is intended to assist collaboration and make its operation easier and more effective. At the risk of boring the Committee to death, to explain how this helps I need to address some of the complexities of local government legislation and some of the history of police authorities.
	At present, unlike other local government bodies, a police authority is not allowed to arrange for any of its functions to be discharged by another police authority. This prohibition is set out in Section 107 of the Local Government Act 1972. In 1972, when this Act came into force, police authorities were still committees of local authorities, as I explained earlier. In those circumstances, it was inappropriate for police authorities to have an independent legal status outside of their councils, and to arrange for another police authority to carry out their functions. But since 1995, police authorities have had an independent legal status, yet remain covered by arrangements which are no longer appropriate in this respect. This restriction has a particularly detrimental effect on joint procurement. Local authorities that wish to make joint procurement arrangements will usually nominate one authority to take the lead on behalf of the other authorities involved. This is usually the authority with the most expertise and experience to manage the procurement process, while other authorities contribute to the cost on a pro rata basis.
	However, these arrangements are predicated on being able to delegate certain functions. So this option is denied to police authorities, which cannot arrange for another authority to discharge their functions, including arranging for and awarding contracts. In practical terms this means that every authority or force taking part in collaborative procurement arrangements has to be a legal party and signatory to the procurement contract, to avoid falling foul of this section of the 1972 Act. Naturally, the result is needless bureaucracy and a disincentive to collaboration. The amendment would resolve this situation and so facilitate much greater collaboration, particularly in relation to procurement, which has driven significant efficiencies in local government.

Baroness Hanham: I support the amendment. As regards collaborative arrangements, it is extremely important that a mechanism is set up to see that joint arrangements are working. I suspect that there would have to be—as the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, suggested—a joint committee made up of members from each of the authorities involved. Given that the police authorities are not able to delegate, it is vital that proper arrangements are in place to ensure that the collaborative work can be carried out satisfactorily in terms of legalities and supervision. There is a lot to be said for this amendment and I hope that the Minister will be able to accept it.

Lord West of Spithead: My noble friend Lady Henig is entirely right that police authorities should be able to deliver their function of holding a chief officer to account for collaborations by way of a joint committee of police authorities, as proposed in Amendment 28. Subsection (3) of new Section 23D actually encourages consideration of joint committees for this purpose.
	However, the Local Government Act 1972, by virtue of Sections 101(1) and 107(1)(a), already allows police authorities to delegate the discharging of their functions to joint committees of police authorities. This amendment is therefore not needed.
	Amendment 36A also concerns the Local Government Act and its provisions regarding the exercise of the functions of police authorities. As already noted, this Act is useful in allowing joint police authority committees to deliver accountability functions under a collaboration agreement. In this way a police authority can already deliver some of its duties jointly under the Local Government Act, such as that of holding a chief constable who is leading a collaboration agreement to account for his work on that joint endeavour.
	However, the principle that the police authority is ultimately responsible for policing in its own area is sound and should remain at the core of what a police authority is all about, whether it exercises that responsibility collaboratively or independently. Even in those cases where collaboration takes a lead force approach, each police authority needs to continue to be involved as the body with overall responsibility for policing of its area.
	There may be some merit in the suggestion which has been put forward recently by the Association of Police Authorities that some employment and procurement difficulties in collaborations might be eased by the ability to delegate to each other some of the functions relating to those areas. These are complex areas and we would not want to make any such amendment before examining the detail and the extent of any such proposal, and giving it close consideration.
	But I beg to suggest that this amendment is too sweeping in its wording and would allow a police authority to divest itself of any or all of its core functions. I question whether this House would support enabling one police authority to delegate to another all responsibility for holding its chief officer to account for the delivery of policing on, say, counterterrorism, or its responsibility to promote equality and diversity.
	I know, however, that a number of police authorities are firmly of the opinion that an amendment of some kind to the police authority provisions in the Local Government Act would be of genuine benefit to collaborations on procurement in particular—procurement is an issue very close to my heart—and I would welcome further work between the Home Office and the association to examine such an approach. In the light of this, I request that the noble Baroness withdraws the amendment.

Baroness Henig: I thank my noble friend for his reply. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Hanham and Lady Harris, for speaking in support of these amendments. In thanking my noble friend for what he has just said, I very much hope that it will be possible for the Home Office and the Association of Police Authorities, and any other bodies that can make a useful contribution, to get together to see whether any amendments can achieve the objective which I think we all seek; namely, to make collaboration more effective and meaningful and to see it working on the ground. I think that all of us in our different ways are trying to ensure that. In the light of that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 28 withdrawn.
	Amendment 29
	 Moved by Baroness Hanham
	29: Clause 5, page 7, line 28, at end insert—
	"23EA Collaboration agreements: report
	(1) A person who makes a collaboration agreement must submit a report on the working of the agreement annually to the Secretary of State who shall lay it before both Houses of Parliament.
	(2) A report under subsection (1) shall include an assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the agreement."

Baroness Hanham: There is a lot to be learnt from collaborative arrangements. They already operate to a limited extent but as they become more and more a part of the lives of police authorities and police forces, lessons will be learnt about where they work, where they do not work, where disagreements arise or do not arise, where there are huge benefits and where there are financial benefits. My amendment seeks to probe how that information will be assembled, taken into account and communicated across all the authorities.
	In lobbing the Secretary of State into this matter, I am arguing for the opposite of what I have argued for throughout the Bill. I suggest that an annual report on any collaborative arrangement should be submitted to the Secretary of State and laid before the House. We could perhaps limit that to the first few years so that the learning process only would be covered. I believe that it would be beneficial and very useful for that information to be freely available so that people do not have to try to find it. If that were the case, they would know that a report had been made and that it would be published, and they could take account of it. That would be useful for police authorities, police forces, local government and anybody else who has a role in the matter. It might also be of marginal interest to the Secretary of State who would receive the reports. I seek purely to provide a follow-through for these collaborative arrangements to see how they are working. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: These Benches are minded to support this amendment. It seems to be a good idea. It would be very useful to know how collaboration is working between forces. We hope that it works well as we certainly would not want to go down the merger route again.
	I have a question for the noble Baroness if she is willing to answer it. Is she able to clarify that the amendment would apply to each person who makes an agreement—that, for example, if two forces decided to work together, two reports would be produced, one from each chief officer? It would be useful to see whether there were circumstances where collaboration had worked for one force but not another, so that lessons might be learnt. If the Minister and the noble Baroness are able to help me there, I would be grateful.

Baroness Hanham: It might be helpful for me simply to say that that is how the amendment is worded. The lay person would be the chief officer on either side. It would be a joint report, but both would be reporting.

Lord West of Spithead: I was delighted to see that the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, spotted the irony of the amendment, which I have to say runs the risk of adding significant unnecessary bureaucracy for those who have entered into a collaboration agreement. It could deter some from entering into joint working arrangements; I am not convinced that it would do that, but it would add to bureaucracy. Since the Flanagan review, cutting back on bureaucracy has become an important aim of the Government, something about which we have been whipped by a number of people, so we take it very seriously. In that sense, the amendment would be a backward step.
	The Government have a clear role in setting the strategic direction and steering police collaboration in a way that benefits policing in the round, but the role of the centre should be limited to when it is really needed. That balance will not be achieved by the amendment. I understand why the amendment was tabled but police authorities already have, and under this clause will continue to benefit from, a clear remit to hold to account and oversee how policing is delivered in their policing area. That is no different for collaboration, and Clause 5 makes adequate arrangements for that. At the local level, the authorities need to pull data together; I agree that it would be useful to draw on that to see how collaboration is working. However, the amendment would do nothing other than add to bureaucracy, so on that basis I ask that it be withdrawn.

Baroness Hanham: There are ironies all round here. The noble Lord mentions Flanagan; I mention in passing that there seems remarkably little of Flanagan in the Bill. I commented on that on Second Reading, and I make the point again.
	We are all interested in getting rid of bureaucracy, but we ought to ensure that we learn lessons. None of this legislation may work; it may work beautifully, but it may not. There is a responsibility on those legislating to know how it is working. I hear what the Minister has said and, for today's purposes, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 29 withdrawn.
	Amendment 30
	 Moved by Viscount Bridgeman
	30: Clause 5, page 7, leave out lines 30 and 31

Viscount Bridgeman: I have been asked by my noble friend Lord Bates, who cannot be in his place, to remind the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, that Cleveland is not only a very small force but a very fine one.
	The Secretary of State remains on stage, because the amendments in this group seek to explore the involvement that the Secretary of State will have in collaboration agreements. We have been discussing the subject in other forms today. The Bill allows for both guidance and directions. Is it really appropriate for the Government to give directions about an agreement directly to a chief officer, over the head of his police authority?
	Do the Government intend to publish guidance under new Section 23F, or is it being introduced as a reserve power in case authorities and officers do not implement these agreements as intended? Is the direction power there merely to back up the guidance if it proves insufficient, or does the Minister imagine the Government taking a proactive role in seeking out opportunities for collaboration agreements and forcing authorities to engage in them?
	Given the intrusiveness that the two new sections allow, Amendment 31 in this group, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Harris and Lady Miller, seems very wise. Indeed, it seems sensible to require the consultation of not only ACPO and the APA, but the affected authority or chief officer. Similarly, Amendment 34 seems entirely in line with the Government's intentions and is another amendment we would support. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendments 31, 32, 34 and 35 in this group stand in my name, and I will deal with each in turn as quickly as I can.
	Amendment 31 is relatively straightforward and would ensure that the Secretary of State had to consult the APA and ACPO before issuing guidance about collaboration. That is only common sense, as they are the bodies responsible at national level for the other legs of the tripartite police governance arrangement. They are also the bodies with the practical experience of collaboration to be in a position to ensure that any guidance is workable.
	My remaining amendments essentially approach the same problem in slightly different ways. That problem is, of course and yet again, the wide-ranging powers for the Secretary of State set out in the new section about directions. The powers are particularly pernicious, because at best they can generously be interpreted as micromanagement, but at worst they represent a means by which policing could be restructured through the back door. I am sure that the Minister will assure me that that is definitely not the intention of the Government but, once the powers are there, someone someday might find it convenient to use them in a way which was not originally intended.
	My first and preferred solution would be to remove the powers altogether. That is the approach taken in Amendment 32. Incidentally, that would also apply to the following new section, which is about terminating collaboration agreements, but one amendment in that respect will suffice to make my point. However, I am sure that the Minister will remind us all how important the future stability and resilience of policing is. No doubt he will argue that the Secretary of State should, in extremis, be able to exercise powers to ensure that the police service is fit to meet the very real challenges it faces from serious crime and other such threats.
	Therefore, I have also suggested an alternative approach to moderating the way in which the powers of direction can be used. Amendment 34 levels the playing field to ensure that the Secretary of State must use the same criteria demanded of police authorities in judging whether or not to collaborate. That would ensure that the yardstick for all must be efficiency and effectiveness, and that the Home Secretary cannot exercise the draconian powers using other, unspecified criteria. Amendment 35 then provides that the powers of direction can only be used following the arrangements in Sections 40 and 40B of the Police Act 1996. Those sections set out very specific criteria and processes by which the Home Secretary can give directions to police authorities and chief officers. It would mean that directions could be triggered only when there was evidence that existing arrangements were failing to support adequate performance.
	The new section also ensures that directions can only be given to chief officers through the police authority. That is a very important safeguard to prevent direct political interference in policing by central government, and is a fundamental tenet of ensuring that policing is kept independent of the state. In addition, the powers of direction under the new section are subject to HMIC's view about the merits of the proposed direction. Finally, the authorities and forces concerned must be given an opportunity to make representations about the proposals.
	In tabling the amendments, I have sought to restrict what are very draconian, centralising powers. If the powers cannot be removed from the Bill altogether, they at least require reasonable checks and balances to ensure that they are not misused.

Lord West of Spithead: I shall take Amendments 32, 33, 34 and 35 first, and move on to Amendments 30 and 31. The first amendments aim to take out the direction powers that the Secretary of State would have to help shape the future of policing in the area, something that the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for. They would also remove the Secretary of State's power to publish guidance to support the implementation of the provisions.
	One of the key reasons for bringing forward the clauses on collaboration is to ensure that this increasingly important means by which to deliver policing benefits from a clear and robust framework that Parliament can approve. At the heart of this is the empowerment of police forces and authorities to enter into collaboration agreements where that is in the interest of policing. However, as the person accountable to Parliament for policing, an equally important part of this is the power for the Secretary of State to be able to ensure that collaboration is done in a way that benefits policing generally, and that arrangements are coherent, transparent and, where possible, consistent. That is not only sensible but constitutionally sound.
	If this is to be achieved in reality, any Secretary of State will need the requisite powers to influence collaboration when it is deemed to be in the interest of the overall efficiency and effectiveness of policing. Powers to direct are not new. Indeed, the powers to direct in this area of business replicate and provide clarity to the broad powers that the previous Government enacted through the Police Act 1996. Other direction powers that the Secretary of State already has under legislation that predates this Government give the Secretary of State powers of direction over elements of policing such as performance, priorities and policing areas. These powers, as is the case with our clauses, are to be exercised in consultation with the parties affected. This continues to be a sensible way for these arrangements to proceed.
	There is a view that any direction given under this new legislation should be in accordance with the arrangements under the Police Act 1996, in particular Sections 40 to 40B. However, these sections deal typically with forces and authorities found, via a report by Her Majesty's inspectorate, to have failed to discharge their functions effectively. While these clauses might be capable of enabling actions to be taken to remedy an individual force's failings, there might be wider strategic reasons, such as a move towards certain operational services being delivered at the regional level, which warrant central direction of a different kind.
	Directions of the sort described would need to be given both to the police forces involved to incorporate the changes to their structure and to the police authorities to incorporate the appropriate changes to accountability arrangements resulting. It is right to use Sections 40 and 40A to react to failings in performance, but, as we stated in the policing Green Paper, if we are to best serve the public interest, we must proactively engage with the service, including HMIC, and proactively determine where robust and consistent collaboration is needed. Directions here would serve to consolidate a consensus and not simply be used as a last resort, which is what lies behind Section 40. In addition, Section 40 goes no way towards specifying the sorts of directions about collaboration that may be given. The new provision in this subsection provides this clarification. As the Home Affairs Select Committee highlighted recently, there may well be a need to require collaboration to deliver improvements in certain policing areas, and where this is the case, it is right for Government to exercise their powers to achieve this. However, a prerequisite is for Government to have the powers in the first place.
	The case for a more robust and consistent collaboration is emerging, with collaboration on functions such as serious organised crime growing. In the light of this progress across policing, we have already asked Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary to work with partners to scope what policing functions could usefully benefit from a more robust collaborative framework. It has, in turn, highlighted a number of areas where it is arguably in the public interest to proceed in a consistent manner across the country.
	I know that some believe that the powers being sought under Clause 5 should be expressly limited to those instances where it is in the interests of the effectiveness and efficiency of policing. I agree. This is, in fact, already provided for under Section 36 of the Police Act, which requires any power of the Secretary of State under Section 1 of that Act, which these provisions amend, to be exercised in a manner that promotes those aims. As we have demonstrated with the recent HMIC report, the Secretary of State will always need to be able to assure Parliament that the actions and decisions taken are grounded in the drive to deliver an effective and efficient police service.
	Some have expressed concerns that these powers to direct are compromising the independence of the police. Protecting the independence of the police is at the heart of our constitution and a critical safeguard in preventing the abuse of power by the executive. However, we must be equally careful to distinguish between this and the Executive's role in ensuring that policing is delivered effectively and efficiently, ensuring the police have the right structures and processes in place to deliver this public-service ambition, and that it is in the public interest and in no way undermines or threatens the principle of police independence.
	The power to mandate in this area—which already exists—has been clarified by these clauses, demonstrating our desire to be clear about our intention in the area. It is unfair to suggest, as some have, that these powers are anything but open and transparent. After all, we set out our intention to consider requiring collaboration in our Green Paper in the summer of 2008. With collaboration becoming a major part of 21st century policing, it is right and proper that, as well as encouraging forces and authorities to pursue collaborative ventures, the Government reserve the right to consult those who are to receive directions—first, to help shape collaboration in those areas where they promote the efficiency and effectiveness of policing at a local, regional and national level, and, secondly, to intervene in those instances where a collaboration may benefit a few but is counterproductive to wider policing interests.
	I turn to Amendments 30 and 31. Statutory guidance is one of the key tools available to Government to ensure the effective implementation of new legislation and, in many instances, to clarify the intention of Parliament as a result of debates such as this one. This guidance becomes even more important where the legislation is seeking to drive organisational reform and new ways of working. In these instances, guidance allows delivery agents to avoid some of the pitfalls experienced by others, best value is achieved, and the legislation drives the necessary public service improvements. This is the purpose behind Section 23F, and to remove it would severely curtail the ability of Government to assist and shape public service reform, which is set out by this legislation but is underpinned by meaningful guidance of the kind that officials will work with the service to produce. This will of course include the APA, ACPO and all other partners helping to deliver effective policing. This consultation happens routinely. It is not restricted to the APA and ACPO and does not need to be included in primary legislation.
	Whilenon-statutory guidance can be issued without the need for primary legislation, as we have seen at Committee stage in the Commons and here today there are issues that are best dealt with in guidance but that are sufficiently important that statutory guidance, developed in partnership with partners, is best placed to ensure that delivery agents have regard to it.
	I know that that has been a long response but I hope that I have been able to set out the case for why the Secretary of State's powers to give directions about collaboration and to issue statutory guidance are both necessary and proportionate in collaboration agreements. In the light of my response, I would kindly ask the noble Lord and the noble Baronesses not to press their amendments.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am most grateful and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 30 withdrawn.
	Amendments 31 to 35 not moved.
	House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.38 pm.

Health: Mouth Cancer
	 — 
	Question for Short Debate

Tabled By Baroness Gardner of Parkes
	To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they propose to introduce screening for mouth cancer.

Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, this is not a new issue. Probably my first controversial amendment in your Lordships' House was when I moved an amendment to the Health and Medicines Bill 1988 to retain free dental examinations. I said:
	"The suggestion to bring in a charge for a dental examination is a retrograde step".—[Official Report, 19/7/88; col. 1220.]
	I was concerned that the introduction of a £3 fee would deter people from visiting their dentist and that they would either not be examined or examined more rarely as they stretched the time between visits to get better value for money.
	Knowing that there would be no point in asking people simply to vote for my amendment, I appreciated that the only way to get support was by winning the argument. Your Lordships have their own views on most subjects that we debate and these views are usually very well informed. The day before the amendment was to be considered, I asked every noble Lord whom I could find whether they would please try to be in the Chamber to hear the debate. Fortunately a large number attended from all sides of the House. When put to the vote, the amendment was passed—Contents 118, Not Contents 97. Unfortunately my success was short-lived. The other place reversed the decision and attached financial privilege, so that this House was prevented from reopening the matter.
	That was the beginning of the end of national health dentistry for all, but I had no idea how sadly the access for patients would deteriorate, of course aggravated by the introduction of a number of new dental contracts that make it very unprofitable, if manageable at all, for dentists to continue in full-time National Health Service practice.
	In last week's press, a headline read: "Millions unable to get appointment with NHS dentist". The Which? survey estimated that this applied to 3 million people in the previous two years. Again, there is nothing new there. Ever since Tony Blair assured us that everyone would have access to a National Health Service dentist, the numbers unable to do so have steadily increased. I know that we have heard stories of people pulling out their own teeth, but I am sure that that is a rare situation and no one could do it unless, due to loss of supporting bone, the tooth was very wobbly. I cannot accept that anyone today could willingly tolerate the pain of removing a solidly set tooth without an anaesthetic. Historically, in the days before dental anaesthesia, the norm was to have a noisy band beside the place in a town where "painless" extractions were offered. It was essential that the band played loudly enough for the following customers—I could hardly say patients—to be given the confidence to face an extraction.
	Enough of the misery of past history. My purpose in raising this issue is to suggest what can be done in practical terms to deal with people's lack of awareness of the danger of undetected mouth cancer—one of the most unpleasant of all types of cancer. Many of your Lordships will have read the moving articles written by the late John Diamond during his distressing illness. Oral cancer remains a lethal disease for more than half the cases diagnosed annually. Prevention is my aim.
	Oral cancer is defined as malignant neoplasms of the lip, tongue, gum, mouth, tonsil and pharynx. There has been no improvement in survival for decades and recent studies show that the incidence is increasing. No other cancer is increasing at this rate. In 1995, there were 3,673 new cases; the most recent figures available show that by 2005 there were almost 5,000 new cases a year, many in males under the age of 45. Nationwide the incidence has increased by 34 per cent, while in Scotland it has doubled in the past 10 years.
	The only way to improve this situation in the absence of effective primary prevention is by improved detection of lesions while they are small—that is, in the early stages. Those are not my words; they are in the report, Health Technology Assessment 2006; Vol 10: No 14. It goes on to say:
	"This may be achieved by increasing awareness among the population so that affected individuals may present earlier, or by screening or case finding for the detection of small, otherwise asymptomatic, cancers and precancers (secondary prevention)".
	One interesting finding of the report is that, although tobacco was long blamed, the reduction in tobacco usage has reduced lung cancer but over the same period there has been no reduction in oral cancer, which has increased in males in exactly the same age group as that with a decrease in lung cancer. The conclusion is that rising alcohol consumption may be a major factor in the rising incidence of oral cancer.
	Delay in diagnosis and presentation with late-stage disease may be due to patient delay or professional delay. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that better education as to signs and symptoms has created an earlier demand from patients for clinical examination. Therefore, there is a case for screening among high-risk groups for early detection of lesions at a treatable stage. Those in the high-risk categories could be offered screening, which the research that I have quoted indicates would be cost-effective.
	The British Dental Association endorsed the specific target in the 1994 oral health strategy that the rising incidence of oral cancer should be arrested by 2005. In 2002, the Chief Dental Officer for England set out, in NHS Dentistry: Options for Change, proposals for a modernised service with a standard oral health assessment. That would include a prevention element that covered,
	"lifestyle advice such as smoking cessation, oral health education, oral cancer screening".
	Screening programmes have been scientifically evaluated. The HTA report states:
	"It was shown that dentists can detect relevant lesions with a sensitivity ... and specificity ... similar to those obtained in other screening programmes".
	Analysis of data from more than 2,000 individuals in two pilot screening programmes showed a correct prediction of oral cancer or precancer in eight out of 10 positive cases. There were false positives, but this is usual in a pre-screen filter and acceptable, as such cases would be identified when given a detailed examination and tests. The prevalence of cancerous or precancerous lesions was 9 per cent compared with 2.7 per cent in the population as a whole. The 2006 HTA report states:
	"It would seem that general dental practice should be an ideal place to initiate a programme of screening for high-risk groups since dentists are already trained to examine the mouth and it would be a simple matter to examine for mucosal lesions opportunistically when a patient presents for some other, unrelated, purpose".
	I have no doubt that that is correct. My concern is about the millions of people who are not able to attend a National Health Service dentist and are unable to afford alternative private dental treatment.
	The Government tell us that they intend to provide a number of polyclincs with a wide range of treatment. Would these not be ideal places to make oral screening for mouth cancer available? Opportunistic screening—checking the mouth of someone who is attending for other treatment—in general medical practice has not been attempted. GPs do not receive training in oral mucosal examination and the general opinion is that it would be prohibitively expensive to introduce. Could not suitably trained nurses or dental hygienists check the mouths of those attending for other reasons? Clearly they would need a basic training, but they would then be able to refer the suspect cases for further examination and any necessary treatment.
	It seems that there may be a problem with this. I understand that, although nurses carry out many procedures as part of a medical team, the Dentists Act may not allow auxiliaries to carry out such an examination for screening for oral cancer. Could the Minister clarify this for me? Will general treatment in a polyclinic operate under rules that would permit this screening? If not, what changes in the law would be needed to make it possible? I know that there has been talk of a new dentists Act for years. Would that be needed to bring about this practical possibility or could it happen under the present laws?
	A paragraph that I must read to noble Lords is headed "Heterogeneity" and states:
	"Meta-regression was conducted to identify any significant differences in discriminatory ability between the programmes conducted in the two industrialised countries, England and Japan, and in the two developing countries of the Indian subcontinent. In the latter, (basic) trained health workers rather than dentists were employed as screeners, reflecting the prevailing economic circumstances in those regions".
	It was a much larger, house-to-house, case-finding programme. The paragraph continues:
	"No evidence of a difference in discriminatory ability was found".
	It was not the big words in that paragraph that impressed me, but the words,
	"reflecting the prevailing economic circumstances in those regions".
	At that time in 2006, the western world was affluent and the National Health Service had extra money poured in. Now we are facing economic realities and there is a real case for getting better value for money. The Indian screening programme is most interesting and is supportive of my suggestion that people could be effectively trained to carry out such preliminary assessments for oral cancer.
	The fundamental purpose of screening is to sort out the apparently well person who probably has the disease from those who probably do not. Experts and fully trained professionals should be used in the final determination, but basic assessments would not require that level of skilled cost to the NHS. It is time for us to address new practical procedures to deal with the growing problem of oral cancer.

Lord Colwyn: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for introducing this debate this evening. It will be difficult not to repeat many of the points that she has already made.
	Oral cancer is an increasing problem but, despite campaigning by the dental profession and other health professionals, public awareness is low. The number of cases has risen markedly in recent years, particularly in the younger age group, most commonly males aged from 35 to 64. Survival rates for those who suffer with oral cancer are low, and about 50 per cent die of the disease. Unlike other cancers, survival rates for oral cancer have failed to improve. A 2007 survey by the British Dental Health Foundation found that public awareness is about 50 per cent, and that more than 25 per cent thought that spicy foods were the primary cause of the condition.
	The causes of mouth cancer are well understood. Tobacco use, which includes chewing as well as smoking, especially in conjunction with the excessive intake of alcohol, dramatically increases a person's chance of suffering from the disease. It is thought that tobacco use and alcohol account for about 80 per cent of cases. People who smoke and drink excessively are up to 30 times more likely to develop the condition than those who do not. Some of the biggest users of tobacco are the ethnic communities. Chewing tobacco is a special problem because few people know that it can cause mouth cancer and other serious diseases.
	We also know that early detection improves the chances of survival and allows for simpler treatment. At any one time, nearly 13,000 people in the UK are living with oral cancer. But there is much work that must be done. The profile of those suffering with mouth cancer appears to have shifted slightly in recent years, with younger sufferers and a growth in the proportion of females affected. These trends must be monitored and further research must be carried out into the findings of new work which seems to establish a link between the sexually transmitted HP virus and mouth cancer.
	As a dentist myself, I understand the important role that dentists play in detecting oral cancer. Because we recall our patients for regular check-ups, we are one of the few groups of health professionals who regularly and routinely screen our patients and are ideally placed to spot white and red patches and ulcers that do not heal—the early symptoms of the condition. So ensuring that everyone is able to access a dentist really is vital to early detection of the condition. The problems many patients face accessing NHS dentistry have been well documented and must be solved.
	As important as ensuring that patients are able to access the health professionals most likely to spot symptoms of mouth cancer is ensuring that dentists are well placed to provide screening and preventive care. May 2007 saw the publication of a Department of Health report, Smokefree and smiling, which made numerous excellent recommendations about the ways in which dental teams can be trained in smoking cessation, how they can offer counselling on risk factors and refer patients to stop smoking services. We have read much about the challenges presented to dentists' provision of preventive care by the current NHS dental contract in England, and it is imperative that the review of dental services by Professor Jimmy Steele, published today, really addresses those problems and allows dentists to engage properly in the kind of preventive care they are so well placed to provide. The report is encouraging. It said:
	"Just as health is the desired outcome of the rest of the NHS, so health should now be the desired outcome for NHS dentistry, while good oral health and the quality of the service should be the benchmarks against which success is measured".
	We, as legislators, also have a role to play. The British Dental Association, along with a whole host of other organisations in healthcare, is urging us to support the tobacco control measures in the Health Bill. Those measures are targeting the point of sale display advertising of tobacco products and cigarette vending machines that can lead to young people taking up smoking. Action is required in three key areas: raising the profile of the condition; its risk factors; and the importance of early treatment would encourage more people who suspect that they are suffering with the condition to seek help. Ensuring that patients can access dental care where sufferers are most likely to be detected would improve early detection rates, giving those who suffer with mouth cancer a better chance of survival. Finally, equipping those dental professionals with the time and tools to deliver really effective preventive care could lead to fewer people smoking and drinking excessively, and suffering with mouth cancer in the first place.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, one always approaches this subject knowing that the first thing one must do is to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, on her tenacity on the subject and the very clear way in which she puts together the case that she wishes to make. She makes it with commendable regularity, so I thank her very much for her introduction.
	The noble Baroness is right to focus our attention on what are rare cancers. Only 1.7 per cent of all cancers are mouth cancers, so it is not a condition for which there is a national screening programme. With uncommon diseases it is most cost-effective to screen people who have an increased risk of developing them. As she set out, over many years, dental professionals have become more aware and highly trained to do preventive work and to pick out those patients who might well be at risk. Is it now possible to get dental practitioners into places where they are likely to encounter those who are in the high-risk groups who are not as likely to present at the dentist. I agree entirely with what the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, said about free dental check-ups. I absolutely agree with that.
	The noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, talked about the fact that there are guidelines for GPs on when they should think about referring people on to a mouth cancer specialist. I wonder whether there is now a case for looking at that guidance for those referrals again to see whether it is specific enough, in the same way as the guidance is to dentists about proactively setting out to identify high-risk groups.
	I want to talk about pre-cancerous conditions. These are the two medical conditions that the noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, talked about which cause abnormal areas in the mouth or throat; they are harmless to begin with, but if they are left untreated, they can turn into a cancer. They are Leukoplakia and Erythroplakia.
	I know from my researches that dental practitioners are well aware of these conditions; I am not sure that the awareness has yet sufficiently translated through to the general public. I wonder whether the Government have considered engaging with the dental profession to see what can be done to improve general information to the public about pre-cancerous conditions.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, mentioned the British Dental Health Foundation calling on the Government to act on new research which reveals that oral screening can provide all-important early detection. I understand that the Department of Health has worked with Cancer Research UK on pilot projects in east London and north-east London, where health experts are alerting patients to predisposing symptoms, such as persistent mouth ulcers. Could the Minister in her reply give an update on this research and the likely changes in practice which may arise from it?
	I understand that at last year's Mouth Cancer Action Week, the WHO oral cancer expert called for dentists to be given greater powers to prescribe smoking cessation treatments. Would the noble Baroness say whether that is likely to happen as part of the Government's overall strategy to bring about a decrease in smoking?
	The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, referred to the health technology assessment and its conclusion that opportunistic screening for oral cancer is probably the most cost-effective approach. Since that technology assessment was produced, I wonder whether work has gone into enabling dental practices to improve their own clinical audit and clinical governance in respect to oral cancer. The University of Glasgow has put together a template of a clinical audit, which a practice could use, based upon social history screening—such as smoking and alcohol intake—and soft tissue screening of the mouth. This model audit then indicates how a practice might gather such data and use them to target those patients for whom the risks are greatest. Could the noble Baroness say whether the Department of Health advises PCTs on how to evaluate the effectiveness of oral cancer screening of dental practices and how to not only monitor their performance but ensure that good practice is exchanged between practices?
	My final point is that it is known that the human papilloma virus, HPV, is linked to mouth and oropharyngeal cancers. In a review of many studies, scientists found signs of HPV in just under one in four people with mouth cancer, and one in three people with of the oropharynx; HPV-16 was the most common type of HPV in these cancers. Given the welcome news last week that HPV is finally being recognised as an issue for men as well as for women—although clearly the number of women who die from cervical cancer is bigger—can the noble Baroness say whether sexual health clinics are made aware of the link between HPV and oral cancer? Furthermore, are there any protocols for ensuring that people who are diagnosed with HPV are automatically referred or advised to have a check-up with a dental practitioner?
	I have not spent as much time on this subject or studied it in anything like as much detail as the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, but I think that tonight she was right in that she invited the Minister to say how we can use the resources of dentists and other health professionals to act on what we know. We know that there are risk factors and high-risk groups, and targeting them, not just with information but also regarding prevention, has to be the way forward. It is therefore reasonable for her department to adopt a strategy for something which is, after all, a treatable condition provided that it is caught early enough.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I believe that we owe my noble friend Lady Gardner a considerable debt for alerting us to the issue that she has raised this evening—and not only this evening but on numerous occasions over the years. As a dentist, she is of course perfectly placed to tell us about the incidence of mouth cancer and the importance of early detection, and I, for one, found her warning messages on that score extremely salutary.
	Oral cancer, as has been said, is a term that embraces a number of different cancers affecting the inside of the mouth. It is not one of the commoner cancers in this country; nevertheless, it is a significant one. About 5,000 people a year are diagnosed with it, and it kills more people than cervical and testicular cancer combined. However, it is significant in another sense as well, because a great many people have never even heard of it and, of those who have, a high proportion do not know what the main risk factors for it are. That level of public ignorance is of concern because, in one sense at least, mouth cancer is like many others: the sooner it is detected in an individual, the better is the chance of long-term survival. Unfortunately and all too often, by the time it is picked up, it has developed to a point where it is too late to do anything but administer radical treatments, which at best merely delay the inevitable outcome.
	As my noble friend said, the incidence of mouth cancer is rising year on year, and, for reasons which are not understood, it is increasingly being found in younger people, especially younger women. That is quite different from the typical pattern of 50 years ago. My noble friend mentioned the main risk factors—tobacco and alcohol use—and of course we know that both smoking and drinking are causally associated with a range of cancers, not just this one. However, it is interesting to see from the figures how heavy drinking can dramatically worsen the chances of a man or a woman contracting this particular type of cancer, more so than for any other. At the same time, smoking and drinking are not the whole story. A quarter of all young people who present with mouth cancer have none of the standard risk factors. Why is that? We do not know.
	Given the incidence of this cancer, the general degree of ignorance about it and the fact that it is not being detected early enough, my noble friend is absolutely right to ask whether a screening programme should be considered. Screening has of course been considered in the past. The National Screening Committee last reviewed the issue in, I think, July 2006 and decided against it. On the face of things, that conclusion seems questionable.
	However, I think that we have to be quite clear about what should govern a decision of this kind. The National Screening Committee employs well established criteria when considering whether to screen for a disease. One of them is that for a screening programme to recommend itself, a simple, safe, precise and validated screening test has to be available. There is a type of dye called toluidine blue which can be used as a marker for malignancy. However, I understand that the tests that have been done with this dye suggest that it is neither effective nor cost-effective as a screening tool in a primary care setting. Another type of screening is routine oral examination, but in the general population routine screening is not seen as attractive because a high proportion of suspicious-looking lesions turn out to be perfectly innocuous. Taking a biopsy from every patient with a suspicious lesion would therefore lead to a high proportion of false-positive referrals, and many would regard that as an unacceptable price to pay for the benefit achieved.
	The NSC also insists that the precise manner in which a condition develops, and the speed of onset, should be adequately understood before we start screening for it, because without this knowledge you cannot set screening intervals. These are things that we still do not know about for squamous cell carcinoma, which is the most common form of oral cancer. Nor do we know enough about the warning signs. My noble friends are better qualified than I to talk about this. With mouth cancer, there are two sorts of precancerous lesions that a dentist or doctor might spot: red ones and white ones. The red ones are rarer, but are quite good predictors of cancer; while the white ones, which are more common, are not. As yet, we do not properly understand the way that mouth cancer progresses in its early stages. It requires more research. Taking things to the next stage, it is difficult to justify a screening programme unless effective treatment is available at the end of it for those in whom cancer is diagnosed.
	For cancer detected in its early stages, treatment is certainly effective, if our measure of success is the five-year survival rate. However, if the cancer is at stage three or four, which it frequently is, the five-year survival rate is the same now as it was in the 1960s—in other words, pretty poor. What is more, any therapy that is given is often disfiguring and often highly debilitating. Doctors admit that the protocols for the clinical management of oral cancers need to be a lot better than they are.
	So, for a number of powerful reasons, the idea of a general screening programme for mouth cancer is problematic. The committee has therefore recommended alternative strategies. One is to say that dentists should be involved directly in promoting smoking cessation and safe alcohol programmes to their patients. I would like to hear what the Minister says about that. We have heard this proposal also from Dr Saman Warnakulasuriya of the World Health Organisation.
	The other is to suggest that, instead of screening the general population, which has been shown not to be cost-effective, we should target those groups of people who are most at risk and screen then opportunistically. The cost-effectiveness of this sort of screening looks a lot better. This was done in the recent research study conducted in southern India that was mentioned by my noble friend, where the targeting of high-risk groups of tobacco and alcohol users led to a sizeable increase in the rate of early detection of oral cancer. The study prompted the British Dental Health Foundation to advocate doing something similar here. I understand that pilot projects are under way already in east and north-east London, under the auspices of the Department of Health in collaboration with Cancer Research UK. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister what these projects consist of, and how they are progressing. Depending on their timescale and what results are achieved, will the Government consider rolling out the initiative to other areas of the country—and what are they are doing to improve public awareness of oral cancer generally? I am not clear whether the information initiatives mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, when he answered a Question from my noble friend in 2005, are still current.
	There is an obvious point here. If there is to be any hope of implementing preventive strategies for oral cancer, GPs, and principally dentists, are in the front line. The unfortunate fact is that since the new dental contract was introduced in 2006, access to NHS dentistry has not risen, as was the intention, but fallen, as my noble friend pointed out. The contract pays dentists for performing an annual allocation of "units of dental activity", which they must meet if they are not to find some of their income being clawed back. At the same time, the system of registering with an NHS dentist has been abolished, which has seriously weakened the ability of dentists to look after the long-term oral health of their patients. Taken together, the changes have had the perverse effect of reducing the incentive for dentists to conduct routine check-ups, which are the only regular way of delivering preventive dental and oral care. Under the charging tariff, regular check-ups fall into the lowest income band. As a result, dentists find that they can afford to devote only around 15 minutes to each session, which is not enough time in which to deliver preventive care and advice to those who most need it.
	If the Government are resolutely determined to cling on to this contract, which so far they have seemed to be, something really needs to be done to address this obvious deficit in preventive oral healthcare. The Steele report may provide us with some of the necessary pointers. There has to be a way of ensuring that NHS dentistry is more available to at-risk individuals: principally, people in lower socio-economic groups and ethnic minority communities who use tobacco and alcohol. I hope that the Minister can provide us with some convincing reasons to think that we are on the right course to achieve this.

Baroness Thornton: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness on her work on these important matters and on the issues that she brings to the attention of the House.
	I will put the challenges that we face in reducing mortality from mouth cancer into the context of improvements in the treatment of cancer as a whole and the role of the National Screening Committee. I will also address the dentistry issues in the course of my remarks.
	Those who are involved in the generality of reducing mortality should be proud of the clear and impressive story of real improvement that is unfolding for cancer patients and their families. We are better at preventing, detecting and treating cancer. Among people under 75, almost 9,000 lives were saved in 2007 compared with in 1996. Unfortunately, as the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, mentioned, we have so far not had the same success in reducing the toll of mouth cancer on the nation's health.
	As noble Lords have mentioned, mouth cancer affects around 4,900 people each year, and around 1,700 people die from the disease. The incidence of the disease has increased by 34 per cent over the past 10 years, and the mortality rate has increased by 9 per cent. As noble Lords have also mentioned, the evidence shows that tobacco, combined with excessive alcohol, is associated with 75 per cent of mouth cancer cases. It is therefore a largely preventable disease. However, the noble Earl is perfectly right to point to the fact that the prognosis is good where systems are detected early. Our problem is in detection and the need for more research.
	I will first address noble Lords' points about dentists and other issues, and then come back to the pilots in east London and the north-east which the noble Earl mentioned. In fact, I think everyone who has spoken so far has mentioned access to dentists and its importance. Indeed, the Steele report is out today and is pointing us to the way forward.
	It is true that access to dentists fell when the new system was introduced, but that is being reversed and access is now up. It had grown to 27 million by September 2008 and to 27.3 million by December 2008. New services are opening, and increased investment gives us confidence that the numbers will continue to grow. However, access is still down by 0.9 million since the reforms, and we are still committed to ensuring that everyone who wants access to an NHS dentist can have it by March 2011. We absolutely accept that there is no room for complacency, and although the past two quarters show sustained growth and that new practices are opening, we know that we need to keep on the case and continue to ensure that we make progress.
	We also acknowledge that the detection of mouth cancer depends on people being able to access a dentist. Earlier today, we mentioned in statements on Professor Jimmy Steele's review of dental resources that he endorsed the measures that we are taking to improve access and made recommendations on providing information to patients on dental services that are available under the NHS. He proposes information for dentists on how to improve the quality of the care they provide, and we accept his recommendations. We are working through the financial implications of those right now.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, made a point about polyclinics. As it happens, my noble friend Lord Darzi went to the Harrow polyclinic today and saw that it is providing comprehensive dental services. We are encouraging team working in dentistry, something that the noble Baroness is very concerned about and has previously raised with me. So, for example, as dental hygienists already examine their patients' mouths when treating periodontal disease, we will consider whether their role might be extended. It might be that dental nurses could, with appropriate training, also have a role here; both hygienists and nurses could conduct examinations under the overall direction of a dentist, and that would not require new legislation. The noble Baroness has raised a very interesting and innovative point that we are going to consider.
	The challenge, of course, is getting people at risk to visit a dentist. Several noble Lords mentioned that. That is absolutely the challenge, and we know that people who are heavy smokers and heavy drinkers are members of the group who do not present themselves regularly for dental examinations. Accordingly, the department has concentrated on raising awareness of the risk factors and the predisposing symptoms mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
	In 2005, the department made a grant of £100,000 to Cancer Research UK to run the Open to Mouth Cancer Campaign. Under this pilot campaign, publicity was given to the predisposing symptoms of mouth cancers—ulcers that do not heal, white and red spots on the gums and tongue—and advised people to consult a dentist, a general practitioner or a pharmacist if they considered that they were at risk. Two sites were chosen.
	In Newcastle and Gateshead, men and women over 40 who smoked and/or drank heavily were the target audience. The aim was to encourage high-risk individuals to visit a dental practitioner for a soft-tissue mouth check, using a voucher that could be collected from the local pharmacy. Early results from phase one, which ran for four months from January to April 2007, show that pharmacists gave out 205 vouchers to members of the public. Of those distributed, 66 per cent of the vouchers went to non-dental attendees, 54 per cent to smokers, and 34 per cent to drinkers. Fifty people made appointments with a dentist for soft-tissue checks. Five were referred to secondary care, and one patient remains in continuous follow-up.
	In Tower Hamlets, the target audience for screening were Bangladeshi men and women over 40, especially tobacco and areca nut users. Oral cancer checks were delivered in community locations, using a mobile dental unit. The checks seem to have lead to an increase in oral cancer diagnoses at the Royal London Hospital. There were eight oral cancer diagnoses in 18 months from June 2006 to December 2007, a number usually seen in a five-year period.
	Evaluation of these pilots is under way, and it is intended that the National Screening Committee will be made aware of the findings of these projects. I am sure that the issues raised both by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, will be taken on board. Decisions about the follow-up action that should be taken will then be taken at that point.
	The noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, raised the problem of getting people at risk to visit a dentist, and I hope some of the remarks I have made will demonstrate that we have taken that on board. Indeed, the Steele report, which I have looked at today, very much emphasises the importance of information services and awareness.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, mentioned the HP virus and we understand that people with the virus receive a thorough review of their overall health. I shall write to the noble Baroness about the involvement of dentists in any follow up examinations and treatment.
	The UK National Screening Committee advises Ministers about all aspects of screening policy and supports implementation. As noble Lords have remarked, there is no national screening programme for any form of head and neck cancer in the UK. National population screening programmes are introduced only where there is evidence that screening would be effective in reducing the incidence of the mortality of the disease. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, eloquently described the issues surrounding that.
	The committee ran a series of expert group workshops on oral cancer which reported in March 2003. It recommended that the epidemiology of the disease could be further investigated with long-term studies; that opportunistic screening of individuals, as mentioned by the noble Earl, by health professionals should be encouraged with the intention of detecting high-risk individuals with early stages of the diseases; and that population awareness should be increased through health promotional programmes. That is what has guided the Government's actions since that time.
	In June 2006, the committee considered a report produced by the NHS R&D health technology assessment programme, which has been referred to already by the noble Earl, on the cost-effectiveness of screening for oral cancer in primary care. On the basis of that analysis, the authors of the report recommended that further study is needed on the natural history of oral cancer and its precursors, and on the effectiveness of interventions, before any further consideration is given to a national population screening programme.
	In the light of concerns about the increased incidence, the UK National Screening Committee is currently reviewing its policy position on screening for mouth cancer. The review is likely to be conducted in the autumn, when Members will be provided with information from the Cancer Research UK pilots. While I cannot pre-empt the committee's findings, it would seem that the results of the pilots and many of the points that noble Lords have made during the debate show that it will be possible to conduct a thorough review on the options for a more systematic approach to screening for mouth cancer.
	Sitting suspended.

Policing and Crime Bill

Bill Main Page
	Copy of the Bill
	Explanatory Notes
	Amendments
	10th Report from JCHR
	15th Report from JCHR
	9th Report from DPC

Committee (1st Day) (Continued)

Amendment 36
	 Moved by Viscount Bridgeman
	36: Clause 5, page 7, line 42, leave out ", or prohibit them from making,"

Viscount Bridgeman: The dinner hour came rather unexpectedly; I was caught out by not being able to thank the Minister for his full explanation of the whole of this clause. As we draw our scrutiny of the clause to a close, I am reminded by the remark of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, who is not in her place—she said, "That's not quite how it works"—of the delicate relationship between the Secretary of State, the police authority and the chief constable. I am sure that we are agreed in all parts of the Committee that our aim is to ensure that the Bill leaves here with that relationship as close and as complementary as it possibly can be.
	Amendment 36 would draw out a small part of new Section 23G. It seeks to probe the circumstances in which the Secretary of State might envisage prohibiting a collaboration agreement. Given the requirements on chief officers to seek the approval of their authorities and the requirements on both of them to assist the efficiency and effectiveness of the agreement, when would the Government consider stepping in to stop one being made? The Minister gave us a fairly comprehensive explanation of that in the previous amendment, but I beg to move.

Lord West of Spithead: As was the case with Amendment 25, proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Harris of Richmond and Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, I reassure noble Lords that the Bill's provisions are not intended as a form of micromanagement that is being imposed because the Home Office does not trust the police service to make its own judgments about collaboration. Instead, this is a power to direct that we expect to have to use rarely, if at all. It is a necessary failsafe as opposed to a proactive legislative tool for regular use.
	Our approach to promoting collaboration has been to encourage forces and authorities to take bold and, at times, innovative steps to work jointly. We continue to encourage this approach and have issued some guidance and good practice on a range of issues to ensure that we learn from those leading the way. However, as our knowledge develops further, we will become better at identifying those instances where experience tells us either that collaboration is not the right form of delivery or that a certain type of collaboration is not going to deliver the improvements needed. Rather along the lines mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, when we were discussing a previous issue, this is something to draw on.
	In those instances, which are likely to be rare, it is the Secretary of State's duty to ensure that policing more generally does not suffer from the few badly executed collaborations. This growing pool of knowledge will also begin to identify preferred models of collaboration for certain policing functions that will need to benefit from a minimum level of consistency nationally in order to be effective. Police functions such as serious organised crime and counterterrorism are already providing good examples of this. In these rare instances, it is in the public interest that the national interest is reflected through the Secretary of State's powers to intervene as a last resort.
	While we hope that we will not need to use this power, Clause 5 provides a legitimate attempt to ensure that, where a collaboration agreement goes against the interests of policing more generally, the Secretary of State is able to reflect and defend the public interest. Should this power need to be used, it will of course be for Parliament to scrutinise and judge the Secretary of State's decision to act. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister for that reply and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 36 withdrawn.
	Clause 5 agreed.
	Clauses 6 and 7 agreed
	Amendment 37
	 Moved by Lord West of Spithead
	37: After Clause 7, insert the following new Clause—
	"Authorisations of covert human intelligence sources: conditions
	(1) Section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23) (authorisation of covert human intelligence sources) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (2) for paragraph (c) substitute—
	"(c) that arrangements exist for the source's case that satisfy—
	(i) the requirements of subsection (4A), in the case of a source of a relevant collaborative unit;
	(ii) the requirements of subsection (4B), in the case of a source of a relevant Scottish collaborative unit;
	(iii) the requirements of subsection (5), in the case of any other source;
	and that satisfy such other requirements as may be imposed by order made by the Secretary of State."
	(3) After subsection (2) insert—
	"(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)—
	(a) a relevant collaborative unit is a unit consisting of two or more police forces whose chief officers of police have made an agreement under section 23(1) of the Police Act 1996 which relates to the discharge by persons holding offices, ranks or positions with any of the forces of functions in connection with the conduct or use of the source; and
	(b) a relevant Scottish collaborative unit is a unit consisting of two or more Scottish police forces whose chief constables have made an agreement under section 12(1) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 which relates to the discharge by persons holding offices, ranks or positions with any of the forces of functions in connection with the conduct or use of the source."
	(4) After subsection (4) insert—
	"(4A) For the purposes of this Part there are arrangements for the source's case that satisfy the requirements of this subsection if such arrangements are in force as are necessary for ensuring—
	(a) that there will at all times be a qualifying person who will have day-to-day responsibility for dealing with the source, and for the source's security and welfare;
	(b) that there will at all times be another qualifying person who will have general oversight of the use made of the source;
	(c) that there will at all times be a qualifying person who will have responsibility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source;
	(d) that the records relating to the source that are maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) will always contain particulars of all such matters (if any) as may be specified for the purposes of this paragraph in regulations made by the Secretary of State; and
	(e) that records maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) that disclose the identity of the source will not be available to persons except to the extent that there is a need for access to them to be made available to those persons.
	(4B) For the purposes of this Part there are arrangements for the source's case that satisfy the requirements of this subsection if such arrangements are in force as are necessary for ensuring—
	(a) that there will at all times be a Scottish qualifying person who will have day-to-day responsibility for dealing with the source, and for the source's security and welfare;
	(b) that there will at all times be another Scottish qualifying person who will have general oversight of the use made of the source;
	(c) that there will at all times be a Scottish qualifying person who will have responsibility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source;
	(d) that the records relating to the source that are maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) will always contain particulars of all such matters (if any) as may be specified for the purposes of this paragraph in regulations made by the Secretary of State; and
	(e) that records maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) that disclose the identity of the source will not be available to persons except to the extent that there is a need for access to them to be made available to those persons."
	(5) After subsection (7) insert—
	"(7A) For the purposes of subsection (4A) a person is a qualifying person if—
	(a) the person holds an office, rank or position with a police force whose chief officer of police is a party to the agreement mentioned in subsection (2A)(a); and
	(b) persons holding offices, ranks or positions with that force are permitted by the terms of the agreement to have the responsibility mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (4A) or the general oversight mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection (as the case may require).
	(7B) For the purposes of subsection (4B), a person is a Scottish qualifying person if—
	(a) the person holds an office, rank or position with a Scottish police force whose chief constable is a party to the agreement mentioned in subsection (2A)(b); and
	(b) persons holding offices, ranks or positions with that force are permitted by the terms of the agreement to have the responsibility mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (4B) or the general oversight mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection (as the case may require)."
	(6) After subsection (9) insert—
	"(10) For the purposes of this section—
	(a) references to a police force are to the following—
	(i) any police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996 (police forces in England and Wales outside London);
	(ii) the metropolitan police force; and
	(iii) the City of London police force; and
	(b) references to a Scottish police force are to a police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967.""

Lord West of Spithead: The new clause inserted by Amendment 37 is related to provisions already in the Bill in Clauses 6, 7 and 8. These clauses are intended to facilitate the work of police collaborative units. They ensure that, where two or more police forces reach collaboration agreements in respect of certain techniques regulating the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the fact that investigative teams may comprise officers from different forces will not cause any operational problems for the authorisation of these techniques.
	This new clause has a similar effect in relation to covert human intelligence sources—CHIS. It may help if I explain precisely what a CHIS is. A CHIS is an individual who establishes or maintains a relationship with someone else for the covert purpose of obtaining information. A CHIS can be a member of the public—for example, a member of a drug-trafficking gang who is recruited to provide information to the police—or a member of a public authority, such as an undercover police officer who infiltrates a drug-trafficking gang to obtain information of a similar kind. In either case, RIPA requires each CHIS to have both a controller and a handler. These play different roles in managing and supervising the CHIS. The controller is responsible for overseeing the use made of a CHIS; the handler has day-to-day responsibility for dealing with the CHIS and for his security and welfare.
	With one key exception, the controller and handler of a CHIS have to be from the same authority or, in this case, police force. The exception to which I have referred is relevant to the need for this new clause. If the activities of a CHIS take place for the benefit of more than one public authority—in this case, more than one police force—the controller and handler can be from different authorities or forces. This exception will solve the problem for many collaborative units that tackle cross-border crime. Where a number of smaller forces agree to delegate all CHIS activity to a dedicated unit, it might not apply. This is because the dedicated unit may be required to investigate purely local, as well as cross-border, crime. In such circumstances, therefore, the controller and handler would have to be from the same force. Obviously, this would limit the point of having a joint investigative unit as part of a collaboration agreement.
	A further benefit of the new clause is that it will facilitate the way in which undercover officers are used across the country. As I have mentioned, the handler of a CHIS is responsible for his or her security or welfare. Often, an undercover officer's own police force likes to keep this responsibility even if the officer is deployed in another force area or is tasked by another force. Under this new clause, such a division of labour between the home and the host force would be possible. We even anticipate that all 43 forces in England and Wales may choose to form an agreement to permit such a sharing of roles in relation to undercover officers. The eight forces in Scotland may also choose to form their own collaboration agreement to this effect.
	Unfortunately, the limited impact of the exception that I have described has come to light only recently. I apologise, therefore, for this new clause being tabled late in the passage of the Bill. It is, however, a relatively minor adjunct to the key provisions in Clauses 6, 7 and 8, which are intended to facilitate the work of police collaboration units, including, in some circumstances, the collaborative work of all 43 forces in England and Wales or the eight forces in Scotland.
	Amendments 38 to 41 are minor and technical. Where all the conduct authorised is likely to take place in Scotland, Section 46 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 prohibits Scottish police forces from authorising under RIPA unless the authorisation is granted or renewed in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Clause 8 of the Bill replicates this restriction unnecessarily. These amendments remove this replication. I hope that noble Lords will agree with the benefits that these provisions will bring. I beg to move.
	Amendment 37 agreed.
	Clause 8: Authorisations for surveillance etc
	Amendments 38 to 41
	 Moved by Lord West of Spithead
	38: Clause 8, page 12, line 21, leave out "(subject to subsection (1ZF))"
	39: Clause 8, page 12, leave out lines 23 and 24
	40: Clause 8, page 13, line 26, leave out "(subject to subsection (3ZF))"
	41: Clause 8, page 13, leave out lines 34 and 35
	Amendments 38 to 41 agreed.
	Clause 8, as amended, agreed.
	Clause 9 agreed.
	Clause 10 : Police equipment
	Amendment 42
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	42: Clause 10, page 15, line 10, at end insert—
	"( ) After subsection (1B) insert—
	"(1C) Before making any regulations under this section, the Secretary of State shall seek advice from Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary.""

Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendments 42 and 44 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Miller, although they also stand alongside related proposals on whether Clauses 11 and 12 should stand part. Both amendments are intended to modernise the operation of regulation and order-making powers under Sections 53 and 57 of the Police Act 1996, to bring them into line with more recent legislation exemplified by Section 53A of the same Police Act. These changes would require the Secretary of State to take into account the expertise of HMIC in the fields of police equipment and facilities and services before exercising powers under this section.
	I believe the Government intend that these provisions in the Bill will enable the Home Secretary to mandate the use of national IT systems. However, the provisions are not limited to this and once again contain wide-ranging order-making powers which could have a much broader application. I accept that it might not be the intention of the current Home Secretary to use the powers more widely, but that does not guarantee that they will not be misused in the future. It therefore seems sensible to include mechanisms that help to ensure that these powers are used wisely and proportionately. The reference to HMIC advice is one way of trying to ensure this. I beg to move.

Lord West of Spithead: We fully recognise that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary plays an important role in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. However, we feel that the existing consultation provisions in Sections 53 and 57 of the Police Act 1996, which relate to regulations that the Secretary of State can make regarding standards of equipment or requiring police forces to use specified facilities or services, are sufficient. Both Sections 53 and 57 already provide that the Secretary of State must consult the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers. Existing safeguards are therefore in place to ensure that the force requirements are fully understood and considered by those who have the greatest expertise in understanding the implications of making those regulations.
	Although we recognise the important role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in advising the Secretary of State, it is conceivable that the inspectorate—in certain technical cases on matters related to the regulations under Sections 53 and 57 of the 1996 Act as amended, for example relating to IT software procurement—would have neither the interest, inclination nor expertise to provide a consultative opinion to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may of course wish to consider consulting HMIC on these regulations in other circumstances, but he should not be required to do so as the amendments propose.
	In light of my response, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I thank the Minister for that response. However, I would have thought that HMIC would have the ability to seek out those with greater knowledge than he or she has on a particular piece of kit. But I hear what the Minister says, and I do not think that we will get any further on this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 42 withdrawn.
	Amendment 43
	 Moved by Baroness Hanham
	43: Clause 10, page 15, line 11, leave out subsection (4)

Baroness Hanham: Amendment 43 is a probing amendment to find out what sort of software the Secretary of State might make compulsory by regulation. I understand that powers are available to ensure the use of hardware, but that current legislation does not allow for software to be similarly prescribed. The subsection would allow the Government to insist on common programmes being used, so has the potential to make considerable savings in the realm of data sharing across different authorities. The principle appears very sensible and entirely in line with reducing unnecessary red tape. Police forces need every encouragement to use sensible computer programmes so that police officers can spend less time at their desks and more time on the beat. Similarly, ensuring that records can be easily accessed by different authorities will help to ensure that offenders are properly identified across the country. The principle we accept. Our concern therefore lies not in the power that the section gives, but in whether it actually could be used.
	I think that we all agree, perhaps even on the noble Lord's Benches, that a great many government IT procurement and implementation projects have been a costly disaster. There have now been two reviews on how to reduce the bureaucracy and data burden in policing—the question is whether the Government have the drive to ensure that their recommendations are pushed through. Is the Government's intention to set up another large database? If so, what steps have they taken to ensure that it does not go the way of the NHS database, for example, and so many others that have had great failure rates? If the Government intend to increase the sharing of data across police authorities—demanded by regulation—how will they ensure that there will not be another disastrous loss of confidential information? I beg to move.

Lord West of Spithead: I understand that this is a probing amendment. As noble Lords will know, the policing Green Paper, From the Neighbourhood to the National, identified that the full potential of information systems to support better policing would be achieved only if there were a co-ordinated strategy for those systems developed across the police service. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, points out, that is a necessary way to go and it is important that we achieve that. She is absolutely right: not just in government, but across the private sector, we have not got the most brilliant record on large IT systems, and we certainly need to be very nervous of them. Certainly the intention here is not to set up another huge database and go down that route.
	Since the publication of the Green Paper, the National Policing Board has commissioned the National Policing Improvement Agency to take forward or consolidate a strategy, known as the information systems improvement strategy. Part of the strategy's approach is to build on the excellent and innovative collaboration work already taking place between forces. The strategy will also review the procurement of IT systems so that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered for national problems. Historically, we have been very bad at this. I remember sitting between two chief constables and talking about some equipment. One said, "I'm going to buy this", and the other one said, "In that case, I'm not going to get that". We must not be in that sort of situation; it is just outrageous.
	Section 53 of the Police Act 1996 already allows the Secretary of State to set standards for "equipment", a term which covers IT hardware but not IT software. A strategy that covers hardware alone is not really feasible. It would need to be able to set standards in respect of software as well to deliver the desired benefits in terms of better procurement, more effective services to the public and greater collaboration. Setting standards in respect of IT software will allow us to maximise efficiencies, whether at local, regional or national level. IT software and its development is a very costly element of any IT project, sometimes more costly than the hardware. Major efficiency gains could be made by ensuring compatible software platforms and leveraging more out of the provider—the people whom we are buying from.
	The amendment seeks to limit the scope of the provisions to IT hardware only. While much progress can be made through voluntary collaboration, we need to be certain that, if it is clear that there are benefits to the public and the police service generally for greater IT collaboration, the Secretary of State has the power to support that collaboration through setting requirements for both IT hardware and software.
	It is not our intention to cut across the operational decision-making of chief officers. We are merely seeking to enable a more effective regime for promoting efficiency and effectiveness. The Secretary of State would make regulations that support the joint design, procurement and management of IT systems at a national or regional level only if it was necessary to do so for the purpose of promoting that efficiency.
	Legislation would require any regulations to be preceded by consultation with the APA, ACPO and other relevant bodies. The existing legislation already provides for regulations on hardware, as I said, and Clause 10 now has the modest effect of extending them to software and making it more flexible. On that basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Hanham: I thank the Minister for that explanation. As long as we do not set off on a nationwide renewal programme, which is bound to go wrong, I am happy with the response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 43 withdrawn.
	Clause 10 agreed.
	Clause 11 : Police procedures and practices
	Debate on whether Clause 11 should stand part of the Bill.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I am rising on behalf of Liberty to propose that Clause 11 and Clause 12 do not stand part of the Bill. I am happy to do so because it is important that Liberty sees its way into Hansard.
	Clauses 11 and 12 raise some serious concerns about the ability of the Secretary of State to interfere in operational policing matters with regard to specific forces. Currently, the Police Act 1996 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring all police forces to adopt particular practices and procedures. These regulations can only be made if the Chief Inspector of Constabulary states that he or she is satisfied that it is necessary to do so to ensure co-operation between police forces and also to ensure that the proper procedure is carried out and that it is in the national interest.
	The proposed new Clause 11 would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations to that effect which only apply to one or more police forces. It would also allow regulations to be made if the chief inspector thinks it necessary to do so to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of a police force, rather than just to ensure co-operation. Similarly, Clause 12 seeks to amend the current position, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring all police forces to use specified facilities and services if he or she thinks it is in the interest of efficiency or effectiveness to require just one or more specified police force to do so. Enabling the Home Secretary to direct the type of policies that apply to specific police forces to promote efficiency in that force raises the spectre of political interference in particular police forces. The current power does not allow the Secretary of State to pick and choose between police forces, and that provides some limit on the power of central government to control how a particular force operates.
	Liberty has consistently warned against political interference in policing. The police must remain able to investigate crime independently and to apply the laws made by Parliament free from political pressure. Liberty's position is that police authorities should be responsible for setting the strategic direction of the police force and should hold the chief constable of the force to account without additional interference by central government. Liberty has frequently stated that police independence and the rule of law are best served by denying the Executive excessive control of operational policing matters. It also maintains that communities are best served when the police are able to act with an appropriate degree of independence.
	We have been going over this ground all afternoon. I make no apology whatever for going over it again and I am delighted that Liberty has provided this particular opportunity.

Lord West of Spithead: Clause 11 extends the Secretary of State's power to make regulations to require police forces to adopt certain procedures and practices. At present, regulations can be made in respect of all forces only where in the opinion of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary and the Secretary of State such regulations are necessary to support joint or co-ordinated police operations and are in the national interest.
	The proposed change allows regulations to be made in respect of one or more forces. It also allows the regulations to be made where in the opinion of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary and the Secretary of State the adoption of practices or procedures will promote the efficiency and effectiveness of a police force and are in the national interest.
	This clause further strengthens the ability of the Secretary of State to provide a regulatory basis for convergence in support of the information systems strategy. It has been our experience historically that the cost of developing common IT applications in policing has increased where there has been no agreement over common business processes.
	As in the case of Clause 10, we do not expect that such regulations will be made frequently. This provision is nevertheless valuable and necessary to improve information systems in policing. It is quite focused. Regulations under Section 53A could however also be used more generally to support the recommendations in Sir Ronnie Flanagan's Review of Policing for more efficient and effective police business processes that would help to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, improve police procurement and create a national set of standardised forms.
	Clause 12 is the last of three clauses which are intended to give the Secretary of State more flexible regulation-making powers in support of a common approach to the development of information systems and services in the police service. This clause will enable the Secretary of State to make regulations in respect of the use by one or more police forces of specific services. Regulations will be made only where the Secretary of State, having consulted the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers, considers them to be in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness of the police.
	The power already exists if applied to all police forces at once. This provision allows the flexibility to make regulations that apply, for example, to one region. The circumstances in which this power might be used would be if there were benefit in a collaborating group of forces using a shared information service—for example, a common secure storage service for digital evidence. Again, we hope that agreement to do so would be done by voluntary agreement on the strength of the business case, but it is possible to envisage circumstances in which the benefit to a larger group of forces might justify an element of mandation.
	Clause 11 agreed.
	Clause 12 : Police facilities and services
	Amendment 44 not moved.
	Clause 12 agreed.
	Amendment 44A
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	44A: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
	"Police authorities: membership
	(1) Schedule 2 to the Police Act 1996 (c. 16) is amended as follows.
	(2) Paragraph 2 shall be renumbered sub-paragraph 2(1).
	(3) After sub-paragraph 2(1) insert new sub-paragraphs—
	"(2) A relevant council or joint committee shall exercise its power to appoint members of a police authority under paragraph (1)(a) and (b) so as to ensure that, so far as practicable, in the case of the members for whose appointment it is responsible, the proportion who are members of any given party—
	(a) where it is a council that is responsible for their appointment, is the same as the proportion of the members of the council who are members of that party; and
	(b) where it is a joint committee that is so responsible, is the same as the proportion of the members of the relevant councils taken as a whole who are members of that party.
	(3) A relevant council or joint committee shall exercise its power to appoint members of a police authority under sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) so as to ensure that, as far as practicable, it has regard to the relevance of the skills, knowledge and experience of the members for whose appointment it is responsible."
	(4) At the end of paragraph 3(1)(a) insert "or a committee of the authority"."

Baroness Henig: The amendment aims to do two things. First, it puts councillor nominations on a more competency-based footing. This is intended to support the Green Paper's ambitions, which I fully endorse, to strengthen police authorities. It aims to contribute to this by improving the capacity and capability of police authority members. Independent members of police authorities are already selected through a competency-based process but the amendment extends this requirement to councillor members.
	At present, the only requirement in selecting councillor members is political balance. In my view, this must remain the overarching consideration. We discussed this on earlier amendments. The ability of police authorities to reflect a balanced range of views has been fundamental to keeping them independent and largely free of party-political domination over the past 15 years.
	However, there must also be room for improvement in the quality of councillor members. As an ex-councillor and ex-police authority chair, I am well aware of the weaknesses in the present system of appointment. Many councillor members are excellent, but some are still appointed for a range of reasons through a process that lacks transparency. Police authorities in some areas still struggle to find councillor members who will turn up and make an effective contribution, and in some cases, this amounts to attending no more than quarterly meetings of the full authority. Councillor members have a vital role to play in providing a link to democratic processes and credible accountability to local communities. Poor attendance or questionable commitment, or a lack of particular capacity to do the job, which is demanding, are not acceptable if this vital link is to be maintained.
	I am not arguing that councillor members should necessarily be expected to bring the same competences to police authorities as independent members. They have a different role to play, focused on engaging with local communities, understanding their needs and better joining-up policing with local councils. But the public have a right to expect that councillors should discharge this responsibility effectively and that the enthusiasm and suitability of candidates should be considered in deciding whether to appoint a councillor to a police authority.
	Secondly, the final paragraph of this amendment corrects a possible anomaly in the current legislation about appointing independent members. A significant round of appointments to police authorities took place last year across the country, which threw up some queries about whether the final stages of the appointments process need to be conducted by the full authority, or whether it can be done by a committee of the authority. Good recruitment practice suggests that it is not particularly effective to subject a candidate to an interview panel comprising 17 or more people, which is the number of members of a full authority. However, there are some doubts about whether it is adequate under current legislation to conduct final interviews through a committee and then ask the full authority to endorse the recommendations of the committee.
	In theory, a police authority can delegate any of its functions to a committee unless the law says otherwise, but this amendment is designed to put the matter beyond doubt and make it clear that the decision on who to appoint can be delegated to a committee of the authority, if desired. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I added my name to this amendment, but the Liberal Democrats have a rather different system for the construction of police authorities. The first parts of Amendment 44A would be quite difficult to support, although I support proposed new sub-paragraph (3), which states:
	"A relevant council or joint committee shall exercise its power to appoint members of a police authority under sub-paragraph (1)(a) ... to ensure that ... it has regard to the relevance of the skills, knowledge and experience of the members for whose appointment it is responsible".
	That is a very important part of the amendment.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, said, having spent a number of years in a full police authority, lining everybody up to interview people to pick the independent members of an authority is ridiculous. Yet, that is what we had to do. I support proposed new sub-paragraph (4), which refers to "a committee of the authority", which would be a sensible way forward. We may have to bring forward at another stage proposals on the make-up of police authorities.

Baroness Hanham: We all have views on how police authorities should be and they are all different. My main concern is the practicality of what is being proposed. Local authority members are not chosen because of their expertise in any particular matter—not yet. That may come in due course, and we will be fluffing around trying to find somebody with financial experience to lead the council on finance matters. But we are not there yet. I am worried that some people who would be very good police authority members would be precluded because they do not happen to have the ability or expertise that the police authority is looking for. Such expertise may not be available on the council at all. A police authority needs people with a robust connection with their local community, who have a lot of common sense and who understand policing. That does not seem to require any expertise other than being able to live in your local community and understand it.
	Although I understand the sentiments behind the amendment, I would not want to support it, because it might put local authorities in a very awkward position. If they were trying to appoint the sort of people that a police authority said it wanted, they might preclude somebody who was very good indeed and who might have been appointed if such restrictions had not been in place.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: I am disappointed that we do not have an amendment from the Conservatives so that we could have a lively debate about their proposals for police authorities. I am sure that we can wait for another day for that.
	The difficulty that we face is that, given the state of local government elections and local government reorganisation, with yet more authorities put on hold in local government review, not only are the electorate not very interested in turning out to vote for their local authorities, but the attendance at police authority meetings, which has never been fantastic, is suffering again a fall in interest from members of the public.
	In proposing amendments to the Bill, we are between a rock and a hard place in coming up with any good suggestions in a system that is so broken and that the Government have so far failed to fix in the much wider context not just of the police authorities but of local government. The issue is very difficult and needs a lot of energy and input before we can get anywhere near solving it.

Lord West of Spithead: The noble Baronesses seek to enshrine in primary legislation the existing duty on those who appoint councillor members of police authorities to reflect the political balance of councils in that area. The Government are aware of the importance of this long-standing principle, which is why it was included in the Police Authority Regulations 2008. I am afraid that I do not see the value of moving this into primary legislation. These regulations have the full force of law and the Government have no plans to remove this principle from them. The Government are also required by statute to consult the APA whenever these regulations are amended. Therefore, if the situation should ever arise where the Government sought to amend this, the APA would be involved in that decision right from the beginning.
	This amendment also seeks to place a duty on councils and joint committees to fill skills gaps in police authorities when appointing councillor members. This duty has long been placed on independent member selection panels when they appoint independent members. Extending this duty to the appointment of councillor members merits serious consideration. Many councillors have a broad range of skills and it appears sensible, in essence, for these skills to be considered in their appointment.
	However, the wider context also needs to be taken into account. Often these decisions reflect broader concerns including political interests. I would not wish to impose restrictions on the discretion of councillors appointing their own members without first engaging with the Local Government Association and other interested stakeholders. I will ask Home Office officials to engage with the APA and the Local Government Association on this matter, with a view to the issue being considered as part of the regulatory reform of police authorities that is currently under way.
	I understand the noble Baronesses' desire explicitly to allow the delegation of appointments to a police authority committee. It is very sensible that small committees of police authorities carry out the interviewing of candidates rather than the whole authority. However, I think that this amendment needs proper deliberation before it is included in the Bill. For example, I would wish fully to understand how this proposed power would interact with local government legislation. Would it impose any limits or requirements on membership of the committee? Could non-police authority members be co-opted on to that committee?
	I hope that the noble Baronesses will agree that further thought should be given to their amendment and will agree to withdraw it on the understanding that Home Office officials include these issues in their review of police authority regulations and guidance.

Baroness Henig: I am grateful for what my noble friend has just said and for the very supportive way in which he has responded to the amendment. In the light of what he has said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 44A withdrawn.
	Amendment 44B
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	44B: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
	"Police authorities: co-operation with responsible authorities
	Any responsible authority (as defined by section 5 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37) (Authorities responsible for strategies)), other than the police authority and the chief officer of police, shall have a duty to co-operate with the police authority in relation to delivery of the Secretary of State's strategic priorities for police authorities set out in section 37A of the Police Act 1996 (c. 16)."

Baroness Henig: Moving speedily on, this amendment was drawn up with the new single confidence target for policing very much in mind. This new confidence target is the one overarching numerical target that will be set for policing in the future by the Home Secretary. It is an important measure, so we must ensure that we get the arrangements surrounding it right.
	The police do not deliver safer communities single-handedly; they have to work effectively with partners to achieve success in improving public safety and in driving down crime. The new confidence target recognises that because it is in fact a measure of public confidence in the police and local councils. Herein, of course, lies the catch. Councils are able to sign up to the same target through their local area agreements, but crucially they have an option regarding whether or not to do so. It is merely one of a range of targets that they can adopt and it is not mandatory for them. I understand that out of approximately 350 councils in the country, so far only about 50 have adopted this target. Of course, the police have little power to influence the council-half of the equation by which success will be measured in the future.
	Although the single confidence target is very laudable and the reduction in the overall number of targets placed on the police is welcome, it seems inequitable that half of what is measured relates to bodies that the police do not control. The concern must be that what gets measured gets done. Particularly in the parlous financial times that we are facing, there will be significant pressure on local authorities to focus only on targets that they have selected as priorities. Targets that are not a priority are therefore likely to be ignored and little resource or effort will be invested in helping partners to deliver targets that are different. That could clearly have a detrimental effect on policing and on force performance, not necessarily through any fault of individual forces or divisional commanders.
	My amendment would provide a solution by placing a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the police in delivering the single confidence target, which is the key strategic priority set by the Home Secretary for policing. This is similar to the duty that partner authorities to local councils, including both police authorities and police forces, are already under to help councils to deliver their local area agreement targets. This seems a proportionate and balanced reciprocal approach to the problem. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: My name is added to this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has outlined it perfectly adequately and I have nothing further to say, other than that I support it.

Lord West of Spithead: The Home Secretary's strategic policing priorities are set at a national level and are already integrated into the processes that govern local delivery. The strategic policing priorities are reflected in the Government's public service agreements, which are adopted at local level through local area agreements. They are also incorporated into the partnership plans of the responsible authorities. The extent to which, and manner in which, the Home Secretary's strategic policing priorities are adopted are determined by local circumstances. I believe that the amendment is not necessary and that it would duplicate the current integration of the strategic policing priorities within public service agreements and existing local priority-setting processes, imposing a rigid process on the current flexible framework of locally determined priorities. I therefore invite my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Henig: I thank my noble friend for that response. In view of the lateness of the hour and the fact that we are nearing the end of this evening's session, I shall not prolong the debate further and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 44B withdrawn.
	Amendment 44C
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	44C: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
	"Police authorities: nominations to crime and disorder committees
	(1) The Police and Justice Act 2006 (c. 48) is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 19 (Local authority scrutiny of crime and disorder matters), after subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) Every crime and disorder committee shall include at least one member nominated by the police authority responsible for maintaining the police force in the area of the local authority, who shall have the same entitlement to vote as any other member of that committee."
	(3) In schedule 8, paragraph 5, for "section 20(6)" substitute "sections 19(1A) and 20(6)"."

Baroness Henig: This amendment seeks to ensure that there is always a police authority representative on crime and disorder committees to square the circle regarding police accountability.
	Crime and disorder committees are effectively council overview and scrutiny committees when they sit to consider crime and disorder issues. They were created through the Police and Justice Act 2006 with the intention that they should scrutinise the work of crime and disorder reduction partnerships. That was nearly three years ago, but the regulations governing the operation of these arrangements were implemented only this year in April.
	Noble Lords with memories somewhat better than mine may recall that I spoke about these provisions when the original Police and Justice Bill was in this House. At the time I was concerned, among other things, that the committees would be used to scrutinise individual partners, and not the partnership as a whole, as intended by the then Bill. I was concerned in particular that the committees would be used in practice to try to hold to account individual police commanders—because police commanders are accountable to the chief officer, who in turn is accountable in law to the police authority. It is not for council committees to do the statutory job of other bodies.
	To guard against this possibility and square the accountability loop, I suggested that provisions should be included in the Bill, specifying that a police authority member should sit on the crime and disorder committee. At the time, my noble friend Lord Bassam resisted my call to put this in primary legislation, but agreed to ensure that it was covered in the regulations that followed. When eventually the regulations were published, in April this year, I was surprised and concerned to see that they did not specify that a police authority member should be co-opted onto these committees. The regulations did contain permissive powers enabling representatives of outside bodies to be co-opted at the discretion of the council. However, if a council chooses not to do this, significant difficulties concerning police accountability may arise.
	I appreciate that the Home Office guidance that supported these regulations made strong recommendations that police authority members should be co-opted onto committees where policing matters were being considered. However, I am also aware that several councils will not, as a matter of principle, co-opt outside individuals onto their committees unless legislation compels them to—and guidance is not legislation. So the situation remains unsatisfactory from a policing point of view, and risks creating tension between local authorities and the police, who are not legally accountable to them. This could have a detrimental effect on partnership working at a time when it is important that all parties work well together to make the best use of scarce resources. In moving the amendment, I ask my noble friend if he has any plans to revise the regulations at some point in the future, or any other plans that would allay my concerns. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: My name is attached to the amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has outlined admirably. I will say only that I support it and that I hope that the Minister will answer the questions.

Baroness Hanham: I merely observe that the proposals put forward by the noble Baroness might be very difficult to operate in London.

Lord West of Spithead: The amendment relates to the composition of crime and disorder overview and scrutiny committees, which have been established by local authorities in England since 30 April 2009 under the Police and Justice Act 2006. The suggestion is that it should be compulsory to have a member of the local police authority as a member of each of these committees. This is an interesting point. However, regulations made under the Police and Justice Act already enable the co-option of additional members—including police authority members—to crime and disorder committees. Although this is subject to local determination, supporting guidance drafted in partnership with the Association of Police Authorities encourages local authorities to presume that police authorities must play an active part in scrutiny committees, and provides clarity on particular circumstances where police authority members or officers can add value to their work.
	I am afraid that I cannot tell my noble friend Lady Henig that we plan to make any great changes. I am confident that existing arrangements will encourage local authorities to ensure that police authorities play an active part in committees when community safety matters are being discussed, and in particular when the police are to be present. The effect of the amendment would be to remove local flexibility in relation to how the local police authority is engaged, which is key to the Government's approach. Therefore I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Henig: I thank my noble friend for his response. I am sure that there are problems with the amendment, but there will be problems also if it does not happen. It is interesting that the Minister is all in favour of flexibility in some circumstances, and yet in others—and we have been arguing since 3 pm for flexibility—he is unable to provide it. In this situation, there could be problems if police authority members are not involved in these bodies, or do not know what is happening on them.
	None the less, I hear what my noble friend has said and, in view of the lateness of the hour and in the hope that regulations will continue to alleviate at least some of the difficulties, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 44C withdrawn.
	House resumed.

Lord Brett: In the light of events in another place, I move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 9.45 pm for the Royal Commission.

Speaker of the House of Commons
	 — 
	Confirmation

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I beg to acquaint the House that a Commission has been issued under the Great Seal to several Lords therein named authorising the said Lords to declare in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, Her Majesty's approbation of the choice of the Commons of Mr John Bercow to be their Speaker.
	Then, the Lords Commissioners (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Lord Strathclyde, Lord McNally, Baroness D'Souza and the Lord Chancellor) directed Black Rod to let the Commons know that they desired their immediate attendance in this House.
	When the Commons arrived, the Speaker-elect said:
	My Lords, I have to acquaint your Lordships that Her Majesty's faithful Commons, in obedience to the Royal Command, have, in the exercise of their undoubted rights and privileges, proceeded to the election of a Speaker, and that their choice has fallen on me. I therefore present myself at your Lordships' Bar and submit myself with all humility for Her Majesty's gracious Approbation.

The Lord Chancellor: My Lords and Members of the House of Commons, it not being convenient to Her Majesty to be personally present here at his time, a Commission has been issued under the Great Seal, commanding us and several other Lords therein named to notify and declare Her Majesty's Approbation of the choice of Her faithful Commons of Mr John Bercow to be their Speaker, which Commission you will now hear read.
	A Royal Commission was read.

The Lord Chancellor: Mr John Bercow, we have it in command from Her Majesty to declare Her Majesty's entire confidence in your talents, diligence and sufficiency to fulfil the important duties of the high office of Speaker of the House of Commons to which you have been chosen by that House, and in obedience to the Commission which has been read and by virtue of the authority therein contained, we do declare Her Majesty's royal allowance and confirmation of you, Sir, as Speaker of the House of Commons.
	The Speaker of the House of Commons said:
	My Lords, I submit myself with all humility and gratitude to Her Majesty's royal will and pleasure. I pray that if, in the discharge of my duties and in the maintenance of the rights and privileges of the Commons House of Parliament, I should inadvertently fall into error, it may be imputed to me alone and not to Her Majesty's faithful Commons.
	The Speaker and the Commons then returned to their Chamber.

House adjourned at 10.05 pm.